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Abstract 
 
The research focuses on the longer-term impacts of past regional 
deindustrialisation and, more specifically, the ways in which individual 
and household decisions have interacted with the local public welfare 
and cultural context to produce profound long-term community 
changes, critically affecting future generations of workers. It compares 
the reasons for, and impacts of, these adjustments in two study areas; 
the Northumberland coalfield in Northeast England, and the 
Monongahela Valley steel towns of Southwestern Pennsylvania.  
 
Very different patterns of initial responses to job losses were observed 
between the two areas. These may be characterised as a distinction 
between ‘place-based’ coping mechanisms in Northumberland, where 
workers adopted strategies which allowed them to remain in place, and 
the ‘mobility-response’ in the Mon Valley, as large numbers of industrial 
workers migrated away to seek employment elsewhere. 
 
Individual workers decisions were influenced by several factors. Most 
significant were the types of alternative work available locally, and the 
opportunities and constraints arising from different public welfare 
systems, transport infrastructures and education and training systems. 
Prevailing local cultural attitudes, norms and values, were also crucial 
in informing opinions. 
 
It is found that in the longer-term there has been no self-righting of the 
labour market. Instead, a new, more troublesome equilibrium has been 
established. In Northumberland the growth in economic inactivity has 
created areas where worklessness has become a norm among social 
networks, influencing the aspirations, motivations and expectations of 
subsequent generations. This reflects the failure of British public 
welfare policy to mitigate the place-specific impacts of industrial 
decline. In contrast, the longer-term impacts of migration from the Mon 
Valley left a collapsed housing market, creating a social-demographic   5 
shift as the former working class population was been replaced by an 
incoming population more dependent on benefits or marginal 
employment. This process reflected the broader failures of American 
social policy.  
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Chapter 1) Deindustrialisation – a study of the past? 
Introduction to the research 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
This research is concerned with the longer-term impacts of 
deindustrialisation in two areas, the Northumberland coalfield in 
Northeast England and the Monongahela Valley (Mon Valley) in 
Southwest Pennsylvania, both of which suffered the collapse of their 
dominant industry during the 1980s. The research focus is on how the 
immediate adjustments to job loss have influenced subsequent, path-
dependent, development. Labour market responses to 
deindustrialisation have been strongly influenced by public, particularly 
welfare policy, and have been heavily structured by age, gender, race 
and social capital. 20-25 years after closures some sections of the 
population have not successfully adjusted to the post-industrial 
economy. They are increasingly socially, economically and 
geographically isolated, and often this disadvantage has become inter-
generational, cumulative and structural. The task of this research is to 
examine these processes in order to better understand the longer-term 
impacts of deindustrialisation, a process which goes far beyond the 
initial short-term labour market shock. Taking a longer-term 
perspective also enables a more informed critique to be developed of 
past and subsequent policies, showing how the policy framework, which 
in both countries was inadequate in different ways, has wrought 
destructive long-term effects. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 will review the past literature relating to 
deindustrialisation, labour market, and community change. While the 
immediate consequences of job losses were extensively researched 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, as academic fashions changed 
deindustrialised communities became a neglected focus of study, even 
though for many economic conditions continued to deteriorate. Chapter   15 
4 sets out the study’s methodology, outlining how effective 
investigation of these issues can be achieved through multi-method 
research, which combines quantitative and qualitative insights. The 
empirical evidence is then presented in chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 
examines the short-term adjustments to job losses which occurred in 
the 1980s, describing the different drivers of change in the two study 
areas. Chapter 6 then explores trends through the 1990s and 
subsequently, thereby bringing us to the present deprived conditions in 
many communities. The final chapter draws out the main conclusions 
from the comparative analysis of the two study areas.  
 
1.2 Introducing the study areas 
 
The two areas represent quite extreme examples of industrial decline. 
They are not the large urban areas which have often been studied as 
examples of deindustrialisation. Instead they are small town 
communities which had historically been dominated by their local 
industries. This made them vulnerable to industrial closures in a way 
that more diversified urban labour markets were not, making their 
collapse more complete. Their peripherality also presents complex 
problems to policy-makers in replacing lost labour demand, so that 
their cases are of distinctive theoretical and practical importance. 
 
The Northumberland coalfield contained around 140,000 people in 2001 
(see Figure 1.1). Deep mining began in the late 19
th century, before 
which the area was largely agricultural. The production relationship 
with coal, which had lasted over a hundred years, was largely brought 
to an end in the 1980s, as Bates, Ashington, Lynemouth, Woodhorn and 
Shilbottle collieries closed. Ellington colliery remained open and was 
transferred into private ownership but it too closed in 2005.   16 
Figure 1.1: The Northumberland coalfield in the Northeast region 
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The Mon Valley is the watershed area around the Monongahela River 
which flows from Pittsburgh towards the state border with West Virginia 
(see Figure 1.2). Located along the banks of the river, and stretching 
around 18 miles south from Pittsburgh’s city limits, the mill towns and 
suburbs cover an area of 109 square miles (Southwestern Pennsylvania 
Commission 2005). It included a population of around 180,000 people in 
2000. During the 1980s the Valley suffered from the closure of five 
large steel mills, at Homestead (Homestead Works, 1986), Duquesne 
(Duquesne Works, 1984), McKeesport City (National Works, 1987 and 
Christy Park, 1986), and Clairton (Clairton Works, 1984). This all but 
ended the area’s relationship with the steel industry that had began 
more than a hundred years earlier, attracting tens of thousands of 
immigrant workers. 
 
Both these areas were mono-industrial; the dominant industry was the 
reason the towns existed. The 1980s therefore represented a radical 
break with their origins and recent history. Of particular interest since 
then has been the role of national systems of welfare. The US has a 
more laissez-faire model and exhibits a more advanced form of 
neoliberal governance. The UK retains a greater commitment to public 
welfare, though recent and ongoing reforms question how long this will 
remain the case.  
 
Figure 1.2: State map of Pennsylvania with the Mon Valley 
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Figure 1.3: Pittsburgh and the Mon Valley 
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1.3   Why is this research important? 
 
The disciplinary space for revisiting deindustrialisation remains largely 
unexplored as many geographers have rushed to embrace studies of 
embeddedness, governance, network approaches and high-tech growth, 
working primarily in successful regions (Barnes et al, 2007). These 
recent disciplinary turns, described by Martin and Sunley (2001; 155) as 
the ‘retreat from political economy’, mean that much of the debate 
about deindustrialisation is now more than 20 years old.  
 
Examples of the types of research presented here, which employ case 
study methodologies extended across both time and space, are rare in 
geography (Barnes et al, 2007; 32). In the 1980s geographers described 
the community impacts of deindustrialisation, with a focus largely on 
the areas in which we now map poverty and deprivation. Such a snap-
shot approach misses a full analysis of the processes and events which 
occurred during the extended period after industrial closures. Only 
through such analysis can we really understand the full impacts of 
deindustrialisation. It is crucially important to understand the local 
specificity of the development trajectory; for example, the process 
whereby a life on benefits becomes normalised, or the fundamental 
fractures which have developed in some local communities. The 
contribution of this research is to investigate such longer-term 
development trajectories, following processes of progress and decline 
after the dust had settled on closures. 
 
With this focus on exploring the path-dependent influences of short-
term adjustment on longer-term development trajectories, the key 
questions to be addressed are:  
 
1) To what extent have deindustrialised local labour markets recovered 
in the period since closures? 
   20 
2) Since the major heavy industrial closures, what factors have 
influenced people’s decisions about taking employment or remaining 
unemployed, migrating or out-commuting? How are the labour market 
decisions of later generations of workers different from those directly 
affected by the original closures?  
 
3) How have different segments of the labour market (e.g. by gender, 
age, and ethnicity) experienced deindustrialisation and post-
deindustrialisation?  
 
4) How does the labour market restructuring process differ between the 
UK and the US? Particularly important may be the roles of welfare and 
employment policies and their changes over the twenty-five year 
period; the effectiveness of local public and private capital 
investment programmes; and the availability and quality of 
alternative employment, locally or within commuting distance.  
 
5) What have been the longer-term outcomes of the most significant 
short-term labour market adjustments?  
 
1.4   The benefits of this research 
 
It is hoped that this research will add to our understanding of the long-
term implications of deindustrialisation as an ongoing process, still 
affecting many of the communities that lost industrial jobs in the 1980s. 
It is only by understanding the continuing impact of deindustrialisation 
that we can really appreciate the scale of the problems still faced in 
these communities. The conclusions may also be relevant to 
communities in other parts of the world, where the policy response will 
be equally important in determining outcomes as the global divisions of 
labour continue to shift.  
   21 
At a practical level the research may also be relevant to wider policy 
debates on welfare and employment policy reform, as well as to local 
government economic development agencies, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and grass-roots actors within the case study areas. 
These include, for example, Alliance (formerly the Coalfields 
Communities Campaign) in the UK, and the Steel Valley Authority (SVA) 
and the Mon-Valley Initiative (MVI) in the US. 
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Chapter 2) Theoretical perspectives  
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the key theoretical accounts of local economic 
and labour market change which frame this research. Working within a 
political-economy tradition I draw upon various heterodox positions, 
particularly institutional and evolutionary approaches to understanding 
the causes and impacts of industrial change. Such a multi-strand 
approach is required to grasp the complexity of economic processes and 
the important role of local specificity (Hudson, 2004; 459: Storper, 
1997; 279: also Hudson 2001).  
 
There are three important ways in which this research builds on the 
established theoretical insights detailed here. These are the 
comparative nature of enquiry; the longer-term perspective which 
provides a more structural reading of contemporary problems; and the 
scale of analysis, studying the more neglected small towns of industrial 
production.  
 
•  To make sense of developments in one country there must be a 
comparative standard by which to judge them. The comparative 
element of this research is also important, however, in the 
context of the Americanisation of British and European social 
policy. As welfare state and economic development policies are 
reoriented towards an increasingly hegemonic US model, it seems 
particularly appropriate to evaluate what this model has meant 
for those communities so badly affected by employment loss in 
the 1980s, and what it might mean for them in the future. This 
can be compared and contrasted with the UK experience of 
public welfare under comparable industrial decline. 
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•  As the effects of deindustrialisation created structural decline in 
many localities, a more nuanced account of what happened next 
is clearly required to understand the monumental changes which 
affected not only those who lost industrial jobs, but also 
subsequent generations of workers faced with radically different 
opportunity structures. Issues of inter-generational and area 
effects, and their implication for economic futures, need much 
greater consideration.   
 
•  Much of the literature on male economic restructuring focuses on 
large urban areas; the city, or more recently the city-region. This 
largely overlooks the small (company) towns in which much 
industrial production took place, towns which were vulnerable to 
deindustrialisation in ways in which the cities, with their more 
diverse labour markets, were not (Laxton and Sissons, 2006). 
These places remain largely understudied. 
 
Structure 
 
We begin by examining the most influential theorisations of 
deindustrialisation accounting for the major trends of economic 
development in nations, regions and communities in advanced 
economies. These focus on the immense changes in the global 
geography of production which occurred in the 1970s and 1980s as a 
response to the crisis of Fordism.  
 
Attention is then turned to the role of the state in the aftermath of 
deindustrialisation. It is argued that the triumph of neoliberal supply-
side thinking in labour market policy, and discourses related to local 
competitiveness, fail to take into account the distinct geography of 
uneven development. They represent an extremely poor substitute for 
state planning aimed at reducing the scale of the inequity. We shall 
examine the contribution that comparative research can make to  
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debates about the role of governments in social welfare. There is a 
need to understand inadequacies in the planning systems of both 
countries if the ongoing structural changes associated with 
deindustrialisation are to be addressed.  
 
The implications of geographical development ‘in place’ are then 
examined. First, local labour markets are defined as the places within 
which identities are formed. However, geographically uneven 
development cannot be understood solely through a focus on what 
happens within place. The study areas are also sites of interactions with 
broader regional, national and international scales, which play a key 
role in creating economic growth or decline. This analysis draws on 
institutional approaches to explain how such interactions are mediated 
and influenced at the local level by the institutional environment and 
changes in institutional arrangements. Evolutionary approaches also 
highlight the importance of local specificity, local economic histories, 
and the path-dependent nature of economic development.  
 
Finally, we consider how best to treat structure and agency, arguing 
that ‘bounded indeterminacy’ best conceptualises an individual's 
decision-making process, whereby individual agency works within broad 
social structures (Massey, 1995; 316). 
 
2.2   The causes and impacts of deindustrialisation 
 
Changes in technology and international competition during the 1970s 
and 1980s resulted in large losses of mining and heavy manufacturing 
employment from some regions of advanced industrial economies. 
During this period, wages began to be seen as a drag on 
competitiveness, rather than a facilitator of consumption, bringing an 
end to the cycle of Fordism which had supported economic growth 
through the post-war period (Peck and Tickell, 1994). In the search for 
a more profitable spatial fix arising from cheaper labour costs,  
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production in many basic industries shifted from more to less developed 
countries. It is this restructuring of the capital circulation process by 
technology and relocation, which creates and sustains spatially uneven 
development, as places ‘rise and fall’ (Swyngedouw 2000; 49; Castree 
et al, 2004; 69; Hudson, 2001; 261).
1 
 
Industrial change served to radically alter the ways in which affected 
localities were connected within the ‘spatial division of labour’.
2 In the 
US this change was most often described as the shift of manufacturing 
industry from the ‘rustbelt’ to the ‘sunbelt’ (Pike et al, 2006; 84; 
Essletzbichler, 2004; 603). It is this ‘shift’ of locality which forms the 
cornerstone of deindustrialisation theory, as Bluestone (1984; 43) 
outlined when replying to critics who questioned the validity of the 
concept: 
 
‘the aggregate trend in employment is 
inadequate to prove or disprove 
deindustrialization if inter-industry and 
interregional worker mobility is insufficient to 
clear labour markets. What counts in an 
economy where mobility is imperfect are the 
trends in specific industries and regions. There 
is, for example, no disputing the fact that 
worldwide employment is expanding rapidly, but 
if it is declining sharply in the United Kingdom, 
the growth in other countries would not in any 
serious way offset the costs imposed on Britain. 
  Likewise private and social costs are imposed 
on workers and communities within the United 
States to the extent that those dislocated from 
declining industries in particular regions cannot 
find employment in equally productive jobs in 
other sectors. The level of imposed costs is a 
positive function of the rate at which 
employment is declining in particular sectors 
and regions and a negative function of the 
economic system’s capacity to absorb dislocated 
                                                 
1 The devalorisation of capital is necessarily ‘time and place specific, as production 
has to occur in place’ (Hudson, 2001; 261). 
2 A ‘spatial divisions of labour’ approach refers to a region’s industrial functional 
specialisation, the geographical concentration of particular production tasks or 
industrial sectors which can help explain regional development trajectories (Massey, 
1995; Pike et al, 2006; 84; Castree et al, 2004; 91).  
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workers into other areas of the economy. For 
this reason the velocity of sectoral and regional 
specific deindustrialization and the overall 
absorptive capacity of the economy are the 
proper phenomena to study. It is in this regard 
that deindustrialization is no myth.’ (Bluestone: 
1984; 43) 
 
Past economic shifts still leave an indelible mark on today’s landscapes 
of labour and locality. Processes of deindustrialisation, whilst driven by 
global economic imperatives, impacted manifestly at the local level, 
emphasising the tensions between labour and capital which are 
produced by their relative (im)mobility (Beck, 2000; 47).  
 
Processes of deindustrialisation have produced localities, and even 
entire regions, which are now on the periphery of the global economy 
and ‘largely disconnected from the decisive circuits of capital and 
major growth mechanisms’ (Hudson, 2005; 581-582).
3 They are typified 
by their weak, or non-preferential, spatial relationships (Massey, 1995; 
355; Allen et al, 1998; 56; Hudson, 2001; 257- 258). Their local 
economies tend to be dominated by low-skilled manual production 
sectors with an absence of higher-skilled, managerial and Research and 
Development (R and D) employment, which tends to be located in core 
urban areas (Massey, 1995, 335; Peck, 1996; 156). For such areas, the 
key question becomes how to reintegrate themselves most effectively 
into new circuits of growth. Some suggest that to develop a region 
there must be an upgrade of its functional specialisation into higher 
level activities, for example R and D or head offices, which provide 
more highly skilled and better paid jobs. In practice, this is not easily 
achieved.  
 
Among areas which underwent the structural shifts associated with 
deindustrialisation, those previously dominated by a single sector were 
most severely affected, as loss of industry created profound local 
                                                 
3 For example see Pike et al’s (2006; 205) grim assessment of the prospects for 
regional development in the Northeast.  
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economic and social disruption (Sadler, 1992). Disinvestment decisions 
cost large numbers of well-paid blue-collar jobs, and even in cases 
where they may have been replaced numerically (and this is by no 
means assured), the new jobs created have often tended to be 
qualitatively different. The net result for many localities has been less 
secure jobs and lower wages, as the growth of poorly paid entry-level 
jobs, particularly in the service sectors
4, has offered little chance of 
career progression for less educated workers, especially men 
(McDowell, 2003; Weis 1990; 6).  
 
The impacts of deindustrialisation have therefore gone beyond those 
directly affected by the original closures. In the aftermath, changes in 
the gender division of labour meant increasing dependence on female 
employment (Hudson et al, 1992; 51) but, crucially, employment 
opportunities for new generations of workers were also affected (Beatty 
et al, 2005; 7). As Danson (2005; 292, summarising from Beatty et al, 
2002; Anyadike-Danes et al, 2001; and Martin and Tyler, 2004) 
describes: 
 
‘Low employment is not just a problem for 
generations who suffered job losses during the 
rundown of the mines, steelworks and shipyards; 
uneven development and chance in a capitalist 
economy ensure that such patterns become 
difficult to shift when national undifferentiated 
policies are applied and dominate the policy 
response’ 
 
Young working class people cannot expect to fill positions similar to 
those of their parents, while any hope of alleviating employment 
disadvantage in declining areas must now be ‘premised on services’ 
(Weis, 1990; 3; Esping-Anderson and Regini, 2002; 4). Such a change 
entails not just an economic shift, but critically a social and cultural 
adjustment, as the attributes of masculinity which were valued within 
                                                 
4 Of course the service sector incorporates a vast range of diverse subcategories (see 
Thurrow, 1989; 180-181; Sayer and Walker, 1992).   
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basic industrial production are generally not those sought by service 
sector employers (McDowell, 2000; 395-396).  
 
Deindustrialisation in the UK  
 
Large numbers of jobs were lost in mining and manufacturing industries 
in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s. Production in basic sectors shifted to 
less-developed countries which offered cheaper factor inputs, but more 
advanced sectors also moved to more technologically competitive 
countries, for example Germany and Japan. One result was the growth 
in both the ‘extent and intensity of non-employment’, leading to 
concern that the ‘losers’ from processes of economic change would 
become increasingly ‘"isolated"- in socio-economic and spatial terms’ 
(Green, 1995; 373). The net result of these structural changes therefore 
was the start of a significant deepening of geographical and social 
inequality.  
 
Two important labour market trends developed from this loss of 
industrial jobs. First, there was a growth of more flexible employment 
relationships, with increasing numbers of people involved in less secure, 
contingent, and often part-time work (Green, 1995; 374).
5 Such 
employment has often been most apparent in the types of jobs 
attracted to former industrial areas. Secondly, since the mid 1980s 
rates of economic activity between the sexes have converged; male 
participation declined, while female participation increased (Bryson and 
McKay, 1994; 5). In deindustrialised areas the growth of female 
employment was partly the result of household coping strategies for 
mitigating male job loss.
6 In some cases this involved the replacement 
                                                 
5 See Doogan (2001; 439) and Taylor (2003a) for a discussion of the extent of this 
insecurity.   
6 In addition some of the observed increase in female participation in areas of decline 
is linked to increased family breakdown which has been strongly correlated to (male) 
job loss. It has been estimated that of the 1,161,000 increase in lone parents between 
1971 and 2001 some 38-59% is attributable to the decline in male employment 
(Rowthorn and Webster 2007; 25). Under these circumstances in some cases women  
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of male with female incomes, as women became the household 
breadwinner. However more often it would involve both male and 
female household members working to compensate for lost wages, since 
many of the jobs created did not pay sufficiently for a single income to 
maintain a family
 (for example see Hudson et al’s, 1992 study of the 
Derwentside District).  
 
The impacts of disinvestments in basic industries, however, went far 
beyond their implications for the local employment market. They had 
wide ranging economic, social and cultural effects on communities 
which had been built around their production relationships. The all-
encompassing nature of these relationships in mono-industrial 
communities meant that many features of what can be termed civic 
engagement were closely related to employment, from local politics to 
support for sports teams and bands. Not only were local economies 
destroyed by the collapse of industry, but their basis for social 
organisation was undermined, as occupation ceased to be the prime 
basis of cohesion (Parry, 2003; 227).  
 
Younger generations of workers therefore now encountered a 
fundamentally different opportunities base. The ‘natural progression’ of 
young men from school into the workplace, which offered an 
opportunity for stable and well-paid employment ‘[i]rrespective of 
educational attainment’ as long as they generally behaved within ‘an 
acceptable framework’, had disappeared (Lloyd, 1999: 1). This took 
away the traditional rites of passage and breadwinner roles that had 
sustained past generations of young men, as subsequent generations 
grew up ‘fearing there will be no jobs for them’ (Coote 1994; 2).
 7 Many 
in deprived communities have struggled to adapt to these new realities, 
as evidenced by the poor educational performance of boys, and rising 
                                                                                                                                  
have become the household’s sole breadwinner; though in other cases they will be 
reliant on the benefits system. 
7 While women have added waged-worker to their domestic roles  
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crime and violence, now key areas of policy concern (Hearn, 1998; 41-
44).  
 
The decline of coal 
 
The conditions which devastated deep mining in the UK were created by 
changes in the international division of labour, as new centres for 
extraction were established in other parts of the world, and by 
technological developments in alternative energy sources (Hudson 2005; 
585). Also of importance was the selling off of other nationalised 
industries, as formerly politically mediated supply ties for coal to 
electricity and steel production were broken, making collieries more 
vulnerable to international competition (Hudson, 2005; 585; Beynon et 
al, 2006a; 2).  
 
This collapse saw in excess of 250,000 jobs lost from the coal industry 
from the beginning of the 1980s (Fothergill, 2001; 241-242). The speed 
and scale of this decline made it Western Europe’s ‘definitive example’ 
of deindustrialisation (Beatty et al, 2005; 4-5). It was not solely the 
direct job losses either: for each colliery which closed, negative 
multiplier effects and the loss of purchasing power meant further losses 
of employment in the locality (Fothergill and Witt, 1990; 11 cited in 
Waddington et al, 2001; 80).  
 
To compound the difficulties in these areas, alternative opportunities 
tended to be particularly scarce in the coalfields as a result of earlier 
National Coal Board (NCB) policies, supported by successive 
governments, which had discouraged other investments so that they 
could dominate local labour markets (Critcher et al, 1995; 70). This had 
intensified labour’s dependence on coal production. 
 
For redundant miners the consequences frequently included long-term 
unemployment and inactivity, damaging health impacts and, in some  
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cases, increasing problems of substance misuse (Waddington, 2001; 31-
55). The mental stresses of job loss were compounded by the 
‘breadwinner ethic’ in ex-mining areas (Dicks et al, 1998; 306; 
Wheelock 1994 cited in Nayak, 2003; 9). Throughout their histories 
coalfield communities had been organised around a gender division of 
labour based on the male breadwinner, giving priority to paid male 
employment assisted by women’s domestic labour (Parry, 2003; 230). 
When this was no longer the case, men often felt ‘doubly redundant’; 
not only unable to provide materially for their family, but also 
‘culturally excluded’ (Dicks et al, 1998; 306).   
 
For the broader coalfield communities, the job losses and multiplier 
effects, created a radically changed opportunities base affecting 
subsequent generations, resulting in an increasing incidence of poverty, 
high levels of economic inactivity, poor educational attainment, rising 
incidences of crime, social disorder and substance abuse (Beatty and 
Fothergill, 1996; Beatty et al, 1997; Fieldhouse and Hollywood, 1999; 
Hollywood, 2002; Waddington et al, 2001; Gore and Smith, 2001).  
 
Deindustrialisation in the US 
 
The drivers of deindustrialisation in the US in the 1980s included a 
‘corporate profit squeeze’, the overseas outsourcing of some production 
by American multinationals, and increased international competition in 
mining, metals and labour intensive consumer goods (Markusen and 
Carlson, 1989; 35-49). There was also the transfer of capital from 
northern to southern states as wage differentials provided the rationale 
for plant relocation to the south (Rodwin, 1989; 6).
8 In addition, many 
productive firms underwent a diversification of their core businesses in 
the 1970s and 1980s, diverting capital from productive investment in 
slow and mature sectors into ‘stock market speculation, the purchase of 
                                                 
8 For an empirical example of this migration of capital using RCA see Cowie (1999)  
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exotic financial products, and mergers and acquisitions’ (Peck, 2002; 
188-189; Clark, 1989; 207-208).  
 
The brunt of these corporate strategies, resulting in large-scale 
disinvestment in industries such as automobiles, textiles and steel, was 
borne by America’s industrial workforce who lost the well-paid and 
secure employment that had characterised post-war economic growth 
(Peck, 2002; 188-189). In its place came the expansion of various forms 
of ‘contingent’ low wage jobs: part-time, temporary and casual work, 
which employed as many as one quarter of the US workforce by the mid 
1980s, as the employment structure became increasingly polarised 
(Bluestone and Harrison 1988; 124; Peck, 2002; 208). This growth in 
low-wage employment significantly increased the number of working 
Americans not earning enough to lift them out of poverty. Being 
employed no longer guarantees a liveable income (Cormier and Craypo, 
2000; 691 & 697 also Krugman, 1994; 23-24).
9 This trend was especially 
apparent in the Pittsburgh area when recovery in the late 1980s saw a 
growing number of workers in poorly paid, part-time trade and service 
employment (Beeson and Tannery, 2004; 21).  
 
Again, the impacts of this economic decline went beyond individual job 
losses, to include wider multiplier effects, ‘social trauma’ and the 
erosion of community bonds (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; 65-66). In 
addition, the loss of social organisation which followed made 
deindustrialised areas more run-down and dangerous (Wilson, 1997; 
20).
10 
                                                 
9 Working poor households are those in which one or more members are working but in 
which the household income is below the government defined poverty level for a 
household of that size. It has been argued that figures of working poor in the US are 
underestimated because the official poverty line is based on an outdated cost-of-living 
formula that under-estimates the amount of money needed for self-sufficiency ‘at a 
customary standard of living’ by between a half and two-thirds (Cormier and Craypo, 
2000; 697).  
10 Wilson (1997; 20) defines social organisation as encompassing the prevalence and 
strength of social networks, the extent of collective supervision of, and individual 
responsibility to address neighbourhood problems, and finally the extent of 
participation in formal and informal organisations (for example, church groups, 
residents groups and localised networks of friends).  
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Steel decline  
 
Steel production in the US went into rapid decline in the early 1980s, 
resulting in heavy and geographically concentrated job losses. Between 
1974 and 1989 national employment in the integrated steel industry fell 
from 512,000 to 168,000 (Hall, 1997; 73). The decline stemmed from 
rising labour costs, outdated machinery, increased environmental 
regulation and foreign competition (Benhart and Dunlop, 1989; 179 
cited in Angstadt and Benhart, 2000; 166).  
 
Like other US corporations US Steel, the Pittsburgh area’s major 
industrial employer, took steps to protect its bottom-line from 
increased foreign competition by diversifying. In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s the company developed interests in real estate, hotel 
ownership, chemicals, and other manufacturing areas (Warren, 2001; 
311-313). In 1982 it purchased Marathon Oil, an immediate effect of 
which was the need to cut costs in the steel division. Many local 
stakeholders, particularly the unions, posed the question whether the 
money spent on these acquisitions might have been better spent 
upgrading the uncompetitive steel plants which would close shortly 
after (ibid; 311-313).   
 
In affected communities, mill closures left a legacy of ‘lost jobs, 
mortgage foreclosures, suicides, broken marriages and alcoholism’ 
(Hoerr, 1988; 11). The towns faced a downward spiral, as their tax 
revenues, which were heavily dependent on the industry, declined to 
such an extent that infrastructure could no longer be maintained. Many 
also experienced significant population loss (Yamatani, et al; 1989; 179; 
Singh and Bangs, 1988; 1; Wilson, 1997; 44; Gillette, 2003). A lack of 
reinvestment, and the boarded-up shops which now constitute main 
streets, are further legacies of this industrial change (Benhart and 
Benhart, 2000).   
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The five county region surrounding Pittsburgh
11 lost some 34,813 jobs in 
steel operations between 1974 and 1996, with employment falling 
precipitously from 40,373 to 5,560 (New Steel, 1996; 37 cited in 
Warren, 2001; 346). These losses were concentrated in the Mon Valley 
where plants closed at Homestead, Duquesne, Clairton and at Christy 
Park and National Works in McKeesport. This left the mill towns as 
‘depressing vistas of decay’, transformed from important centres of 
production into communities largely reliant on pension cheques and 
social security transfers (Cunningham and Martz, 1986; Warren, 2001; 
336).  
 
2.3 The role of the state in mitigating deindustrialisation 
 
Generally, in capitalist economies state activity is concerned with 
regulating conditions to allow markets to operate efficiently. The state 
is also one of the institutions through which social risk is managed, 
however, the others being the market and the family (Esping-Anderson, 
1999).
12 Traditionally, cases of local economic collapse have mandated 
increased government intervention in ‘supplementing or replacing 
market mechanisms’, for example through the provision of welfare 
services, creating conditions to attract private sector investment, 
public investment in services, and in some cases creating public sector 
jobs (Hudson, 2004; 453; 2001; 271). Within liberal welfare regimes like 
that of the US, and increasingly including the UK, however, there has 
been an ongoing ideological project aimed at minimising the state’s role 
in economic management, to ‘individualize risks, and promote market 
solutions’ (Esping-Anderson, 1999). The perceived dominance of 
hypermobile capital and the need to project an ‘entrepreneurial 
culture’ has provided the rationale for governments to reduce spending 
                                                 
11 The Pittsburgh Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) 
12 Of course in reality the impacts of government action go far beyond this and state 
influence permeates virtually all aspects of social and economic life (Painter, 2000; 
362; Hudson, 2001; 48-49).  
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on social programmes and to make labour markets more flexible 
(Swyngedouw, 2000b; 66). Attention is now turned to the constituent 
parts of this project, looking firstly at the now dominant supply-side 
orthodoxy in labour market policy before discussing the important, and 
in many ways regressive, changes in the conception of local government 
and governance. Finally, comparative differences will then be set out in 
the roles of public welfare in the two countries.  
 
Supply and demand-side policies 
 
The appropriate balance between supply and demand based policies in 
areas of high non-employment has been the focus of much debate in 
recent years (examples include Campbell, 2000; Webster, 2000, 2006; 
Gordon, 2003; Green and Owen, 1998; Peck and Theodore, 2000; 
Wilson, 2003). In both the US and the UK, however, government-led 
employment expansion has slipped almost entirely from the policy 
agenda with thinking now firmly rooted in supply-side responses to 
enhance ‘employability’ through ‘flexibility’. Policy makers have 
decided ‘either that they cannot influence where jobs get created or 
that uneven development for labour does not really matter because 
people will respond through outward migration, wage moderation or 
retraining’ (Turok and Edge, 1999; viii).  Policy debate therefore 
focuses on barriers to employment rather than on lack of jobs. Some 
such barriers are presented as ‘structural difficulties’ in matching 
jobseekers to vacancies. These can include poor transport links, the 
housing market and the fixed costs of taking up employment (Bryson 
and McKay, 1994; 8). Others emphasise the importance of ‘attitudinal 
barriers’, suggesting the greatest obstacles that the unemployed face 
are their own attitudes towards work (ibid; 8). In such an explanation 
the failure is not that of the market, but of local people to adjust 
sufficiently (Hudson, 2005; 589). This emphasis on attitudinal barriers 
informs US, and increasingly UK, ‘Workfarist’ policies, rooted in the 
belief that problems of labour market disadvantage lie in the  
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‘“preparedness” of those out of work to accept “flexible jobs” ’
 (Peck 
and Theodore, 2000; 455-456; Peck, 2001; 6).
13  
 
Such a supply-side focus neglects the widely varied geography of labour 
demand which, in the absence of a hypermobile workforce, is crucial in 
determining the success of any intervention. Supply-side measures are 
often most relevant, and stand the greatest chance of success, in areas 
where there is strong demand for labour, but have been found to be 
much less effective where more limited opportunities exist to turn an 
individual’s enhanced employability into employment (Martin, 2000a; 
469; Beatty and Fothergill, 2001; 21).
14 This paradox is illustrated by 
recent research in the UK on the success of the New Labour 
government’s flagship New Deal programmes. New Deal’s success has 
varied widely between tight and slack labour markets. The former offer 
plenty of private-sector employment options while the latter depend 
heavily on ‘residual’ options, raising employability but not employment 
(Peck and Theodore, 2000; 739: Sunley et al, 2006). This casts 
considerable doubt on the validity of the entire concept of individual 
employability outside the context of the level of local demand (McQuaid 
et al, 2005; 194).  
 
It is apparent that to tackle labour market disadvantage in many former 
industrial areas, a suitable mix of supply and demand-side interventions 
is required (Beatty et al, 2005; 32). Supply-side policies are necessary, 
but not sufficient, tools for tackling unemployment and social 
exclusion. The slow rate at which deindustrialised areas have adjusted 
to job losses presents a strong case for demand-side action. The context 
of vastly differing geographies of demand leads Webster (2006; 115) to 
conclude that nothing short of a ‘specific recovery plan for each area’ is 
required. As the current reliance on macro-economic growth, trickle-
down and ‘consumption led expenditures’ has largely failed to provide 
                                                 
13 For a full treatment of workfare see Peck (2001) 
14 Similarly Peck and Theodore’s (2001, 434) review of US workfare experiments found 
‘precious few conspicuously successful programmes’   
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depressed communities with the investment in the employment 
infrastructure which would enable them to recover (Brooks, 1995; 108; 
Babcock, 1997; 258-259). 
 
In reality the policy focus on supply-side responses shows few signs of 
abating, and has recently been supported by Florida’s (2002) ‘Creative 
Class’ thesis, enthusiastically seized upon by policy-makers in the US, 
and increasingly the UK (see Peck, 2005).
15 For Florida, instead of 
attracting jobs, successful city economies need to create the ‘right 
people climate’ which will enable them to attract members of the 
‘creative class’ (2002; 13).
16 A ‘class’ which is defined by its ability to 
‘add economic value through their creativity’ (ibid; 68-69), thus driving 
economic development.  
 
Such scenarios offer little comfort to deindustrialised localities. They 
work firmly ‘within the grain’ of neoliberal strategies, emphasising inter-
place competition, place marketing and ‘middle-class consumption’ 
(Peck, 2005; 740-741). In this sense it is an extension of the 
‘entrepreneurial’ urban strategies described by Harvey, a zero-sum 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ competition for mobile public and private 
investments’ with instead the emphasis on mobile people (1989, cited in 
Peck, 2005; 761).  
 
Such an approach fails to acknowledge that, while competition between 
places may create winners, there are also serial losers; places with the 
least capacity to compete. These have suffered social and physical 
decline and are largely the types of places that better-off white-collar 
(or for Florida, no collar) workers tend to avoid (Massey, 1995; 328). For 
                                                 
15 Florida’s assumptions (and methods) have become the subject of considerable 
controversy (see Peck 2005). 
16 Florida’s ‘creative core’ and ‘creative professionals’ include: 
Creative Core: scientists and engineers, university professors, poets and novelists, 
artists, entertainers, actors, designers and architects, non-fiction writers, editors, 
cultural figures, think-tank researchers, analysts and other opinion-makers. 
Creative Professionals: those ‘who work in a wide range of knowledge-intensive 
industries such as high-tech sectors, financial services, the legal and healthcare 
professions, and business management.  
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America’s deindustrialised small towns the portents of such an approach 
are not good. In the new competitive supply-side ethos they are 
considered to be among the ranks of ‘hopeless places’ (or the ‘wrong 
kinds of place’), ‘small places with huge working-class backgrounds’ 
which, in Dreher’s words, are ‘not even worth the effort trying to turn 
them around’ (2002; 4).  
 
Governance and state restructuring 
 
The role of government remains important in shaping development in 
localities, particularly in decisions on taxing, spending and 
redistribution. In recent years, however, attention has shifted towards 
ideas of ‘regional competitiveness’ and local governance, re-defining 
the role of the state in managing economic decline (Pike et al, 2006; 
134 & 150). Local governments in Western Europe have increasingly 
been adopting the tendencies of economic boosterism which have for so 
long been prevalent in the US (Caroline and Goldsmith, 1998; 103).  
 
This shift in local governance is characterised by the greater role 
afforded to the private sector in economic development, as well as by a 
much greater emphasis on the local as the terrain of response. As the 
local is perceived to be the most suitable site for an ‘adaptation to the 
requirements of global capital’ to be staged (Swyngedouw, 2000b; 68). 
Such a shift is nevertheless extremely problematic. Is the local scale 
actually a site of empowerment, or does such localism simply breed 
ever more destructive interspatial competition (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002; vi)? Changing scales of governance also alter the geometry of 
power within which each locality sits, simultaneously empowering some 
while disempowering others (Swyngedouw, 2000b; 70-71). For 
deindustrialised localities this has happened at a time when the 
structures which had previously represented them, particularly the 
unions, were also disempowered. For those who find themselves at a 
disadvantage in this competitive process, the localisation of governance  
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renders them even more impotent as the power of the local is 
eviscerated within a ‘globalised world political economy’ (Herod and 
Wright, 2002; 9).  
 
Within this changing framework of governance, increasing importance is 
also being placed on public/private partnerships in shaping the 
‘entrepreneurial practice and ideology’ needed to compete successfully 
with other localities (Swyngedouw, 2000a; 53). This competition, 
legitimated and rationalised by ‘tales of municipal turnarounds’, ‘little 
victories’ and a lack of any realistic alternatives, rests on the ‘economic 
fallacy’ that all can win (Peck and Tickell, 2002; 393). Structures of 
governance have also served to blur the boundaries between the public 
and private sectors, generating serious questions over accountability 
and the use of public funds (Pike et al, 2006; 128-130; Castree et al, 
2004; 111; Swyngedouw, 2000a; 53; 2000b, 70; Harvey, 2006; 26). The 
issue is again one of power relations. Parker and Feagin argue that in 
many American cities entrepreneurial elites have developed ‘private-
public partnerships in which governments are little more than 
sycophants and the servants of business’ (Parker and Feagin, 1990, 216; 
their emphasis).  
 
While in neither country is there any great sense of accountability of 
such partnerships to local citizens there is an important distinction in 
the central government role, as the main funder in the UK, instead of 
state and more local funding in the US. On one hand local partners are 
held more accountable by central government for the effectiveness of 
expenditure than is the case in the US. On the other, of course, the 
central role that government plays in determining the narrow scope of 
project eligibility limits opportunities for more radical and 
experimental, locally-based approaches to regeneration.  
 
An example of the restructuring of government responses is the new 
policy prescription of ‘Task Forces’ in the UK which aimed to revive  
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ailing communities. These are ad hoc bodies and partnerships of the 
‘usual suspects’ from public and private bodies directed to addressing 
specific policy problems associated with industry decline (Pike 2004; 
2150-2151).
17 They are largely temporary, unaccountable and closed to 
scrutiny (Hudson, 2005; 593; also see Castree et al, 2004; 111 and 
Hudson, 1998; 24 on the Urban Development Corporations). Such 
bodies, under the strong guidance of central government, utilise largely 
conventional policy instruments, mainly orthodox interventions aimed 
at addressing ‘short-run to medium-run market adjustment’ (Pike, 
2004; 2150).  
 
Such public-private partnerships represent state withdrawal from 
effective planning, as national level income redistribution and balanced 
economic growth is replaced by localities competing with each other for 
investments and people. They embody nothing more than an attempt to 
‘paper over the consequences of economic decline’, while doing nothing 
to address long-term structural weaknesses that persist in 
disadvantaged localities (Hudson, 2005; 593; Pike, 2004; 2151). For 
localities that lack the ‘competitive edge’ such policies do not bode 
well. The question largely missing from this now dominant narrative of 
‘globalization-competitiveness’ is, ‘what kind of economic development 
is required and for whom?’ (Lovering, 2001; 353; Pike, 2004; 2143;).  
 
The value of comparative research 
 
The trans-Atlantic comparison is of central importance to this research, 
especially the role of the state and governance structures in the study 
areas’ adjustment processes. Particularly significant is the extent to 
which a more neoliberal agenda has been followed through. The UK 
welfare regime has been a mixture of European corporatism and 
                                                 
17 In regions which are ‘institutionally thin’ such governance structures tend to be 
dominated by elite coalitions drawn from ‘regional government offices, local 
authorities, development agencies, the business leadership’; in some cases this may 
act as an obstacle to ‘institutional renewal’ and growth (Amin, 1999).  
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American neo-liberalism. With many European countries aspiring to 
adopt the ‘American model’, the UK can be viewed as the ‘transmission 
belt that connects the American model (in all its neo-liberal force) to 
the future of social policy in Europe’ (King and Wickham-Jones, 1999 
and Peck, 1998 cited in Cochrane et al 2001; 148; see also Martin, 
2000a; 469; Weiss, 1997; 3-4). Appendix I reproduces OECD figures on 
national social expenditure and show how the UK does represent a kind 
of half-way house between the US and the continental European social 
welfare models. Total social expenditure as a percent of GDP in the EU 
(15) in 2001 was 24.0% compared to 21.8% in the UK and 14.8% in the 
US. Proportionately most is also spent in the EU on old age benefits, 
followed by the UK and, further behind, the US (8.8%, 8.1%, 5.3%). 
Sickness benefits (2.9%, 2.5%, 1.1%) and family benefits (2.2%, 2.2%. 
0.4%) follow similar patterns. Spending on unemployment benefits and 
active labour market policies are closer together between the US and 
the UK. 
 
Continental Europe’s social model has historically been differentiated 
from that of the US by its greater employment protection, more 
generous welfare state benefits, working time regulations, and the fact 
that wage levels have largely been determined through collective 
bargaining (Esping-Anderson and Regini, 2002; 11-12).
18 However, 
labour market flexibility, and particularly wage flexibility, is likely to 
become a more important characteristic of continental European labour 
markets under a single currency and intensified global competition 
(Esping-Anderson and Regini, 2002; 53). Indeed the concept of 
competitive relationships has been enshrined in the EU through the 
Lisbon Agenda (2000; 2005). Within this context it seems appropriate to 
compare how economic shocks impact disadvantaged labour markets 
under the different UK and US systems, and how ideas of labour market 
                                                 
18 It is accepted that there is significant diversity between different European states 
labour market and welfare systems (see Esping-Anderson 1999; Esping-Anderson and 
Regini, 2002; and Taylor 2003a; 2003b). However, as the OECD (1998; 1999; 2002) 
figures illustrate, the general trend is for more generous and protective regimes in 
Europe (EU15) than in the US.   
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flexibility, supply-side policy, and emergent workfare regimes manifest 
themselves in areas of industrial decline. 
 
In the UK the retrenchment of the public welfare model towards that of 
the US in recent years is clear from the literature on policy transfer, 
particularly in labour market policy. While individual policies tend not 
to be imported wholesale, the general approach to reform in the UK has 
echoed that in the US by focusing on issues of welfare dependency and 
compulsion. The net result has been the ‘tendential’ but incomplete 
‘Americanisation’ of UK social policy (Peck and Theodore, 2001; 450). 
For example, the New Deal programme was ‘copied’ from US workfare 
experiments (Martin, 2000a; 469). For Daguerre (2004; 42) this 
represented a ‘paradigm shift’, reinforced by the 2001 measures which 
further emphasised the ‘work first’ principle.  
 
While the direction of change is similar in the two countries there 
remain practical differences in the application of welfare to work 
policies, with an obviously less complete transformation in the UK. This 
is outlined in Daguerre (2004; 47 & 52): 
 
•  Reform in the UK has been much more incremental. There is no 
UK version of the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).
19 
•  The process of reform in the UK is less ideological than it has 
been in the US. 
•  The American legislation is much tougher on single mothers than 
in the UK where they are ‘encouraged to work, but not required 
to do so’. 
•  In the US the introduction of the two year limit on welfare 
payments was a watershed.
20 Welfare recipients must be in work 
                                                 
19 PRWORA was a 1996 Clinton reform which dramatically changed the US welfare 
system as it required recipients to ‘work’ in exchange for benefits 
20 This refers to welfare payments not Unemployment Insurance which was already 
time-limited at six months   
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related activities after two years. A five-year time limit was also 
introduced under which families who have received welfare 
assistance for a total of five cumulative years (or less if the state 
deems) will be ineligible for cash welfare payments (states will 
have the option of providing non-cash assistance) (Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2005) 
•  Criteria and levels of assistance are defined at the national level 
in the UK; in the US states have a considerable degree of 
discretion over welfare policy.
21 
 
Some of this difference, and some of the more regressive aspects of 
change in US social policy, reflect the different national governmental 
structures. Institutionally in the UK central government remains 
extremely important and the decentralisation of policy-making has been 
very limited.
22 In contrast, under the US federal structure, the states 
have significant powers including over some aspects of welfare. For 
example, for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families programme 
(TANF), the state governments fund half the cost and determine 
eligibility and benefits levels (Rushefsky, 2002; 30). This 
decentralisation of power to the states, which increases competition 
between localities, also ‘destroys their ability to fund high quality social 
programs’ (Peterson, 1995; xiii).  
 
The more specific empirical dimensions of the comparison are sketched 
out in the following chapter, but it is important to note that the envious 
glances which many British policy makers direct at US welfare reform 
are based on one outcome: a desire to reduce welfare rolls. Of course 
getting people off welfare and into work may be a laudable aim, if 
regulatory mechanisms ensure that work pays a living wage and is 
appropriate for the individual. However, as we shall see in the next 
                                                 
21 Peck and Theodore describe how workfare policies in the US have taken the form of 
‘local experiments’ (2001; 432). 
22 Though there has been some significant recent decentralisation of economic 
development policies to Scotland and Wales and, on a more limited scale, to the 
Regional Development Agencies in England (See Robson et al, 2000)  
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chapter, around one quarter of the US workforce is classed as working-
poor, placing into sharp focus the desirability of ‘forcing’ people to take 
whatever menial, casual, low-wage work is available. A far greater 
emphasis is therefore required on the individual and community impacts 
of welfare reform, rather than looking solely at the aggregate number 
of claims. 
 
2.4   Understanding geography, development in place 
 
Local labour markets 
 
The technical definition of a local labour market, on the demand side, 
is the ‘labour supply shed’ or ‘worker recruitment space’ of local 
employers. On the supply side it is the geographical area in which 
workers can change their jobs without changing their residence: their 
‘employment field’ or ‘job search space’ (Martin, 2000a; 458). The 
more the employment field of workers and the labour supply shed of 
employers coincide spatially, the more easily defined and more self-
contained the local labour market will be (ibid; 458).  
 
It is also within the labour market that local economic shocks are 
absorbed through labour market adjustments. These adjustments 
include changes in levels of net commuting, net migration, 
unemployment, economic inactivity (withdrawal from the labour 
market), or demographic change. The literature on plant closures has 
generally placed great emphasis on the short-term impacts, including 
negative multiplier effects, which serve to depress local demand and 
incomes (Tomaney et al, 1999; 402), and the short-term imbalances in 
labour markets through which typically the brunt of closures is borne by 
older and less-skilled workers (for example see Hinde’s [1994] work on 
the closures of British Shipbuilders yards in Sunderland). However, given 
the ongoing difficulties faced by many deindustrialised local labour 
markets, there is clearly more to this than short-term imbalances.  
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Labour markets are much more than a series of employment 
relationships and economic adjustments however. They are diverse and 
complex social systems which are not reducible to a simple commodity 
market. They are internally heterogeneous, within which different 
groups of worker are differentiated by skill levels, commuting patterns, 
and by their degree of attachment to a place of residence.
23 But more 
importantly, they are not just places to work; they are also places to 
live. Local labour markets become distinctive and long lasting localised 
‘communities and cultures woven into the landscape of labour’ (Storper 
and Walker, 1989; 157). The distinctive individual history of 
communities and cultures can in turn provide the foundation for the 
formation of identity subsequently among residents and workers 
(Hudson, 2001; 262). Such landscapes of labour are dynamic and are 
redrawn over time by economic, social and demographic trends (Green 
and Owen, 1998; viii).  
 
Labour markets should therefore be viewed as social constructs which 
influence the decisions of their residents and workers.
24 While 
conventional economic wisdom suggests that financial incentives are 
crucial for individual and family work and non-work decisions (workers 
may have higher incomes than non-workers), a range of factors other 
than income can also be influential (Bryson and McKay, 1994; 2). These 
can include family (parenting or caring) commitments, assessment of 
the opportunities available in the local labour market (discouraged 
workers), or individual commitment to work. These factors combine 
with the prevailing aggregate demand to set a labour market’s 
employment rate. 
                                                 
23 This may be a cultural attachment, but can also result from low mobility within the 
housing market (Martin, 2000a; 460). 
24 Such a view of labour markets as social constructs has been reinforced by the trend 
in increasing female supply of labour. The live/work patterns of women tend to be 
more tightly spatially defined than those of men, primarily because of caring 
responsibilities. This increases the importance of local demand and the boundedness 
of labour markets.  
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Labour markets have not only use values but also emotional values; 
benefits people derive from where they live that are not reducible to 
economic factors (Castree et al, 2004; 65). It is through the 
development of these emotional values that deep and complex 
relationships to place are formed. Such attachment can be particularly 
strong in mono-industrial communities which came to be seen as 
‘closed’. The processes by which this boundedness was achieved are 
detailed by Hudson (2001; 265; see also Castree et al, 2004; 71): 
 
‘Places that came to be seen as closed 
communities, associated with a strong sense of 
place and deep attachments to them on the 
part of their residents, often developed in that 
way out of necessity. This was one way of 
coping with the fact that they were created 
“from scratch,” discursively and materially, 
with people often thrown together from a wide 
variety of locations. As the local indigenous 
population typically was unable to meet the 
burgeoning demands for labor-power, labor had 
to be imported from other locations. From the 
outset, therefore, they were in part constituted 
via their relations with other areas, as open, 
porous, and hybrid places. 
  The issue is not whether places were 
objectively bounded and closed but rather why 
people living in them constructed images of 
them as such. The subsequent development of 
place-specific institutions and identities, and a 
sense of community by their residents, was a 
way of surviving and dealing with the risks and 
uncertainties of their precarious existence, 
especially in monoindustrial places (such as 
colliery villages and towns).’  
 
Missing from the modern literature however is, ‘what happened next?’ 
After the production relationship on which communities were based 
disappears, does a process of unbounding occur whereby the 
communities disintegrate and ultimately die away completely? There 
are clearly elements of this already evident as the proportion of the  
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population with a direct (or even indirect) relationship to the old 
industry declines. These are important questions for the future 
sustainability of places. Attachments to place can outlast investment 
decisions (Hudson, 2001; 262-263), but for how long and under what 
conditions?   
 
Pratt and Hanson (1994; 10) have observed that, ‘most people lead 
intensely local lives’ whereby their homes, workplace, friends and 
leisure activities are situated within ‘a relatively small orbit’. The most 
obvious dictate of this (often) intense localism is time and money (ibid; 
11]). In part because of these financial constraints, tightly 
geographically bounded spheres of life are often especially associated 
with deprived communities, and they remain settings in which identities 
are forged (Page, 2000; 22; Amin and Thrift, 1995; 9). This can be both 
a positive and a negative process. Arguably, post-decline, this identity 
formation has become more problematic. Past work on 
deindustrialisation presents a somewhat static picture of the social 
basis of communities, while more recent work on poverty and social 
exclusion tends to remove localities from their historical context. This 
area of identity formation is an important, and under-researched, area. 
 
Networks and relational geographies 
 
While for individuals’ everyday lives the local may be important in 
forming identity, the potential opportunities base within which they 
operate is largely dependent on external factors. Flows of money, 
commodities and people, which are crucial in a region’s economic 
development, occur in relative space-time (Harvey, 2006; 143).
25  
Localities cannot be examined, therefore, as closed containers, but are 
‘nodes in relational settings’ constituted from their wider social 
relations with other places (Amin, 2002; 391-392; Castree et al, 2004; 
                                                 
25 In recent years, on average the ‘frequency’, ‘intensity’ and distance of these 
spatialised social relations has tended to increase as places become more open 
(Hudson, 2001; 257- 258; see also Castree et al, 2004; 64-69).   
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67; Allen et al, 1998; Yeung, 2005; 47-48).
26 It is the different ways in 
which they are connected, and their ‘contrasting mixes of growth 
dynamics’, which create intra-regional differentials (Hudson, 2001; 257- 
258). Research such as this therefore needs to be sensitive to both the 
local and to broader spatial relationships influencing development 
outcomes. 
 
Institutional insights  
 
The recent re-emergence of interest in institutional approaches has 
‘revived regional political economy’ in geography by encompassing 
issues of local context, the evolutionary nature of economic 
development and the power relations and conflicts which are inherent 
in the economic system (Tomaney et al, 1999; 402; Martin, 1994; 43-
44).
27 Institutionalist insights reveal how current economic successes 
and failures are partially a product of past institutional frameworks, 
habits, routines, knowledge frames, network relations and regulatory 
environment (Amin, 2001; 1238-1239). Such institutions may not 
necessarily be local, but may be ‘institutions at a distance’. Examples 
include national policy, head office strategies and the routines of 
corporate elites (Amin, 2001; 1238-1239). 
 
While institutional structures are not the sole cause of uneven 
development, they ‘enable, constrain, and refract’ economic 
development in ‘spatially differentiated ways’ to produce 
geographically differentiated outcomes (Martin, 2000b; 79). These 
structures support a locality’s relational network, with the local and 
regional therefore being significant scales in institutional research:  
 
‘It is at the regional and local levels that the 
effects of institutional path dependence are 
                                                 
26 Increasingly the non-local is ‘in the local’ (Castree et al, 2004; 67-68; 260; see also 
Hudson, 2001; 257- 258; Allen et al, 1998; 1-2).  Places become, as Swyngedouw 
(1997) memorably termed it, ‘glocal’. 
27 On ‘old’ institutional economics see Amin (1999; 367-368).  
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particularly significant. Institutions are 
important “carriers” of local economic histories. 
Different specific institutional regimes develop 
in different places, and these then interact with 
local economic activity in a mutually reinforcing 
way. If institutional path dependence matters, it 
matters in different ways in different places’. 
(Martin 2000b, 80, his emphasis; see also Amin, 
1999) 
 
A central distinction in institutionalist research is between the 
institutional environment, which includes customs, norms and social 
routines, and institutional arrangements, formal organisational 
structures including markets, firms, unions, statutory bodies and the 
welfare state (Martin, 2000b; 79-80). The evolution of such institutions 
consists of ‘periods of relative stability (or slow change)’ which are 
‘punctuated historically by phases of major transformation’ (Martin, 
2000b; 85; Hudson, 2004; 451; 458).
28 While in some cases such ‘major 
transformation’ may follow from radical economic change, this is not 
necessarily the case. Grabher’s (1993) work on the Ruhr, for example, 
demonstrates how a region can become ‘locked in’ by outdated and 
outmoded institutions, as relics from the industrial past. Such outdated 
institutions then serve to become a structural weakness, holding back 
restructuring and integration into new circuits of growth (Essletzbichler 
and Rigby, 2007; 9).  
 
For some, the promotion of new institutional networks is seen as a 
potential route to increasing competitiveness and economic growth for 
old industrial regions (see Cooke, 1995; Kitson et al, 2004). It is 
assumed that the ‘soft’ attributes of territories that are ‘winners’ are 
among the key determinants of competitive success. This implies that 
the task for those regions which have lost is to ensure conditions that 
will allow them to do the same (Hudson, 2001; 281). In practice, 
however, attempts by places that have ‘lost’ from global economic 
                                                 
28 See Martin (2000b; 78) who considers how the upheavals in the global economy in 
the last two decades have lead to the ‘institutional landscapes of capitalism being 
redrawn.’  
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restructuring to adopt the structures of those that have ‘won’ have 
generally been unsuccessful (Dunford and Hudson, 1996 cited in Hudson, 
2001; 282). It is apparent therefore that, while policy aimed at breaking 
lock-in and fostering new institutional forms may be beneficial for 
struggling regions, this is not itself sufficient to secure  economic 
development (Pike et al, 2006; 95).
29 
 
A further element of institutional thought, of particularly relevance here, 
is work on cultural processes, which inform individual and group norms 
and conventions and mould social structures. Such norms and structures 
are significant for economic development because of the crucial role 
they play in transmitting ‘knowledge, attitudes, and values from one 
generation to the next’ (Martin, 2000b; 81). Hudson’s (2005; 586) work 
has been especially significant in showing the ways in which an 
inappropriate institutional environment from an earlier era can bar 
moves to a new and more positive development trajectory.  Discussing 
the ‘perils of instituted behaviour’ he describes the habits and routines 
established as part of the identity of the traditional economy in the 
Northeast (ibid; 587). Some of these have been relatively easily 
transformable; in particular the breakdown of the established gender 
division of labour, as more women entered the labour force. Others have 
proved more resistant to change, however, and represent what he 
describes as ‘cognitive lock-in in the terms of the ways people think of 
the labour market and their possibilities’ (587-588). He identifies three 
specific examples, each of which has significant policy ramifications: 
1.  A reluctance to commute among some in the region, stemming 
from the old life/work patterns of industry whereby workers were 
housed close to their workplaces.
30   
                                                 
29 For example see Hudson (1995; 196- 216) who argues that the national and local 
economic climate is a central determinant of whether strategies which promote 
institutional change will be a success. Similarly Amin (1999; 366) notes that such 
institutional tweaking will count for very little in the absence of expansionary macro-
economic policy). 
30 He develops this point by arguing that the region should be viewed as ‘a series of 
small, discrete, and spatially bounded labour markets, rather than forming an  
  51 
2.  A limited ambition towards education and skills achievement, 
based on past community experience of sons following fathers into 
jobs via recruitment through personal networks and on the job 
training.  
3.  The culture of dependency on wage labour which is a limiting 
factor in developing endogenous SMEs in the region.
31  
     (Hudson, 2005; 587-588). 
 
Such insights are of central importance in understanding the 
development trajectories of places that have undergone radical economic 
decline. They are nevertheless restricted by being limited to describing 
lock-in from the previous industrial era. A fuller understanding of 
aspiration formation and entrenched patterns of dependency needs to be 
sought by encompassing new norms forged in the social and economic 
environment of deindustrialisation, and how these combine with those 
which already existed. A key aim of this research is therefore to describe 
and account for institutional continuity and change during the period of 
radical economic restructuring by examining why some institutions, social 
structures and norms remain robust, while others are modified and even 
crumble.  
 
The evolutionary nature of economic development 
 
Just as a locality is not a closed-box, it is equally important not to treat 
it as a blank slate. Any approach to understanding local labour markets 
and communities must be grounded in an understanding of an area’s 
unique history and an appreciation of the ways in which past phases of 
development exert a strong influence over present and the future 
prospects (Martin and Sunley, 2006; 399; Scott and Storper, 2003; 579). 
For this reason evolutionary approaches embrace the ‘the path 
                                                                                                                                  
integrated labour market in which people are linked to employment opportunities 
across the region’ (587) 
31 See Hudson (1995; 197-198) for the evolution of this dependency.  
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dependent [or more accurately path-contingent
32] character of 
development’, placing current development outcomes within a 
locality’s historical specificity (Hudson, 2004; 459 also Martin and 
Sunley, 2006; 402-403; for an excellent example of path-dependency 
see Cronon, 1992). As Pike et al have shown, the importance of 
exploring the influences of historical specificity have been embraced by 
a number of influential geographers in recent years (2006, 35-37): 
 
•  ‘local and regional development trajectories are strongly path-
dependent' (Sunley, 2000) 
•  ‘future development is unavoidably shaped by their own 
historical evolution' (Clark, 1990) 
•  ‘[P]henomena happening in the present ‘trail long tails of 
history’ (Allen et al, 1998) 
 
Path-dependency in economic development can be particularly salient 
in monoindustrial communities, where previous dependence on a single 
industry and the absence of a recent history of innovation often means 
they lack the economic and social capacity to become ‘learning 
regions’. They are also often typified by the absence of the ‘institutions 
and (cooperative) relationships’ between local and regional actors 
which are important for fostering innovation (Essletzbichler and Rigby, 
2007; 9). Further to this, when new technologies are being developed, 
business location decisions tend to seek out ‘diverse pools of skilled 
labour, industries, firms and institutions’ which are often in short 
supply in old industrial regions (ibid; 10).
33 In the context of this 
distinctly un-level playing field it is hardly surprising that many old 
industrial regions struggle to attract forms of investment that might 
enable them radically to alter their development trajectory. 
                                                 
32 Development is path-contingent in the sense that the actions, practices and 
‘systematic interactions’ of agents can produce change, either subtly or radically, in 
future development trajectories (Hudson 2004: 463). 
33 In addition to this, in many less favoured regions social capital has been seriously 
damaged by ‘economic hardship, state-dependency, [and] elite domination’ making its 
renewal a daunting task (Amin, 1999; 373).  
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This research is sensitive to the path-dependent nature of development, 
but also incorporates the longer-term impacts of initial adjustments to 
economic restructuring. The historical economic structure of the study 
regions is not the only influence on their future trajectory, though it 
clearly has a strong bearing on education and training structures, their 
built environments, perceptions of the area, and their institutional 
structures. The immediate responses to the challenges of economic 
restructuring also need to be incorporated into our understanding of 
path-dependent development. 
 
2.5   Structure and agency  
 
This analysis has emphasised a structural reading of the consequences 
of deindustrialisation. Human agency nevertheless retains considerable 
scope to work within, change, and challenge these structures.  There is 
a long history in geographical writing of balancing the relative 
importance of structure and agency (Hudson, 2006; 381). This balance 
depends on neither under- nor over-socialising individuals (Granovetter, 
1985). The structural determinism or ‘metanarratives’, inherent in 
some treatments of global economic change, which ‘closes off space for 
human action and political practice’, need to be avoided. The multiple 
and complex structural parameters within which agency can operate 
must nevertheless be acknowledged and explored. These include the 
basis of such ‘broad structural relations’ as class, gender and ethnicity. 
These may have determinate effects, although these are contingent and 
can be analysed only through empirical research (Massey, 1995; 303-
304; Hudson, 2003; 745; Jessop, 2001a; 1226; Sayer, 1997, 473).  
 
Human behaviour (both individual and collective) may thus be 
understood as ‘instituted’, simultaneously both ‘enabled and 
constrained’ by the social structures within which it operates (Hudson, 
2004: 451). Agency is therefore subject to ‘bounded indeterminacy’,  
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within which individual agents are neither ‘blind followers of rules’ nor 
‘fully autonomous actors’. Rather, they are restricted in what they can 
and cannot do: they are ‘boxed in’ (Amin, 2001; 1238; Massey, 1995; 
316). It is within this ‘bounded indeterminacy’ that agency operates 
but, as explained by Granovetter, such structures can never fully 
predict outcomes (1985; 487): 
 
‘Actors do not behave or decide as atoms 
outside a social context, nor do they adhere 
slavishly to a script written for them by the 
particular intersection of social categories that 
they happen to occupy. Their attempts at 
purposive action are instead embedded in 
concrete, ongoing systems of social relations’. 
 
These broad social structures vary widely across time and space, as 
history and structural location become key determinants of the many 
different constraints under which actors operate (Amin, 2001; 1238; 
Granovetter, 1985; 486). This variability is crucial as what people know 
and how they will react to a given situation depends, in part, on their 
positionality in terms of the key dimensions of social differentiation, 
including class, gender and ethnicity (Hudson, 2004; 450). This 
positionality enables some actors to choose a path of action more or 
less skilfully than others (Jessop, 2001a; 1226). As Wilson (1997; 55) 
explains, it is through these key dimensions of social differentiation 
that the ‘decisions and actions [of those in deprived inner-city Chicago] 
occur within a context of constraints and opportunities that are 
drastically different from those present in middle-class society’.  
 
Structural relations thus influence and constrain human agency, shaping 
not only the opportunities available, but also how we think, feel about 
and experience our environment, creating and reproducing cultures, 
norms and expectations. For example, drawing on Bourdieu’s work 
(1981; 309), Hudson (2004; 464) describes how ‘members of a “class  
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fraction”, by sharing common histories, share similar habitus
34, creating 
‘regularities of thought, aspirations, dispositions, and patterns of 
action’. Such regularities are linked to positionality in the social 
structure and are continually reproduced. Commonalities of identity are 
experienced as “people like us”, and may also relate to other social 
features, including gender, ethnicity or where a person lives (Hudson, 
2004; 463). For example, Bourdieu describes how childhood experience 
can create the disposition of young workers to identify with, and wish 
for, a work experience similar to that of their parents:
35 
 
‘The dispositions inculcated by a childhood 
experience of the social world which, in certain 
historical conditions, can predispose young 
workers to accept and even wish for entry into 
a world of manual labour which they identify 
with the adult world’. (Bourdieu, 1981, 314) 
 
Research such as this must therefore place individual agency clearly 
within the structural constraints of social differentiation and living in a 
deindustrialised locality, with both its opportunity structure and local 
culture. These structures exert significant influences on the future 
prospects for economic development, but can be revealed only through 
detailed empirical research.  
 
2.6   Concluding comments  
 
This chapter has explored the main threads of recent theoretical debate 
that frame this study, from that relating to deindustrialisation itself, 
through the role of the state, the importance of institutional and 
evolutionary processes, and the balance between structure and agency.  
The central insights are: 
 
                                                 
34 Habitus is defined as the embodied history, the part of objectified history which is 
‘carried, enacted and carries its bearer’ (Bourdieu, 1981; 306-307). 
35 Heaven (1995 cited in Lloyd, 1999) also stresses the important role of family ‘as a 
socialising force where young people learn about work’. For empirical studies see 
Nayak (2003) and McDowell (2002).  
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1)  To understand the wide-ranging economic and social impacts of 
radical industrial change, the process of deindustrialisation must 
be viewed as a long-term structural change in local economies 
and communities, rather than a short-term adjustment in factor 
markets.  
2)  Comparative research is needed into the role of state actors. 
Recent policy developments in both the UK and US have 
increasingly promoted competitive relationships between places 
and supply-side policy orthodoxy. Such policies largely fail to 
acknowledge the widely differing demand contexts of local 
economies and further marginalise those who cannot ‘compete’ 
effectively.  
3)  Regional research must move beyond viewing localities as closed 
systems, and recognise the system of broader relational networks 
which plays a crucial role in accounting for growth or decline.  
4)  The institutional architecture and environment of a locality plays 
a critical role in influencing local economic development. 
Particularly important is the balance between continuity and 
change over time. Past conceptions have however often 
conveyed a static conception. This research will give greater 
emphasis to the combination of institutional change and inertia 
in the development of deindustrialised regions. 
5)  Economic development is often strongly path-dependent. An 
area’s economic history and legacy, and the ways these 
enable/constrain growth are always important.  This research 
builds on previous work by analysing how the immediate (labour 
market) impacts of deindustrialisation have strongly influenced 
longer-term development. 
6)  The workings of local labour markets are reducible neither to 
free agency nor to structural determinism. The structural 
constraints within which individual agency operates are 
nevertheless critical in analysing local labour market trends. 
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Chapter 3) The experiences of industrial decline in the UK 
and US 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
The last chapter set out the key theoretical contributions that have 
framed this work. We shall now move on to the earlier empirical 
evidence informing the study. The aim is to evaluate this literature 
from the perspective of the comparative approach adopted in this 
research. This is achieved by drawing on research addressing labour 
market change from a number of areas, particularly related to job 
creation, labour mobility and models of public welfare. The key themes 
that emerge relate to private sector investment decisions, which set 
the levels of demand for labour, and the role of public welfare policies 
in mitigating decline. These provide the context for individuals’ 
decisions. We shall therefore also consider research relating to 
individual responses to job losses, whether through commuting, 
migration or the withdrawal of labour.  
 
Attention is first turned to the significance of new job creation in old 
industrial areas, including the geography of investment, to consider 
whether demand for labour has been replaced, and under what 
circumstances. The focus then shifts from flows of investment to flows 
of people, and what past research tells us about labour mobility, 
through commuting and migration. This is important because of the 
potentially positive role such mobility can play in redressing imbalances 
between labour supply and demand. An important cultural difference is 
demonstrated in attitudes towards labour mobility, suggesting a much 
greater propensity to commuting and migration in the US than the UK.  
 
The following two sections deal with the role of government (and 
governance) in influencing development outcomes. While both countries 
have experienced quite regressive welfare reforms in recent years,  
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aimed at pushing people into jobs, important differences remain in both 
the scope of welfare, and in the use of public money for regeneration. 
In the US, the federal government has largely taken a hands-off 
approach to industrial decline and the aftermath. Regeneration 
strategies are therefore usually highly localised, ad-hoc and under-
funded. This intense localisation of responsibility means that such 
initiatives are often ill-informed and lack strategic thinking. In the UK, 
central government has maintained a much greater role in economic 
development and has been more willing to fund regeneration projects 
aimed at attracting private capital or supporting failing localities. There 
are thus important differences in development outcomes which need to 
be considered. 
 
3.2   Replacing local employment 
 
The UK: some growth in services 
 
One of the most obvious determinants of how destructive a factory, mill 
or mine closure may be for a local community is the extent to which 
lost jobs can be replaced by new job creation. For many UK coalfield 
areas, job creation strategies have only had limited success in 
rebuilding the local employment base (Bennett et al. 2000; 44). Recent 
estimates suggest that only around 60 per cent of the jobs lost in the 
coal industry since the early 1980s have been replaced by new jobs for 
males (Beatty et al, 2005; 2). Indeed, rates of employment creation in 
the coalfields have been significantly below the national average. 
During the period 1983-2002, total employment in the UK grew by 
22.9%, while in the coalfields it grew by only 8.9% (Ormerod, 2007; 4). 
 
There have been three obvious approaches to job creation in old 
industrial areas, encouraged by policy, since the major industrial 
closures in Britain. They have included, firstly, attracting light industry, 
particularly in the immediate aftermath of closures as part of  
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reindustrialisation strategies. Emphasis was subsequently placed on the 
growth of indigenous Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), though this 
is often more rhetoric than reality. Finally, the most significant trend 
has been towards expanding service sector employment.  
 
Such strategies have clearly only been partially successful in replacing 
the numbers of jobs lost, and even less successful in employing 
displaced workers. Many of the new jobs created were more insecure 
and demanded different skills sets and attributes than the heavy 
industrial employment that preceded them. It was particularly difficult 
for older and less skilled workers to gain such alternative employment. 
They were also less likely to retrain for other sectors, leaving them with 
few realistic employment options (Murray et al, 2005; 354). These 
groups were disproportionately affected by closures and more likely 
never to work again (Tomaney et al, 1999; 409-410). Many of the new 
jobs created in declining industrial regions were therefore not filled by 
redundant workers but were instead orientated to a low-skill, low-wage 
and female workforce (Danson, 2005; 287).  
 
The first strand of this development policy often involved attracting 
mobile capital in the form of branch plant investments. These were 
typically far removed from the companies’ centres of decision making, 
‘global outposts’ largely concentrated into low-value added and low 
wage activities (Beynon and Austrin cited in Hudson, 2005; 585; also 
Morris, 1995; 58-60; Bennett et al, 2000; 43-44). Such investments were 
often poorly integrated into the local economy, and came with 
attendant problem of vulnerability to disinvestment (Pike et al, 2006; 
203). Major questions have also been raised about the cost-
effectiveness of the types of public subsidies often used to attract 
them.
36 Such reindustrialisation strategies have thus been at best only 
                                                 
36 For example see Castree et al (2004; 144-145). The Siemens wafer fabrication plant 
in North Tyneside opened in 1996, drawing in around £60 million in financial assistance 
from local and central government, only to close two years later with the loss of the 
1,200 jobs created.  
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partially effective, replacing a relatively small proportion of the 
manufacturing jobs lost (for example see Hudson, 1995; 199-202 on the 
Derwentside Industrial Development Agency).
37 
 
The second strand of economic development, the encouragement of 
indigenous SME growth, similarly offered relatively few prospects for 
redundant workers. First, prospects for SME growth were limited by the 
local economic environment, including the multiplier effects from plant 
closures which kept local economies depressed. Secondly, where new 
firms were established there is little evidence that they had a 
significant direct role in alleviating labour market disadvantage. 
Storey’s (1982; 179) study of new firm formation in Cleveland 
(Northeast England), for example, found that new firms created 
relatively few jobs in their early years, and those that were created 
were filled primarily by skilled workers ‘rather than those who have 
been off work for a long period’. In the longer-term this solution, 
although attractive in many ways, has been limited by the continuing 
depressed local economies, and cultural and institutional barriers 
stemming from the previous dependence on waged-work (Hudson, 2005; 
588). 
 
Service sector employment has become an increasingly important 
alternative to manual work in areas such as the coalfields, even though 
it is often low-skilled and poorly paid (Lindsay and McQuaid, 2004; 301; 
also Morris, 1995). As a consequence, interpersonal skills, including 
attributes such as personality and appearance, have taken on increasing 
importance for an individual’s ability to gain access to and maintain 
employment (McQuaid et al, 2005; 192). This has presented a significant 
barrier to employment for many former industrial workers. There is also 
evidence that, in customer facing employment, employers would 
                                                 
37 See also Stone (1995; 195) who argues that the modernisation and reindustrialisation 
strategies adopted have, even in Wearside, the recipient of massive investment from 
Nissan, not been sufficient to ‘fill the employment and income gaps left by the old 
industries’.  
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discriminate against older workers considered not to look or sound right 
(Warhurst et al, 2000; Hollywood et al, 2003 cited in Lindsay and 
McQuaid, 2004; 302). In reality many former industrial workers would 
also themselves have ruled out most forms of service employment, 
which is perceived to be low paid and insecure (Lindsay and McQuaid, 
2004; 306-307; Murray et al, 2005; 357; Danson, 2005; 285; 288).  
 
These changes in employment structure and culture, from the 
established practices of ‘natural progression’ from school to work , to 
an increasing emphasis on developing interpersonal skills and education, 
left those without such ‘employability’ facing multiple barriers to work. 
Significantly however, 20 years later these individuals are no longer 
former miners, but come from subsequent generations of workers 
(McQuaid et al, 2005; 193 see also Danson, 2005; 289).
38 The 
pronounced lag in educational attainment in the coalfields compared to 
the national average indicates that the cultural adjustment to these 
new realities has been slow at best (see Gore and Smith, 2001).  
 
In more recent years the focus on branch plants, SMEs and service 
sector growth has been augmented by a fourth strand of economic 
development policy in peripheral localities, based on regeneration to 
serve tourism, leisure or cultural activities (Hudson 1995; Jobling, 2007; 
Ashworth and Voogd, 1990; 6-9; 14).
39 Again such strategies, which for 
Hudson (1995; 206) represent a locality’s recognition of its ‘economic 
marginalisation’, may be problematic for at least two reasons. First, the 
types of jobs created, for example by reclaiming industrial sites to 
attract middle-class consumption, tend to be unskilled and poorly paid 
(Hudson, 1998; 24). Secondly, relying on such an approach is a ‘very 
risky course of action’, throwing a region into direct competition with 
                                                 
38 The net result of these changes is that either a large number of ‘men’s jobs’ need 
to be created, or young men’s assumptions about what is ‘men’s work’ need to change 
(Lloyd, 1999; 2).  
39 This was a trend which was first hit upon by the UDCs. In their appraisal of this type 
of development Parkinson and Evans (1990; 80-81) found that while the physical 
regenerative effects could be impressive, the social and economic benefits which 
accrued for the most deprived would be much less so.  
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other, possibly more appealing, tourist destinations (Hudson, 1995; 
206).  
 
It is clear that new job creation in the coalfields has not compensated 
for the jobs lost in industry. Often where job creation has occurred it 
has tended to be low-waged and low-skilled. This is partly an outcome 
of economic development policies focused on numerical job creation, 
irrespective of the type of investment. A Coalfield Task Force report, 
for example, identified call centres as a potentially viable source of 
new jobs in the coalfields (1998; 13).
40 The coalfield areas have also 
often been promoted to potential investors by touting their low wage 
rates (Beynon et al, 2006d). Employment growth in coalfield areas 
therefore needs to be assessed in terms of both its quantity and quality. 
With social mobility in the UK poor and becoming worse, decent quality 
employment opportunities are needed from the beginning, rather than 
relying on upward mobility to remove people from a no wage/low wage 
cycle (Dickens et al 2000; 105-106).
41 At the national level, wages from 
entry level jobs have fallen compared to others since 1979, which has 
had significant implications for the benefit trap, the extent to which it 
appears financially worthwhile coming off benefits (Gregg and 
Wadsworth, 2000; 499). Entry-level positions therefore need to provide 
decent wages, hours and working conditions. Crucially, they must also 
offer the opportunity for ‘personal development and advancement’ if 
they are not to continue being avoided by jobseekers, particularly 
males (Lindsay and McQuaid, 2004; 315).  
 
 
 
                                                 
40 In call centres in the Northeast the majority of employees are females. They have a 
very limited hierarchical structure and so offer few opportunities for career 
development and provide few employment multipliers in local support industries (see 
Richardson et al, 2000 as well as Beynon et al, 2006c; 8-9 in the coalfield context).  
41 Mobility between pay deciles has been declining since the 1970s. Low paid workers 
are not only relatively worse off but also have less opportunity for moving up the wage 
distribution scale (Dickens 2000; 496). There is also considerable ‘churning’ among the 
low paid.   
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Diversity of experiences 
 
While this discussion has focused on national trends, there is 
considerable diversity in the experiences of the coalfield areas. Some of 
the smaller areas in Leicestershire and Warwickshire are ‘well on the 
way to full recovery’, while others have made much slower progress 
(Beatty et al, 2005; 2; DCLG, 2007; 85). Ormerod (2007) recently 
investigated this diversity at the local authority level, finding the most 
important driving factors to be, first, the extent to which they relied on 
mining before closures. Secondly, what he refers to as, an ‘attitudinal’ 
variable. Those areas with greatest support for the miners’ strike were 
also the slowest to recover. Thirdly, the diversity of the industrial 
structure among neighbouring local authorities was also significant. 
Areas with a higher proportion employed in mining in the 1980s were 
recovering slowest, but those bounded by areas with diverse industrial 
structures tended to recover more quickly. There is also a distinct 
regional geography, with more accessible coalfields, within a more 
supportive regional growth context, faring better than some of the 
more peripheral coalfields that have continued to struggle.  
 
The US: struggling to create employment 
 
Many of the deindustrialised localities scattered across the US have 
suffered similar problems, as heavy industry and other manufacturing 
jobs were not replaced during the subsequent decades. Some regions, 
such as California, Massachusetts and New York, with more diverse 
economies, experienced strong growth in other sectors to compensate 
for the lost jobs, but others, in Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois, 
attracted nothing like sufficient compensatory growth.
42 For this second 
group, the impacts of industrial decline were particularly disastrous, 
                                                 
42 The experience of older industrial regions such as Boston’s Route 128, which has 
seen some of its productive capacities rebuilt largely through Federal defence 
spending and the proximity of Massachusetts Institute for Technology is firmly the 
exception rather than the rule (Markusen et al, 1991; 118-147).  
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creating a huge mismatch between labour supply and demand (Rodwin, 
1989; 17).  
 
Deindustrialised communities across America’s heartland have had great 
difficulty attracting private investment. This is in part due to their 
image problems as run-down, depressed and dangerous communities 
(see O’Hara, 2003).
43 Some areas have also suffered the legacy of their 
historical image, being branded with a ‘union label’, which was the ‘kiss 
of death’ for recovery (Armstrong and Mullen; 1987; 10). The 
difficulties of attracting investment are further compounded in many 
small former industrial centres by their geographical isolation. 
 
The response of local planners to industrial decline in the 1980s was 
generally to present their communities as offering an increasingly 
‘flexible’ resource for employers to locate (Clark, 1989; 209-212). This 
approach sought to make a strength out of labour’s weakness, 
persuading employers that they could benefit from paying low-wages 
and cherry pick from a pool of desperate individuals. In addition to such 
‘place promotion’, huge resources were devoted to “smoke-stack 
chasing”; attracting industry from elsewhere, primarily in the US 
(Markusen and Carlson, 1989; 52). This was often the core of a local 
reindustrialisation strategy. This type of planning represented a ‘zero-
sum competition for employment’ and a huge waste of resources (Clark, 
1989; 215). Even those localities that ‘won’ new investment typically 
overpaid for it, and many learned the painful lesson that ‘easy in’ also 
meant ‘easy out’, as capital searched out ever more profitable 
locations. While there was some recovery in manufacturing in the 
1990s, investment avoided most of the metropolitan areas of the old 
manufacturing heartlands, which continued to shed employment, 
                                                 
43 For example, in the late 1990s the image of Gary, Indiana, itself a steel centre, 
became so bad that Fedex refused to pick-up from the city after dark. They were later 
forced under local political pressure to reinstate these evening pick-ups (New York 
Times, 1997)  
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suggesting that their reindustrialisation policies were largely impotent 
(Essletzbichler, 2004; 607; 614).
44  
 
While many deindustrialised localities attempted to go down the 
‘smoke-stack’ chasing route, the new reality for most was that job 
creation was largely premised on a growing service sector (Herzenberg 
et al, 1998; 22-24). Such growth was typically concentrated in low-wage 
occupations (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988; 120). This created the 
situation described by Rodwin (1989; 14-15 see also Bluestone, 2003; ix) 
in which workers found themselves ‘”skidding down” into catch-as-can 
employment’, taking jobs which offered ‘lower pay and benefits, less 
dignity, less structure, and less security’ (Armstrong and Mullin, 1987; 
11). These types of jobs were taken out of necessity, since men who 
had not worked a full complement of years did not qualify for even 
minimal retirement benefits (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; 79). As in 
the UK much of this service growth was not the direct replacement of 
industrial jobs, but instead drew in more female labour to fill positions.  
 
Subsequently, the economic growth experienced by the US during the 
1990s, based on technological innovation (particularly in IT) or the ‘new 
economy’, saw incomes become further geographically and socially 
polarised (Rosenburg, 2003; 309-310). This boom offered little for old 
industrial areas, which missed out almost entirely on high-end growth as 
the US economy became the leading performer among advanced 
economies in the creation of low-waged work (Dicken, 2007; Krugman, 
1994; 23-24; Cormier and Craypo, 2000; 705). While at the national 
level some evidence of improvement in wages emerged during the late 
1990s and the proportion earning poverty wages declined slightly, the 
rate of improvement slowed markedly between 2000-2005 (Mishel et al, 
                                                 
44 The picture of manufacturing job creation in the US has become more complex than 
the patterns of change associated with the shift from the rustbelt to the sunbelt which 
characterised the deindustrialisation of the 1980s. For example, there has been some 
recovery in the Midwest. However this investment has tended to be concentrated in 
non-metropolitan areas away from the previous sites of production (see Essletzbichler, 
2004).  
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2007; Tables 3.4 and 3.7). For those earning the least however (the 
bottom tenth percentile) the situation has deteriorated further and 
their real wages in 2005 were less than in 1979 (ibid, Table 3.17). 
Similarly the real hourly wage has fallen since the 1970s for workers 
with below college education, and especially for those who did not 
finish high school (ibid, Tables 3.4, 3.5). There also remain 25% of 
workers earning poverty wages (ibid, Table 3.7).  
 
3.3   Mobility through migration and commuting 
 
Geographical labour market mobility may involve either out-migration, 
a permanent or semi-permanent residential move, or commuting, 
through which workers travel outside their area of residence for 
employment.
45 Migration decisions can be either a ‘proactive choice’ or 
a ‘reactive necessity’. In the former, migration is a positive strategy to 
improve wages and/or skills and general quality of life; in the latter, it 
is ‘undesired but necessary’, a ‘geographical strategy of last resort’ 
(Castree et al, 2004; 199).
46  
 
Much of the US policy towards mitigating the impacts of 
deindustrialisation rested on the assumption that labour markets would 
adjust through migration. While such geographical mobility may 
improve the effective working of national economies, high levels of 
mobility can also have negative localised effects. A region’s endowment 
of human capital is crucial in determining its future prospects for 
economic growth (see Florida, 2002; 220-222; also Glaeser, 2000). 
Large-scale out-migration can therefore erode local social capital. It 
can also breakdown social and kinship networks, and engender a lack of 
commitment to locality (Green, 2004; 630; Donovan et al 2002; 22). 
                                                 
45 This can vary from daily to weekly long-distance commuting (see Green et al, 1999). 
46 Often these distinctions are not clear cut and vary for workers from the same plant, 
it depends on their satisfaction with the areas pre-closure, and their situation in the 
place of destination (for example see Castree et al, 2004; 203-204 on the migration of 
Corus workers from Ebbw Vale to Ijmuiden).  
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Discussion of migratory process should therefore be sensitive to both 
sender and receiver regions.  
 
Migration 
 
The UK resistance to migration  
 
The lack of willingness in the UK to move for work has been the basis of 
much academic debate in recent years. Mobility rates in the UK are 
much lower than in the US, with around 8% and 16% respectively of the 
population moving home in 1996/7 (Gregg et al, 2004; 378). In the UK 
most of these moves are also intra-regional, often over very small 
distances and are much more likely to be for housing rather than job 
related reasons (Donovan et al, 2002; 2-6; Dixon, 2003, 194).  
 
Migration is also strongly linked to socio-economic status. Through the 
1980s, non-manual workers in the UK were three times more likely to 
make inter-regional moves than manual workers (Bailey and Turok, 
2000). This suggests that adjusting to job loss through migration 
responses has been ‘particularly difficult for manual workers’ (Bailey 
and Turok, 2000; Webster 2000). Furthermore, while migration from 
areas of low labour demand to areas of high demand has the potential 
to reduce overall unemployment, speculative residential moves among 
the unemployed in the UK are very rare (Dixon, 2003; 191; Gregg et al, 
2004; 373-393). It has been suggested that the overrepresentation of 
the unemployed in social housing appears to limit mobility (Gregg et al, 
2004; 397).
47  
 
Beatty et al (1997) demonstrate in their aggregate studies of labour 
market change that migration has however been a significant 
                                                 
47 This is probably the result of local authority housing policy which generally gives 
priority to those currently resident in the district. Only 14 percent of new lettings in 
social housing are movers from another region compared to 37 percent of new private-
sector lettings (Gregg et al, 2004; 384 & 397).  
  68 
component of adjustment in coalfield areas, with some 59,600 men 
moving out between 1981 and 1991, 4.8% of the economically active 16-
64 year old males.  However, Hollywood (2002), using evidence from 
the Sample of Anonymised Records (SARs) – a sample of individual 
census returns, finds that migration has not been a significant labour 
market response by former miners. This apparently conflicting evidence 
suggests that while out-migration has been a general response to 
industrial decline, it has not been by those groups directly affected by 
job losses. Instead, it involved individuals affected either by multiplier 
effects, or those who simply to move for residential reasons. There is 
also a sound financial explanation to the immobility of ex-miners who 
received fairly substantial redundancy, typically in the region of 
£15,000 to £30,000, which was often used to pay off mortgages (Beatty 
and Fothergill, 1999; 44; Critcher et al, 1995; 22; also Tomaney et al, 
1999; 408 on Swan Hunter). Having done this, some were essentially 
trapped by low property prices compared with other areas, and even by 
negative equity. 
 
The US frontier spirit 
 
In contrast to the UK, high labour mobility is a well established part of 
US life. The propensity for migration which fascinated De Tocqueville 
(1969; 536) some 170 years ago still persists to this day (Gregg et al, 
2004; 373). Although the differences have been subject to swings over 
time, during the last thirty years US labour mobility has been 
approximately double that of Europe (see Jacoby and Finkin, 2004; 8-9). 
In addition, the occupational structure has been the reverse of that in 
the UK. In the US during the 1980s manual workers were 30% more likely 
to move out of their county of residence than non-manual workers 
(Hughes and McCormick, 2000; 15 cited in Donovan et al 2002; 7). 
 
Migration has therefore been a significant response to 
deindustrialisation in the US. An extreme example is the industrial  
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hobo, documented by Maharidge and Williamson (1985; 7), a new class 
of people who, on losing blue-collar jobs, simply travelled the country 
looking for work. The context surrounding this US style mobility is 
neatly summed up by John Hoerr (1988; 12-13): 
 
‘This is wide, broad shouldered America, where 
there is always room someplace else for people 
abandoned by their livelihood. Are you an 
unemployed steelworker from the Mon Valley? 
Well, move on, brother! The first hill is the 
hardest one to cross. After that, the 
opportunities are limitless…Texas, Arizona, or 
anyplace from here to there where McDonald’s 
need someone to serve that one-trillionth 
burger.’ 
 
While mobility of this type has been promoted by the Federal 
Government as a way of boosting national economic efficiency, the 
costs of the large-scale loss of skilled labour for a transmitting region 
are high. Migration is self-selective, so that those who move out are 
likely to be younger and more employable, while older members of 
communities and African-Americans less likely to move (Raphael and 
Ricker, 1999; 17-46 cited in Jacoby and Finkin, 2004; 11). The character 
of the region is therefore altered, leaving behind the ‘poor, elderly and 
disabled’ and, in short, the likelihood of a recovery diminishes (Sweet, 
1999; 248; Cunningham and Martz, 1986). The loss of a viable work 
force also reduces the tax base, with multiplier effects on local 
businesses and services.  
 
Such a population loss, experienced by many old industrial areas, also 
had pronounced implications for local housing markets. These were 
particularly significant in relation to changing federal policy for housing 
as the government began to curb its involvement in direct housing 
provision, relying instead on private sector renting. This policy, known 
as Section 8, was established as part of the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974 and is now the ‘dominant form of federal 
housing assistance’ (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2003; Ellen  
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et al, 2005; 5; Turner et al, 2000; 8; 53). Section 8 provides public 
housing vouchers for low-income families to live in privately rented 
accommodation. The voucher covers ‘the difference between 30 
percent of adjusted family income and a PHA determined payment 
standard or the gross rent for the unit, whichever is lower’ 
(www.hud.gov). 
 
Problems can develop with Section 8 in areas of weak housing demand, 
however, with landlords buying up cheap properties to attract tenants 
with Section 8 vouchers. In such circumstances there are stronger 
incentives for landlords to misuse the programme by not sanctioning 
unacceptable behaviour or by taking in problem tenants to provide a 
guaranteed income where there are difficulties in finding paying private 
tenants (Pollock and Rutlowski, 1998 cited in Turner et al, 2000; 23). 
There are also racial aspects to this, as mixed or predominantly black 
neighbourhoods are more likely to have low property values, making 
them most susceptible to the influx of Section 8 tenants.  
 
The transfer of housing into Section 8 programmes can therefore cause 
friction with existing residents because of possible negative effects on 
the values of surrounding properties. There may also be ‘population mix 
effects’, or a worry that such housing brings in poverty and joblessness 
affecting the ‘neighbourhood's quality of life’ (Ellen et al, 2005; 11).
48 
In recent years there has been strong neighbourhood opposition to 
increasing numbers of Section 8 households in Boston, Chicago, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore and St Louis (Turner et al, 2000; 15).
49 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 There are very few studies on the impacts of Section 8 because of difficulties with 
accessing accurate data (Ellen et al, 2005; 1-2).  
49 In Boston when these issues were probed it was found that most of the behaviour 
problems were actually attributable to unsubsidised families (Turner et al, 2000; 15).  
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Commuting 
 
Increased commuting is another way through which worker mobility 
mediates the impacts of local economic shocks. The extent to which 
commuting may achieve this is highly dependent on geography, and 
particularly on proximity to more buoyant local labour markets. 
Unfortunately for many deindustrialised localities, including 
Northumberland and the Mon Valley, their local decline was often part 
of a more extensive regional trend.  
 
The UK reluctance to commute 
 
Recent empirical work by Beatty et al (2005) has suggested that 
increased out-commuting was a very small response to mining job losses 
in all the coalfields areas over the period 1981-1991, increasing by only 
4500 men, or 0.4% of the economically active males (16-64)
50. There 
are two main explanations for this. First, the peripheral and relatively 
inaccessible location of many of the coalfields meant that the monetary 
and non-monetary costs of travelling to work in surrounding areas 
created a ‘friction of distance’, which limit the scope of an individual’s 
employment field (Webster, 2006; 113). Secondly, a reluctance to 
travel too far for work is considered by some to be ‘culturally 
ingrained’ in the coalfields, an example of the ‘cognitive lock-in’ 
referred to earlier
51 (CTRU, 1992; 26 cited in Waddington, 2003; 12). 
Parry (2003), in her work on coalmining decline, similarly documented 
‘survivalists’ who prioritised local work and were unwilling to travel 
far, thereby limiting their labour market options.
52 While the 
                                                 
50 There is of course some geographical diversity of experience with regards 
commuting rate change from different coalfield areas which is detailed in Beatty et al 
(2005) and Townsend and Hudson (2005). 
51 Hudson (2005; 587-588) has argued that state policies aimed at breaking unwanted 
forms of lock-in, including such relative immobility, have been largely unsuccessful.  
52 Drawing on work by McCrone (1994), Parry suggests a framework for investigating 
labour market change in deindustrialised areas which divides individual’s responses to 
economic change into two different responses; the ‘strategic’ and the ‘survivalist’ 
approach (Parry, 2003). The approach adopted depends on an individual’s resource 
endowment in terms of both financial and social capital. The ‘survivalists’ approach is  
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immediate implications of this reluctance are well documented the 
inter-generational aspects remain unexplored. 
 
The US more accepting attitude towards commuting 
 
In general commuting patterns in the US have tended to be somewhat 
broader than those in the UK as a result of the dominance of private 
transport and the process of suburbanisation (the separation of 
residential and production geographies). There is little evidence to 
suggest that a cultural reluctance to commute such as that described in 
the UK coalfields applies in the US. Past studies show that displaced 
workers were not averse to commuting increased distances to 
employment (see Armstrong and Mullin’s 1987 study of Massachusetts). 
However, in many cases the scale of this response would have been 
limited either by broader regional decline, or, for some of the smaller 
industrial towns, by the distances between them and other employment 
centres. 
 
In the Mon Valley, for example, there was already significant 
commuting by industrial workers at the time of closures. Whereas 
historically workers would have lived and worked in the same 
community this relationship had been changing since the 1970s as well-
off steelworkers began to move outwards from the mill towns into the 
suburbs, escaping from the pollution of the mills (Cunningham and 
Martz, 1986; 71-72; Mon Valley Regional/ Urban Assistance Team, 1988; 
24; Department of Engineering and Public Policy School of Urban and 
Public Affairs and Department of Social Science, 1983; 9-10; Yamatani 
et al, 1989). By 1980, over half of all steel workers were working 
outside their town of residence (Department of Engineering and Public 
                                                                                                                                  
to find paid work for the primary aim of immediate material gain; ‘strategists’, 
however, had undergone a process of investing in their labour market futures, putting 
a long-term strategy ahead of short-term gain and had adopted a range of work (not 
just paid employment) to achieve an ‘occupational satisfaction qualitatively 
comparable to those provided by traditional forms of coalmining’ (Parry, 2003; 241).  
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Policy School of Urban and Public Affairs and Department of Social 
Science, 1983; 55-56).  
 
3.4   The role of public money in regeneration and economic 
development 
 
Over the past 25 years both the UK and the US have been undergoing a 
substantial neoliberal realignment of the relationship between state 
and market. Although the state has retained a significant role in local 
economic development in its setting of priorities and in provision of 
funding, such funding, particularly in the UK, has not been insignificant 
though it has arguably been neither enough nor effectively targeted. 
This section summarises evidence for the role of government (and 
governance) in deindustrialised localities in the two countries.  
 
In the 1980s both the UK and US national governments began to cut 
back on welfare spending and tighten eligibility criteria on key benefits 
(Cochrane et al, 2001; 74-75; Green, 1995; 374). The aim was to reduce 
perceived disincentives and encourage more people to work. However, 
the speed and scale of this change were more measured and less 
complete in the UK, and welfare remains relatively more ‘generous’. 
There are also other important differences in terms of the state role in 
mitigating the impacts of industrial decline. While in the UK aggregate 
public funding on social expenditures was cut back in the 1980s, 
considerable amounts of public money have been made available to 
alleviate the worst impacts of deindustrialisation, and support those 
communities most affected. This was particularly true from the early 
1990s onwards. In the US, in contrast, the scale of public money 
available for economic development was radically slashed in the 1980s, 
and reliance was placed on adjustments in factor markets, particularly 
through labour migration, with much less public support provided to 
prop up or regenerate those communities most affected. 
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The UK, market damage but publically funded regeneration 
 
In Britain, the extent of state involvement in the economy was reined 
back from the mid 1970s onwards as a result of changing fiscal 
priorities, in a transition from a social democratic model to a new 
more neoliberal mode of engagement (Hudson, 2005; 585; Lloyd et al, 
2006; 2). Spending on regional policies declined, and nationalised 
industries including coal, steel, electricity supply and shipbuilding were 
rationalised and privatised (Hudson, 2005; 585). Before this the public 
sector was felt to be the ‘natural mechanism’ for alleviating the 
problems of private market failure. The Thatcher government, 
however, saw the public sector as a cause of, rather than solution to, 
problems with economic development. With this in mind they created a 
slew of initiates aimed at giving the private sector a lead in urban 
problems including Task Forces, Urban Development Corporations and 
Enterprise Zones (Parkinson and Evans, 1990; 65). 
 
Economic and physical regeneration in the coalfields 
 
British coalfield areas contain around 9% of the national population, and 
they retain considerable political weight (Royal Geographical Society, 
1999). Their geographical scale meant that significant amounts of public 
funding had to be made available to facilitate regeneration after the 
closures of the 1980s. Funding received in the aftermath of closures, 
although comparing poorly with the planned transitions away from coal 
production in other European countries, nevertheless represented a 
significant political response (see Critcher et al, 1995 for an Anglo-
German comparison). The resources were provided by central 
government to local actors, particularly local authorities, with no 
coherent national policy for influencing the geography of job creation. 
 
The emphasis of regeneration policies in the coalfields was based on 
three objectives: physical renewal and improving local infrastructure;  
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labour market policies; and empowering of local communities 
(Waddington et al, 2001; 161). By the early 1990s it became 
increasingly clear that the problems faced by the coalfields would not 
be solved either ‘naturally’ (i.e., through the market), or quickly. In 
1993 the Government implemented a package worth £75 million to 
support supply-side policies of skills development and job search 
programmes in coalfield areas, as well as an equivalent amount to 
provide business sites (DTI, 1993 cited in Waddington et al, 2001; 18). 
Generally these attempts were uncoordinated and largely failed to 
arrest the ongoing economic and social decline, as the emphasis on 
supply-side did nothing to address the fundamental problem, which was 
lack of jobs (Critcher et al, 1995; 21-28). 
 
By the mid 1990s, English Partnerships, the national regeneration 
agency, extended earlier programmes on a much larger scale including 
a huge programme of land remediation in the coalfields, including over 
5,600 acres of land transferred from British Coal Enterprise (BCE), 
investing £385 million over ten years with the hope of creating over 
50,000 jobs (Beynon et al, 2006b; 12). BCE themselves spent a further 
£101 million on job creation programmes, though there is some doubt 
about their claim to have helped create 130,000 new jobs (Beynon et 
al, 2006b; 13). While there are questions over job creation outcomes, 
the reclamation of colliery sites did make significant environmental 
improvements and at least provided some infrastructure for future 
investment. 
 
In 1997, when the Labour government came to power, some hoped the 
long-term future of what was left of the coal industry would be 
secured. While these hopes may have been disappointed, its approach 
towards coalfield regeneration has been somewhat more positive. In 
response to the Coalfields Taskforce report (1998) over £1 billion a year 
was made available to Local Authorities containing coalfield 
communities. A further £354 million was assigned by the Coalfields  
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Regeneration Trust to community initiatives and an estimated £70 
million of Single Regeneration Budget funding targeted at the coalfields 
(Beynon et al, 2006b; 15; Waddington, 2003; 33). These resources had 
some positive impacts, particularly in upgrading the infrastructure but 
in the case of many coalfield areas has been insufficient to encourage 
the required private sector investment. 
 
The central government is not the only important funder of the 
coalfields regeneration. The EU was an increasingly significant actor 
through its regional policy in the 1990s, which was estimated to be 
worth as much £200 million a year in the late 1990s to the UK coalfields 
(The Coalfields Taskforce, 1998; para 6.5). This figure will though have 
declined sharply since changes in the Structural Funds, the end of 
RECHAR, and the statistical effect of enlargement (Bennett et al, 2000; 
40).  
 
The Northumberland coalfield area was one such beneficiary of 
European money. It was designated as being within an Objective 2 area 
(1994-1996; 1997-1999; 2000-2006) to fund initiatives aimed at 
enhancing entrepreneurship, SME growth, investing in business and 
tourism sites, and community projects. Earlier funding periods focused 
on improving infrastructure to attract inward investment and 
developing knowledge based industries (Europa, 2004a; 2004b). The 
RECHAR Programmes (1991-1993, 1994-1997) have also helped fund 
environmental improvements, infrastructure development, community 
development, image improvement, tourism development and human 
resources development in the coalfield (Europa, 2004c).  
 
For all these resources there remain very substantial economic and 
social problems in the coalfields and regeneration attempts have been 
at best partially successful. Indeed a recent ‘Coalfield Communities’ 
report published by an ODPM Select Committee found that the 
coalfields would require at least two more decades of sustained public  
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subsidy (Regeneration and Renewal, 19
th March, 2004). The money has 
certainly made some difference, in particular to the environment, and 
also to those individuals who have benefited from retraining or funding 
to develop small enterprises. It is nevertheless difficult to escape the 
conclusion that much of what has been done could have been done 
more effectively. The net result of the various strands of regeneration 
policies appear less than the sum of their parts, with a much more 
strategic and wide-ranging approach required. In their evaluation of 
regeneration measures for the coalfields Waddington et al (2001; 165) 
found that: 
 
i.  land reclamation is feasible but its economic impacts are 
undetermined;  
 
ii.  branch plant investment by large organisations is the most 
effective way of replacing employment but there remain 
problems over job quality and the threat of relocation;  
 
iii.  re-skilling the workforce creates the paradox of whether to train 
for high technology jobs that may not arrive, or for locally 
available low skilled/low wage jobs; 
 
iv.  belief in the contribution of small business creation owes more to 
ideological commitment than economic realities, and  
 
v.  tourism gives more of a boost to image than the economy. 
 
The problems faced by many coalfields are qualitatively different from 
the types of urban problems which have also attracted much public 
money in the UK. The physical location and the culture of mining 
communities pose specific challenges for regeneration policies. Many 
coalfields are in rural locations and depended almost entirely on 
coalmining, with often poor transport infrastructure which still hampers  
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investment and commuting. Many also have very poor or run-down built 
environments with properties dating back to the 19
th century often no 
longer suitable for occupation (Beynon et al, 2006e; 4). Coalfields also 
face difficulties which go beyond the economic as their collapse 
‘undermined a range of social regulation that were grounded in the 
politics of the workplace and the trade unions’ (Waddington et al, 
2001; 3; Bennett et al, 2000; 2-4). As we have seen, some of the norms 
which grew up around the production relationship, including the 
dependency on local waged work, have proved particularly entrenched. 
There is a sense that insufficient attention has been paid to these 
differences, the result of which has been less effective policy 
outcomes.  
 
The US withdrawal of federal support and the inadequacy of state and 
local actors 
 
As a precursor to Britain’s experience, in the early 1980s the Reagan 
administration set out to encourage flexibility in labour markets by 
lowering the effective minimum wage and curbing union power 
(Rosenberg, 2003; 234). This resulted in a sharp erosion in the value of 
the Federal Minimum Wage, which was on a par with the poverty level 
in 1980 but 30 percent below by 1990 (Harvey, 2006; 18).
53 The 
administration also increased the minimum federal requirements for 
claiming Unemployment Insurance (UI) meaning fewer workers 
qualified, while also reducing its value. This approach was so 
‘successful’ that by 1988 only 32% of America’s unemployed received 
UI, down from 76% in 1975 (Levitan et al, 1986; 165 and Baldwin and 
McHugh, 1992 cited in Rosenberg, 2003; 245). 
 
Historically the US Federal Government has had a very limited 
involvement in regional policy, largely adopting a ‘laissez-faire stance 
                                                 
53 The poverty level is defined as two-thirds of the average wage.  
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to the spatial distribution of economic growth’ (Sweet, 1999; 242).
54 
This has deep cultural roots: in the US, communities have always been 
commodified, as places to be ‘bought, consumed and discarded when 
no longer exploitable’ (Hill, 1983; 18). Gold Rush towns of the west, or 
the sawmill towns of Michigan and Wisconsin now exist only in memory. 
 
Since the 1930s the emphasis of regional development programmes has 
been on helping individuals and communities to compete more 
effectively, rather than attempting to influence demand for labour 
directly. Furthermore, these programmes have generally been under-
funded and inadequate to tackle structural decline (see Wilson, 2003; 
181; 197-198). This stance was further entrenched by the Carter 
administration’s (1977-1981) ‘regional policy’, the primary purpose of 
which was encouraging population mobility, finding ways to ‘increase 
mobility in assisting people to follow jobs, rather than concentrating on 
efforts to direct jobs to where people are’ (Sweet, 1999; 242). This 
approach was again extended by the Reagan administration who saw 
attempts to limit the mobility of labour and capital as a barrier to 
raising ‘the wealth of the entire nation’, believing that workers ‘should 
be encouraged to move to areas with labour needs’ (Sweet, 1999; 248). 
This aim was pursued by making it more difficult for depressed areas to 
provide the services which might impede the mobility of redundant 
workers (Warren, 1990; 549 summarised from Clark, 1983; Friedland, 
1983; Yago, 1983). At a time of large industrial closures, the welfare of 
local communities was therefore firmly subordinated to the goal of 
                                                 
54 The partial exceptions to this were the Economic Development Administration, 
Appalachian Regional Commission and Title V Regional Commissions established during 
the Kennedy-Johnson administrations in the 1960s. The 1970s the HUD programmes, 
Community Development Block Grants and Urban Development Action Grants also 
served to target economic aid to depressed localities, though without any evidence 
that they formed a coherent plan (Sweet, 1999; 240-242). The Economic Development 
Administration, one of the few federal programs which does have some direct spatial 
economic development component has been watered down, weakened, and had its 
budget slashed by successive administrations since the 1970s (ibid; 264-268). In 2007 
the EDA had a budget of less than $300 million (EDA website). The large number of 
qualifying areas means a ‘wide dispersal of funds in relatively small amounts’, without 
additional funding this is unlikely to create any ‘meaningful increase in economic 
activity’ (ibid; 267).   
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national economic efficiency (Clark, 1983; 156 cited in Warren, 1990; 
542). The budget cuts the Reagan administration made in the 1980s 
were part of a conscious effort to create the conditions for the 
abandonment of regional development programs and state 
‘interference’ in the free market economy, by convincing ‘states and 
communities that they were on their own’ (Sweet, 1999; 293-294; 247; 
Warren, 1990; 549). It was believed that such cuts would necessitate a 
greater reliance on private sector funding to regenerate regional 
economies (for example see Hula [1990] on Baltimore).  
 
Industrial change in the US was therefore accompanied by a ‘hands-off 
policy’ by both the Federal and state governments (Hoerr, 1988; XI). At 
the more local level economic development actors had ‘small budgets 
and few powerful tools at their disposal’ (Markusen and Carlson, 1989; 
51). Where funding was available it was directed at what Glasmeier 
terms third wave models of local economic development policy, which 
emphasised supply-side responses and reducing barriers to employment, 
especially through ‘education and training’ (2000; 562). Such 
(non)regional policies were wholly insufficient to address the deep 
structural changes and loss of demand which deindustrialisation 
produced in local communities (Sweet, 1999; 235). 
 
With the notion of industrial planning ‘virtually absent’ at the local or 
regional level, responsibility for economic revival fell to elected, but 
almost completely unqualified, citizen volunteers in many small 
American towns (see Armstrong and Mullin, 1987; 13-14 on 
Massachusetts). This trend has been further extended in recent years 
with even more emphasis placed on the devolution of responsibility for 
‘alleviating the plight of economically distressed areas’ to the local 
level, though this has not been accompanied by sufficient funding 
55 
                                                 
55 Part of the failure of regional economic development policy in the US is linked to 
the federal structure which precludes programs which do not give a share of benefits 
to every state. Preferential treatment programs designed to help regions in need have 
won passage through Congress only by having loosely defined eligibility criteria, ‘thus  
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(Sweet, 1999; 246; 254). This lack of a coherent regional policy means 
that American communities compete with one another for private and 
public investments, and the taxes and jobs they provide, raising the 
subsidy costs for all (Warren, 1990; 542; Sweet, 1999; 293- 294).  
 
The Mon Valley mill towns  
 
No comparable, industry specific, regeneration plan, such as that of the 
Coalfields Taskforce has been put in place in the US, and individual 
localities are reliant on applying for funding for specific projects on an 
ad hoc basis. There is therefore little scope for generalisation about 
success or failure in a national context beyond a general critique of the 
lack of intervention. The experiences of the Pittsburgh region must 
therefore be considered as no more than an example of policy responses 
to the loss of an industrial base.    
 
There are three significant levels of funding for economic development 
in the US: the Federal Government, state governments, and county 
governments, which are increasingly the most significant actors. As we 
have seen, the Pittsburgh area’s shutdown of steel production came at 
the very time that federal funding assistance for economic development 
was declining (Lubove, 1996; 25-26). This, combined with the cuts in 
state programme assistance budgets for regeneration, left the 
Pittsburgh area with massive economic and social problems, but 
desperately short of funds (Department of Engineering and Public Policy 
School of Urban and Public Affairs and Department of Social Science, 
1983; 37).  
 
                                                                                                                                  
providing a little something for everybody’. This watering down of the basis of needs 
serves to minimise the beneficial impact of the program (Sweet, 1999; 250-251). 
There are therefore no coherent federal policies for regional development. Instead, 
depressed localities have to turn to many different federal agencies and programs for 
different aspects of aid (ibid; 250-251).  
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Where federal funding for the region was provided during the 1980s it 
largely went to the City of Pittsburgh, with little going to the area’s 
industrial communities (Gleeson and Paytas, 2005; 202). Although state 
funding through the Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority 
increased in the 1980s, the region’s industrial communities again 
received less funding per capita than either the City or the residential 
suburbs (Gleeson and Paytas, 2005; 207). At the county level a major 
development plan, Strategy 21 was similarly enacted in Pittsburgh in 
the 1980s, though again the Mon Valley received ‘little attention and 
even less funding’ (Mitchell-Weaver, 1992 cited in Detrick, 1999; 7).  
 
This left very limited public money available to alleviate the huge social 
and economic problems of the Mon Valley (Mon Valley Regional/ Urban 
Assistance Team, 1988; 13; Baum and Twiss, 1996; 130-131). This lack 
of resources was compounded by an inability to use them strategically, 
as the fragmentation of local government into many jurisdictions and 
the reticence of the towns to work together hampered the regeneration 
effort (Mon Valley Regional/ Urban Assistance Team, 1988; 10).  
 
During the early 1990s the Allegheny County government turned its 
focus to developing the corridor of land between downtown Pittsburgh 
and the airport, again leaving the Mon Valley to languish (Gleeson and 
Paytas, 2005; 194-195). More recent Allegheny County strategies have 
emphasised the potential role of development partnerships with 
universities and hospitals, now the region’s biggest employers, 
particularly with regard to attracting increasing research dollars and 
developing advanced technologies (Detrick, 1999; 7). Such a strategy 
largely creates high-skilled jobs, however, beyond the reach of many in 
the old industrial communities. Those in the greatest need, particularly 
the least skilled, and many in the black communities, therefore reap 
the smallest residual benefits from such an approach.
56 
                                                 
56 The reliance on these non-profit organisations is also problematic because their tax 
exempt status means local governments derive little financial benefit directly from 
their activities (Sbragia, 1990; 63).  
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The region has also mobilised only limited resources from the State for 
physical regeneration in the last few years, fostering selective physical 
redevelopment, with resources poured into ‘glitzy new structures that 
have negligible long-term impacts on economic activity’ (Montarti, 
2006; 10). For example, of the $338.8 million of the Redevelopment 
Assistance Budget funding given to southwestern Pennsylvania by the 
State between 1992 and 2002, some $150 million (39% of the total) 
subsidised new stadia for Pittsburgh’s professional baseball and 
American football teams (Montarti, 2003, 7). This compared with only 
$100 million spent on site development, clean-ups and industrial parks 
(ibid; 7). 
 
The huge scale of the steel mill closures meant that recovery would 
never be a quick process (Mon Valley Regional/ Urban Assistance Team, 
1988; 12). But the general lack of resources from the federal, state and 
county governments has been compounded by the priority targeting of 
public money on Pittsburgh, at the expense of the Mon Valley and other 
industrial communities. The Mon Valley sits in a cat’s cradle of funding 
streams, suffering two-fold. First, budgets have been cut at all levels. 
Secondly, where money has been directed at the area the Mon Valley 
has lost out to the City of Pittsburgh for federal money, the city and the 
airport for county money, and the city’s residential suburbs for state 
money.  
 
3.5   The public welfare context of individual and family support for 
non-employment 
 
There are two forms of non-employment, the unemployed who want a 
job and are actively looking, and the economically inactive who are 
neither employed nor looking for employment. Reasons for inactivity 
include (early) retirement, homemakers, long-term illness, discouraged 
workers, those in education or caring for a relative/friend. In reality  
  84 
there is a strong relationship, and in some cases a continuum, between 
unemployment and inactivity. Long periods of time spent unemployed 
can flow into being a discouraged worker, as individuals adjust to life 
without employment by establishing new routines tailored to their 
reduced income (Warr and Jackson, 1985; 805 cited in Ritchie et al, 
2005; 7-8). The development of health problems may also necessitate a 
change from unemployment to inactivity.  
 
The UK reliance on public help 
 
In the period since the major industrial closures of the 1980s there has 
been a national trend of rising female economic activity rates, while 
those of men have declined (Bryson and McKay, 1994; 5; Owen et al, 
1984; 470; Green, 1995; 373). There has also been a clear geography to 
these changes, as Britain’s places of deindustrialisation have seen the 
most significant increases in male inactivity.  
 
The trend of rising male inactivity has been intensively researched, 
particularly by Fothergill and his associates at Sheffield Hallam. They 
argue that Britain’s official unemployment measures seriously 
underestimate unemployment in areas of labour market disadvantage. 
Looking specifically at the coalfields, Beatty et al (1997) show a sharp 
reduction in economic activity among men during the 1980s, with 
84,600 withdrawing from the labour force (between 1981 and 1991), 
amounting to 6.8% of the economically active male population. Similarly 
Fieldhouse and Hollywood (1999) used the SARs to suggest a huge 
growth in hidden unemployment amongst the permanently sick in 
coalfield areas between 1981 and 1991 (1999; 487-489 see also 
Tomaney et al, 1999; 408 on Swan Hunter). It has recently been 
estimated that up to 100,000 men in coalfield communities who are 
inactive may be classed as ‘hidden unemployed’ (Beatty et al, 2005; 2) 
defined as those who, in a fully employed economy, could reasonably  
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be expected to work (Beatty and Fothergill, 1996; 2004; Fothergill, 
2001).
57  
 
Declining male participation has been accompanied by a steep rise in 
the number of recipients of Incapacity Benefit (IB), from 700,000 in 
1979 to 2.6 million in 1997, and by a further 100,000 after 1997 (DWP, 
2005; 41). Beatty and Fothergill believe that the great majority of 
people are not claiming benefits fraudulently, but that the qualification 
test for IB, which assesses the ability to undertake certain physical tasks 
rather than to do any form of work, means many who could work are 
classified as permanently sick (2004; 5). Many former miners with 
health conditions resulting from a life of hard industrial work fell into 
this category (Beatty and Fothergill, 2004; 5). There is also an economic 
rationale to the decision of former industrial workers to claim sickness 
benefits. The job vacancies taken by those who are out of work are 
dominated by entry-level jobs. Their low wages, compared with levels 
of benefits, can therefore act as a disincentive (Gregg and Wadsworth, 
2000; 517- 518). There is also some evidence that local arrangements 
had facilitated the movement of industrial workers onto sickness 
benefits.  Murray et al (2005; 350) found that some ex-miners in South 
Yorkshire had ‘worked the system’ by exaggerating health limitations 
after redundancy because of the advantages of claiming sickness 
benefit over unemployment benefits. Strangleman’s work on the 
coalfields also describes how sympathetic ‘socialist’ doctors would sign 
off ex-miners (2001; 260-261). 
 
As the numbers of men claiming IB who were previously employed in 
heavy industry begins to decline as they reach retirement age it is less 
clear what is driving continuing high IB claim rates. Part of the 
explanation is that welfare reform has made IB comparably more 
                                                 
57 Beynon et al (2006f; 18) found during interview research in the coalfields that high 
levels of sickness do exist and they urge caution in assigning all (or most) of those on 
IB to the category of the ‘hidden unemployed’ which they find is only a partial 
explanation.  
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attractive. It is worth more to a recipient than Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA), and is not means-tested (except in a small minority of cases 
where the recipient has a substantial pension), unlike the JSA after six 
months (Fothergill, 2001; 243). The result in depressed labour markets 
has been to favour being on sickness benefits rather than 
unemployment benefits (Webster, 2006; 111). Levels of inactivity more 
generally, however, are correlated with prevailing local labour market 
and social conditions, concentrated in areas with high unemployment, 
and among older, less skilled men and people living in local authority 
housing (Dickens et al, 2000; 102). Almost 40% of IB claimants now cite 
mental health issues as their main disability, in numbers that exceeds 
the official unemployment count (Young Foundation, 2006).
58 
 
Recent political debate about the rising numbers of people claiming 
Incapacity Benefit and its geographical concentration has led the 
Government to seek to reduce the numbers of long-term claimants. 
Recently the ‘Pathways to Work’ programme has been rolled-out under 
which new claimants are mandated to attend five work focused 
interviews at Jobcentre Plus, the organisation responsible for managing 
eligibility for benefits. For those already in receipt of the benefit, 
measures aimed at re-integrating them into the labour market include 
both financial measures (a £40 per week Return to Work Credit) and 
non-financial incentives, including healthier workplaces, more active 
GPs, a more enhanced role for employers, and return to work support 
(DWP, 2005; 42-51). Of greater significance are the changes planned for 
Autumn 2008, when Incapacity Benefit will be replaced by the 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), placing much greater 
emphasis on the work an individual can, rather than cannot do (see 
                                                 
58 In their recent work Beatty and Fothergill (2004) estimated that national diversion 
(i.e., the hidden unemployed) to sickness benefits is around 650,000 for men, while a 
recent Green Paper (2006), A new deal for welfare, estimated that around one million 
people on sickness benefits want to and could work. Interestingly Beatty and 
Fothergill’s work suggests that, even given full employment, levels of sickness would 
still be substantial. It seems therefore that strong labour demand is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for reducing high levels of inactivity (Dickens et al, 2000; 
104).  
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Appendix II for details). The swifter and tougher Personal Capability 
Assessments (PCAs) of ESA is likely to choke the inflow of new 
claimants. At present there are no firm plans for the ESA to apply to 
current claimants, but they will be subject to revised PCAs. The 
evidence nevertheless suggests that any policy aimed at pushing people 
off IB in deindustrialised areas with weak local labour demand is likely 
to trigger another benefit shift, this time a reversal from IB to JSA 
(Beatty et al, 2008). 
 
The US weaker safety net 
 
There are greater financial penalties for both economic inactivity and 
unemployment in the US than in the UK, with the US labour market 
matching ‘much more closely the economist’s ideal of a freely 
competitive matching of supply and demand’ (Krugman, 1994; 23). 
Unemployment benefits are small and time-limited, generally to six 
months, and workers are under great pressure to accept jobs at 
whatever level of wages they are offered (Krugman, 1994; 23). After 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) eligibility has expired the unemployed 
become reliant on welfare, itself now also subject to time limits (OECD, 
2002; 13).  
 
In the short-term after closures, unemployment rates tended to be 
high. Workers displaced in the early 1980s in the Middle Atlantic region, 
of which Pennsylvania is part, had unemployment rates of around 22 
percent by the mid 1980s (Horvath, 1987 cited in Markusen and Carlson, 
1989; 33; see also Bluestone, 1984).
59 Despite welfare cutbacks and 
time limits the high levels of unemployment in the mill towns reflected 
the real lack of available, or accessible, opportunities (Yamatani et al, 
1989). Indeed the municipalities of McKeesport and West Mifflin 
Borough had the highest and 10th highest unemployment rates of all 
                                                 
59 Figures refer to the situation in 1986 of those who lost jobs in plant closures 
between 1981 and 1985.   
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Minor Civil Divisions in the state of Pennsylvania through the 1980s 
(Singh and Bangs, 1988; 5).
60  
 
Since the large industrial closures the process of welfare reform in the 
US has been particularly thorough compared to UK experiences. In 1992 
President Clinton pledged to “end welfare as we know it”. This pledge 
was fulfilled in 1996 when the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) programme was replaced by the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) programme, under which welfare responsibility was 
decentralised to the states, who were then obliged to reduce welfare 
numbers (Cochrane et al, 2001; 140). The reassertion of variable state 
welfare has therefore rolled back the welfare gains achieved during the 
civil rights era and earlier phases of increasing federalisation (Peck, 
2001; 102). When TANF replaced AFDC, recipients were ‘obliged to find 
paid employment as quickly as possible’, with an emphasis on getting 
any job (Daguerre, 2004; 46). This transformation of welfare to 
workfare, involving the residualisation of welfare and the compulsion of 
those on benefits to fulfil work requirements, was rooted in critiques of 
‘welfare dependency’ (Peck and Theodore, 2001; 429).  
 
As we have seen, however, welfare does not only include 
unemployment benefits, but also a range of other income replacement 
benefits. In the US during the last 25 years there has also been some 
growth in the numbers claiming sickness benefits, though not to the 
extent of that in the UK (OECD, 2003; Kemp et al, 2006). Some of this 
growth has been attributed to workers losing jobs in manufacturing 
industries and not being able to find alternative work (Rupp and 
Stapleton, 1995; 58:4). The numbers claiming sickness benefits in the 
US in the late 90s, however, represented only around 4.6% of the 
population aged between 20-64 (OECD, 2003); in the UK the figure for 
those of working-age was around 7.0% (Webster, 1999). The more 
limited US growth was largely due to tougher criteria of assessment for 
                                                 
60 Figures refer to places with a population of over 25,000.  
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eligibility, whereby adults are eligible only if they cannot ‘engage in 
any substantial gainful activity’ (Department for Social Security)
61. 
 
Geographical variations are also less pronounced in the US, and are 
biased towards the southern states rather than the northern industrial 
heartlands (McVicar, 2006; 521). This may in part be due to the linking 
of disability benefits to a replacement value based on the national 
average wage, which makes them worth relatively more in low-wage 
states (Autor and Duggan, 2003). There is also less evidence in the US as 
to whether regional differences reflect health or labour market factors 
(see McVicar, 2006; 526). It would therefore be expected that a move 
onto sickness benefits would be less significant in the Mon Valley than in 
comparable situations in the UK.  
 
How the benefits compare 
 
OECD Benefit Systems and Work Incentives published data allow some 
direct comparisons to be made between benefit systems in the UK and 
the US, including the value of unemployment benefits relative to 
earnings among different household types. For each country the OECD 
studies estimate Net Replacement Rates (NRR) to show the net income 
the unemployed receive as a proportion of average net income of 
workers. NRRs are calculated for the short-term unemployed and also 
for the long-term jobless who have exhausted unemployment insurance 
benefits.
62 The levels of earnings for which NRRs are calculated are 
based on the OECD indicator of the country specific Average Production 
                                                 
61 The Disability Determination Services (DDS) then decides if an impairment or 
combination of impairments is severe, stating that: ‘An impairment is severe if it 
significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If your 
impairment(s) is not severe, the DDS will find that you are not disabled.  
Examples of basic work activities are: physical functions such as standing, walking, 
sitting, lifting; seeing, hearing, speaking; understanding and carrying out simple 
instructions; use of judgment; responding appropriately to supervision and co–workers; 
and dealing with changes’. 
62 US Figures for long-term unemployed include Food Stamps which were introduced to 
move away from the payment of cash benefits. These are vouchers which recipients 
exchange for food.  
  90 
Workers (APW) earnings, and are also produced at two-thirds of this 
level. The two-thirds figure allows for the position of a relatively low 
waged worker to be examined compared to unemployment.  
 
There are two main weaknesses in these data. First, they began to be 
produced only in the late 1990s, so that it is not possible to judge the 
earlier positions of the two countries, including at the time of the 
major closures of the 1980s. Secondly, data are limited to 
unemployment benefits, which, as we have seen, have become a 
somewhat less significant aspect of worklessness in recent years. This is 
particularly the case in the UK where sickness benefits and Income 
Support have become more important, and tend to be worth more to 
the recipient than unemployment benefit. 
 
Tables 3.1- 3.4 show figures for a range of household types for the years 
1998 and 2007. In the short-term (during the first month of benefit 
receipt) the UK and US unemployment benefits compensated at around 
the same level in 1998 in comparison to APW earnings. For most groups 
this was at around 60% of earnings. At the two-thirds APW level, 
benefits in the UK were worth significantly more. By the 60th month, 
because of the time-limited nature of US unemployment benefits, UK 
benefits were worth very substantially more at both the APW and two-
thirds APW levels. This is significant because a lower level of benefits 
given over a longer period may have a greater effect on labour market 
actions than higher levels of benefit paid over fewer months (OECD, 
2002; 32).  
 
By 2008 the gap between the US and UK had narrowed somewhat. In the 
short-term, US benefits compared with APW earnings were mostly more 
generous by around 20 percentage points than those in the UK, though 
they were broadly similar at two-thirds APW levels. In the longer-term, 
the UK remains substantially more generous at both the APW and two- 
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thirds APW levels in all cases except for families with had two earners 
prior to claims. 
 
For unemployed young people the differences are even more striking 
(see Table 3.5). The 2002 figures (the latest available) show that youth 
unemployment pays almost nothing in the US, whereas in the UK it 
compensates at 42% of APW earnings levels, and 60% of the two-thirds 
APW level.  
 
The figures clearly show the greater relative generosity of 
unemployment benefits in the UK, even as they have been reduced in 
value by successive rounds of welfare reform. Some argue that this 
reduces the propensity to work, but there are still clearly relatively big 
financial returns to working even at the two-thirds wage, suggesting 
that the work disincentives of welfare payments are not the central 
explanation in areas for worklessness.  
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Table 3.1: Net replacement rates for four family types at two earnings levels after tax and including family and housing benefit in 
the first month of benefit receipt, 1998 
 
  APW level  66.7% of APW level 
  Single  Married 
Couple 
Married 
Couple 2 
children 
Lone 
parent 2 
children 
Single  Married 
Couple 
Married 
Couple 2 
children 
Lone 
parent 2 
children 
UK  52  63  67  56  75  88  80  63 
US  58  60  59  60  59  59  50  52 
(Source: OECD) 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Net replacement rates for four family types at two earnings levels after tax and including family, and housing benefit in 
the 60
th month of benefit receipt, 1998 
  
  APW level  66.7% of APW level 
  Single  Married 
Couple 
Married 
Couple 2 
children 
Lone 
parent 2 
children 
Single  Married 
Couple 
Married 
Couple 2 
children 
Lone 
parent 2 
children 
UK  52  63  76  65  75  88  91  80 
US  7  13  51  43  11  18  58  50 
(Source: OECD) 
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Table 3.3: Net replacement rates for four family types at two earnings levels after tax and including family and housing benefit in 
the first month of benefit receipt, 2007 
 
  APW level  66.7% of APW level 
  Single  Married 
Couple 
(one 
earner) 
Married 
couple 
(two 
earner) 
Married  
couple 
2 
children 
(one 
earner) 
Married  
couple 
2 
children 
(two 
earner) 
Lone 
parent 
2 
children 
Single  Married 
Couple 
(one 
earner) 
Married 
couple 
(two 
earner) 
Married  
couple 
2 
children 
(one 
earner) 
Married  
couple 
2 
children 
(two 
earner) 
Lone 
parent 
2 
children 
UK  41  41  49  60  54  60  58  58  60  70  65  72 
US  62  62  78  56  80  58  62  60  82  49  87  50 
(Source: OECD) 
 
Table 3.4: Net replacement rates for four family types at two earnings levels after tax and including family, and housing benefit in 
the 60
th month of benefit receipt, 2007 
  
  APW level  66.7% of APW level 
  Single  Married 
Couple 
(one 
earner) 
Married 
couple 
(two 
earner) 
Married  
couple 
2 
children 
(one 
earner) 
Married  
couple 2 
children 
(two 
earner) 
Lone 
parent 2 
children 
Single  Married 
Couple 
(one 
earner) 
Married 
couple 
(two 
earner) 
Married  
couple 2 
children 
(one 
earner) 
Married  
couple 2 
children 
(two 
earner) 
Lone 
parent 2 
children 
UK  41  49  41  67  52  60  58  69  50  79  62  72 
US  7  12  44  40  56  35  10  17  54  48  67  43 
(Source: OECD)  
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Table 3.5: Net Replacement Rates for young unemployed single people at two earnings levels after tax and including family and 
housing benefit in the first and 60
th month of benefit receipt, 2002 
 
  APW Level  66.7% APW level 
  Initial 
(UI or 
UA) 
Long-
term 
(SA) 
Initial  Long-
term 
UK  42  42  60  60 
US  0  7  0  10 
(Source: OECD)  
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3.6   Cultures of worklessness? 
 
One other aspect of unemployment and inactivity which needs to be 
addressed are the transmission effects, or cultural influences, which can 
stem from the absence of work in individual households or communities. 
Such households and communities can often be ‘characterised by multiple 
disadvantages, where people face more than one barrier to participating in 
the labour market’ (Ritchie et al, 2005; 2). Where there is clustering of 
worklessness there can be both place and people effects, as outlined by 
the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU), a Cabinet Office task force charged with 
assessing policy interventions and identifying future trends in poverty and 
disadvantage (2004; 13): 
 
Place effects: arising from the characteristics of 
place, such as location, poor infrastructure, lack of 
transport, competition for limited job/training 
opportunities or variation in the quality of local 
service; and 
 
People effects: these relate to the damaging effect 
of living with many other workless people, for 
example limited information about jobs and area 
based discrimination by some employers’. 
These area effects can have ‘damaging effects on 
residents’ other social and economic outcomes’; 
this can be for example through reduced 
educational attainment or their increased 
likelihood of being the victim of crime, and they 
can also place very significant pressure on public 
and private sector service providers locally. 
 
While stopping short of ascribing a culture of worklessness to many 
deprived communities this SEU report found plenty of evidence that living 
in a workless environment could negatively impact young peoples' attitudes 
towards employment and aspirations to work (page 35).
63 Similarly, work 
                                                 
63 Although a cultural transmission is hinted at in their explanation that ‘Some local areas 
with high worklessness have strong communities and identities, but others – especially  
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undertaken by the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) in Salford 
found that living in a workless community could contribute towards a 
‘poverty of aspiration’ (DWP, 2003 cited in Ritchie et al, 2005; 44). Yet 
further evidence is provided by Page’s work on three different types of 
housing estate. Although not specifically couched in the language of 
culture, this identified an ‘estate effect’ which negatively influenced the 
attitudes of residents towards work and education, in which success was 
‘mocked’ (2000; 22-26). Quite strong peer effects were also found, 
whereby individuals can be content to live on benefits because everyone 
else they know is ‘in the same boat’. 
 
These cultural mechanisms of transmission need, of course, to be placed 
within their structural context. Wilson’s (1997) work emphasises the loss of 
work as an explanation for areas of continuing concentrated 
disadvantage.
64 Similarly, Ritchie et al have described the types of social 
changes and behaviours, including increasing drug taking, and incidences of 
crime and teenage pregnancy, which have developed in many 
disadvantaged localities as a response to structural economic changes 
rather than ‘a growth of deliberate irresponsible behaviour among 
individuals’ (2005, 43). Clearly this is an important area of research which 
requires further attention. 
 
3.7  Concluding comments 
 
This chapter has reviewed earlier empirical evidence to draw out the key 
comparative influences on labour market and community change in the UK 
                                                                                                                                    
those with a high turnover of residents – cannot really be said to have a local ‘culture’ at 
all’. 
64This is in contrast to Murray’s (1996) work on the ‘underclass’ which emphasises the 
cultural explanation, that those who are highly disadvantaged have different moral and 
behavioural norms.  
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and US which may affect the Northumberland and Mon Valley experiences. 
The central findings are: 
 
1.  Studies of displaced workers from both countries show that the 
oldest and the least skilled suffered most from losses of industrial 
jobs. 
2.  In both countries the immediate policy responses to 
deindustrialisation were attempts to attract alternative 
manufacturing investment. More recently in the UK, SME and service 
sector growth has been seen as increasingly important. In both 
countries there has been only limited success in rebuilding the 
productive capacities of these areas, though in the UK significant 
advances have been made in improving the physical environment 
and infrastructure. In both countries more peripheral areas have lost 
out in the scramble for resources to big city neighbours. 
3.  In both countries lost jobs have very often been replaced by jobs 
which are qualitatively different in terms of wages and conditions, 
and often filled by women and by younger generations of male 
workers. The growth in various forms of service employment 
necessitates not just an economic but also a cultural adjustment, 
requiring very different characteristics of employees from those 
required in heavy industry.  
4.  In general labour mobility would be expected to be higher amongst 
American than British workers. Previous studies have shown a much 
lower cultural reluctance among American industrial workers to 
commute as a result of longer-term process of suburbanisation and 
geographically expanded live/work patterns, as well as a greater 
propensity for residential migration.   
5.  The public welfare context is also of considerable importance in 
understanding labour market change. The greater relative 
generosity of unemployment benefit, and the diversion from  
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unemployment to sickness benefits in the UK, has enabled many 
displaced workers to cope in situ in a way that would not be 
possible within the US welfare system. 
6.  While there has clearly been a realignment of the public welfare 
system in the UK towards the American model, important 
differences persist. Benefits remain relatively more generous in the 
UK. There is also a significantly greater degree of public 
intervention in economic development. The historically laissez-faire 
model in the US meant that more resources have been available to 
address the consequences of industrial decline in the UK. While 
many policy responses have been criticised as ineffectual, 
environmental renewal, the attraction of inward investment, the 
maintenance of public service provision, and welfare transfers, have 
supported communities in ways that are much less apparent in the 
US. 
7.  The area and inter-generational effects of employment loss on 
communities are of central importance to understanding longer-
term economic development trajectories. These are the outcomes 
that have been addressed in closer detail by the research reported 
in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 4) Research methodology 
 
A more holistic treatment of local labour markets is taken than that in 
many past studies of deindustrialisation, which focus on displaced workers. 
While illuminating, such studies are limited in two respects. First, they 
neglect the broader community experience of deindustrialisation, including 
the multiplier effects, housing market adjustments, and changing social 
norms, impacting beyond the displaced workers themselves. Secondly, and 
most important, over time the viability of local labour markets and 
communities has come to depend not on the displaced workers, but on 
subsequent generations, whose experience remains under-researched. 
 
4.1   Multi-method research and critical realism 
 
Different methods have been used to ‘address different facets’ of the 
research questions outlined in Chapter 1 (Phillip, 1998; 264). Quantitative 
methods mainly describe ‘how’, while qualitative methods attempt to 
address ‘why’, local labour markets have restructured in different ways. 
An established form of aggregate analysis, Labour Market Accounts (LMAs), 
is used to provide a frame for a schedule of interviews in the case study 
areas.  
 
Divisions still exist within geography between users of quantitative and 
qualitative methods (Philo et al, 1998; 191). Many qualitative methods 
were established as a critique of quantitative research, and questions 
remain as to the extent to which they can be complementary, and their 
theoretical positions reconciled (Flick, 2002; 262-3; Phillip, 1998; 262). In 
recent years however using combinations of methods, seeing them as 
complementary, has become more established, with a recognition that  
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quantitative analysis need not explicitly be tied to positivistic reasoning 
(Flick, 2002; 265). 
 
Critical realism would appear to support a turn away from quantitative 
methods, since it assumes the openness of social systems. However the 
search here is not focused on ‘facts’ or ‘laws’ in a positivist sense, but on 
the systematic processes which occur even within open systems, even 
though these may not hold for all cases and are subject to flux (Martin, 
2004). The approach rests on the ability to uncover and evaluate ‘key 
causal processes and mechanisms’ (Hudson, 2003; 744). These causal 
influences are those which constrain individual agency; in other words, 
‘everything that is there before any given voluntaristic act’ (Lopez and 
Potter, 2001; 30). The search for causality is the attempt to ‘identify 
properties which enable an object to produce or undergo distinctive kinds 
of changes, and indeed are a necessary condition for doing those things’ 
(Sayer, 1997; 471). The tensions inherent between structure and agency in 
such an approach are resolved through Bhaskar’s ‘transformational model’, 
which recognises that, while structures are processes of human activity, 
they at the same time limit the possibilities open to individuals, since they 
also, ‘act upon us’ (Lopez and Potter, 2001; 15). As such the model 
outlines how we ‘reproduce and transform’ social structures, even though 
such structures also causally affect how we do this (ibid, 2001; 15). Case 
studies may not always be representative in a statistical sense, but may be 
representative of these causes, allowing the ‘social processes that underlie 
regional development’ to be revealed (Hudson, 2003; 744).  
 
As we have seen these causal structures are always multiple and non-
deterministic, contingent and context dependent (Hudson, 2006; 377).  
Their study is critical, however, because, ‘at any moment of time we are 
heavily constrained by pre-existing structures’ and it is the operation of 
these structures which needs to be explored (Lopez and Potter, 2001; 30).  
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For example, at the time of redundancy, a worker’s choices may be 
simultaneously constrained by interest rate policy, the housing market, 
government employment policy, the changing international division of 
labour and numerous other factors. The realisation of causal powers is 
therefore time and space specific and depends on the presence and/or 
absence of other causal powers (Hudson, 2003; 743).   
 
Such an approach eschews the positivist conceptions of mainstream 
economics, and the closed systems and empirical regularities that are its 
concerns (Sayer, 2004; 1785- 1786). It thereby moves away from the search 
for powers of future prediction which concern traditional theory, instead 
emphasising the potential for emancipation:  
 
‘the criterion against which [critical theory] it is to 
be judged, is to change the underlying structures 
that generate socially unacceptable and politically 
regressive outcomes (for example, in the form of 
‘problem regions’), the persistence of which would 
allow prediction based on extrapolation of past 
trends to be possible’ (Hudson, 2003; 745). 
 
Why is a multi-method design appropriate?  
 
A multi-method research design is adopted for several reasons. First, as 
has been explained, the study aims to go beyond a focus on displaced 
workers. This is important because loss of employment should be viewed as 
not an individual event but one which heavily impacts on whole households 
and communities (Waddington et al 1998). The adoption of the LMA 
framework therefore allows for interactions to be described between 
displaced and other workers in the labour market. There is also an 
important gender issue to be addressed, with women’s experiences of 
deindustrialisation far less researched than men’s. Secondly, the research 
seeks to identify the dominant causal structures informing readings of the 
labour market and lived experiences. Decision making is a complex  
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process, and in-depth research is needed to avoid inferring causal 
processes solely from aggregate trends (Hanson and Pratt, 2003; 122). A 
combination of methods therefore allows dominant adjustment 
mechanisms to be described and the reasons behind them to be 
investigated. LMAs show the relative importance of different adjustment 
processes in the study areas. They provide the context for local enquiries 
into the causes of local labour market trends. As previous work has 
suggested, such causes may include lack of appropriate job opportunities; 
prevailing levels of unemployment and other welfare benefits; the 
operation of the housing market; employment laws and levels of 
redundancy payments; family and community ties; and supply-side issues, 
such as demographic trends and lack of relevant skills. Local trends are 
also influenced by wider patterns of private investment, government 
policy, regional and local intervention, social and cultural attitudes, and 
levels of unionisation. Lastly, LMAs are useful in identifying aggregate 
supply and demand trends over time, but neglect the fact that not all 
employment outcomes are equal. The gathering of local evidence is thus 
imperative to analyse factors such as wages, working conditions and job 
security in presenting a fuller examination of labour market change. 
 
The research design builds on the previous literature in several key 
respects. First, by linking aggregate analysis to direct enquiry, the danger 
is avoided of assigning causal mechanisms to people’s decisions on the 
basis of figures alone. Secondly, the use of LMAs in association with more 
intensive research methods will support a more holistic local study. This is 
important because plant closure impacts not just on those directly 
displaced but has wider local labour market and community effects. 
Thirdly, labour market change is investigated in inter-generational terms. 
Finally, the longer-term focus of the research is important.  The modern 
condition and futures of these local labour markets now rely on a younger 
generations of workers. It is ‘youth, who will have to live out during their  
  103 
entire work lives the reorganization of society’ (Weis, 1990; 12). With few 
notable exceptions, their experiences remain under-researched (e.g. 
McDowell, 2002, 2003; Nayak, 2003; Weis, 1990).  
 
4.2   The study areas  
 
The analytic rationale for the selection of case study areas is rarely given 
much attention in academic research, but it is important that the 
comparison here is justified (Barnes et al, 2007; 32). Firstly, the coal and 
steel industries were chosen because of the comparable scale of their 
regional impacts, and similarities in the rapid pace, timing and extent of 
their declines. Decline in steel production in the UK was slower than in the 
US, and the regional and local impacts more limited. Coalmining in the US, 
on the other hand, was largely too remote, and employment levels in the 
more numerous but much smaller privately owned mines too small to 
support a useful comparison with UK experience. Coalmining in the UK and 
steel in the US do have many similarities, however, which justify a 
comparison. Both were dependent predominantly on semi-skilled and 
unskilled male labour, and both dominated local labour markets and 
economies. The study areas are therefore representative of single-
industry, non-metropolitan areas, small towns with little else to fall back 
on. They also well illustrate the impacts of the different public welfare 
systems, and national and regional working and community cultures in a 
context of extreme and highly localised decline. 
 
For the comparison to be most effective the study areas needed to have a 
similar scale of decline, in both absolute and relative terms. Table 4.1 
describes some comparisons. The Mon Valley was selected because of its 
similarity in population and scale of industrial decline to the 
Northumberland coalfield. Other industrial sites considered in the US were  
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mostly too remote in their location for the comparison to be meaningful 
(for the regional geography refer back to Figures 2.1 and 2.2).  
 
In absolute size and scale of decline the Mon Valley is larger. The total 
working age male population in 1980 was 67,000 compared to 43,000 in 
Northumberland. Similarly more men lost employment in the primary 
industry during the 1980s in the Mon Valley than in Northumberland. In 
terms of the relative scale of the decline however the two areas are 
comparable, with a 21% loss of employment in the dominant sector as a 
percentage of working age men in the Mon Valley compared to 19% in 
Northumberland. They are also similar in that they both form hinterlands 
to larger urban areas.  
 
Table 4.1: Comparable descriptive statistics of the study areas 
  Northumberland coalfield  Monongahela Valley 
Total population 2001  140, 000  180,000 
Working age male 
population 1980/1 
43,000  67,000 
Distance to central city 
at closest point 
14 miles  7 miles 
Distance to central city 
at furthest point 
35 miles  21 miles 
Number employed in 
primary industry in 
1980/1
65 
11,000  17,000  
% of working age men 
employed in primary 
industry 1980/1 
25%  25%  
Number of jobs lost in 
primary industry during 
the 1980s 
8000  14,000  
Number of jobs lost in 
primary industry during 
the 1980s as a % of 
working age men 
19%  21% 
(Source: Census) 
 
                                                 
65 Mon Valley figures are estimates produced by calculating the ratio of men employed in 
durable manufacturing employed in primary metals for those municipalities for which data 
are available and applying this to all municipalities. 
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The regional context 
 
We have seen that local decline needs to be understood within the context 
of industrial change in the broader regions. The Northeast of England has 
undergone a long-term relative decline in industrial employment since the 
1930s, which accelerated in the last two decades of the twentieth century 
(Hudson, 1989; Robinson, 1989, 2002; HM Treasury and Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) 2001 cited in Pike et al, 2006; 198). While 
Northumberland lost some 8,000 jobs in the coal industry during the 1980s, 
other parts of the region also lost employment, in Newcastle’s heavy 
manufacturing, Sunderland’s shipbuilding and also in Durham’s mining 
industries. There has therefore been a persistent regional imbalance 
between labour supply and demand. The regional loss of male jobs during 
the 1980s is outlined in Table 4.2. Newcastle lost some 20% of its male 
jobs, and the rest of its city region 17%. Although there was some recovery 
in the 1990s, the level stayed well below its pre 1981 level. 
 
Table 4.2: The change in male employment in the Newcastle region - total 
number of men employed by area 
  1981  1991 
% 
change 
81-91 
Newcastle  62,960  52,182  -20.65 
Rest of city 
region  203,123  173,566  -17.03 
(Source: Census) 
 
The Mon Valley sits in the south of Allegheny County where, during the 
1980s, almost 30,000 jobs were lost in basic steel making, with the payroll 
from steel shrinking in real terms by $1,131,526,000
66 (County Business 
Patterns 1980; 1990). These losses, with significant multiplier effects into 
local supply industries, were concentrated in the Mon Valley, and in 
Pittsburgh itself, at Jones and Laughlin and Southside Works.  
                                                 
66 Calculated using CPI Inflation calculator  
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Boundaries of the study areas  
 
Northumberland 
 
The definition used here for the Northumberland coalfield is based on that 
outlined in Beatty et al (1997; 2044); a set of continuous coalfield wards 
with employment of over 10% in energy and water in 1981. These wards 
are amalgamated to form a ‘coalfield’ area. In local policy circles the 
coalfield is sub-divided into urban and a rural coalfield areas, and some of 
the results presented reflect this division (see Figure 4.1). The urban 
coalfield contains Northumberland’s larger towns including Ashington, 
Castle Morpeth and Blyth.  The rural coalfield is more sparsely populated, 
consisting mainly of former pit villages, with the towns of Alnwick and 
Amble. The rural coalfield definition was adopted from that outlined in the 
2005-2010 Rural Coalfield Plan published by the Northumberland Strategic 
Partnership. In addition to the wards defined in the plan several wards 
adjacent to these to the north, included in the Hallam coalfield definition, 
have been added (see Figure 4.2). The 2001 wards which form the coalfield 
area are: 
 
Alnmouth and Lesbury 
Alnwick Clayport 
Alnwick Hotspur 
Amble Central 
Amble East 
Amble West 
Shilbottle 
Warkworth 
Cowpen 
Croft 
Isabella 
Kitty Brewster 
Newsham and New Delaval 
Plessey 
South Beach  
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South Newsham 
Wensleydale 
Chevington 
Ellington 
Lynemouth 
Morpeth Central 
Morpeth Kirkhill 
Morpeth South 
Morpeth Stobhill 
Pegswood 
Ulgham 
Bedlington Central 
Bedlington East 
Bedlington West 
Bothal 
Central 
Choppington 
College 
Guide Post 
Haydon 
Hirst 
Newbiggin East 
Newbiggin West 
Park 
Seaton 
Sleekburn 
Stakeford 
 
‘Northumberland’ is used in this thesis to refer to the coalfield area.  
‘Northumberland County’ refers to the entire administrative county.   
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Figure 4.1: The rural and urban coalfield areas 
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Figure 4.2: Ward map of the Northumberland coalfield 
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Mon Valley 
 
This research focuses on the upper Mon Valley, running from Pittsburgh to 
Forward Township. To the south, the Lower Mon Valley becomes a rural 
economy which was never as reliant on the steel industry as the Upper 
Mon. The area’s municipalities’ population size in 1980 ranged from 425 to 
31,012. They were subject to the same 10% test as in Northumberland to 
establish the area of study. This involved some estimation of steel industry 
employment, as more limited data are available from those places with 
population below 9,999 (in 1980). The estimates were made on the basis of 
the percentage of those employed in ‘durable manufacturing’ in ‘primary 
metals’ for areas for which data are available. This ratio was then applied 
to the ‘durable manufacturing’ figures for the smaller places for which 
‘primary metals’ figures were not available. This provides a similar 
definition of the Mon Valley to that given in the Mon Valley Economic 
Strategy (Tripp Umbach, 2005; 12). Four additional municipalities were 
also included, however: Liberty, Port Vue and Versailles linked to the 
McKeesport local labour market; and East Pittsburgh linked to both 
Braddock and Turtle Creek.
67 These areas were all also estimated to have 
had over 10% employed in primary metals.  
 
There are some limitations associated with the data available for the 
smallest municipalities, those with less than 2,500 total populations in 
1980. For these areas there is little available information beyond total 
population, so that nine of them are excluded from the analysis of change 
from 1980-2000. This represented less than 5% of the population of the 
total Mon Valley area. In using stand-alone data for 2000, these 
municipalities are incorporated into the Mon Valley definition.  
 
                                                 
67 I do not include the three Pittsburgh neighbourhoods included in their definition.  
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The municipalities used in the Mon Valley definition are: 
 
Braddock borough 
Clairton city 
Dravosburg borough 
Duquesne city 
East McKeesport borough 
East Pittsburgh borough* 
Elizabeth borough * 
Elizabeth Township 
Forward Township 
Glassport borough 
Homestead borough 
Liberty borough 
Lincoln borough* 
McKeesport city 
Munhall borough 
North Braddock borough 
North Versailles Township 
Pitcairn borough 
Port Vue borough 
Rankin borough 
South Versailles township* 
Swissvale borough 
Trafford borough (Allegheny and Westmoreland County) 
Turtle Creek borough  
Versailles borough* 
Wall borough* 
West Elizabeth borough* 
West Homestead borough 
West Mifflin borough 
Whitaker borough * 
White Oak borough 
Wilmerding borough* 
 
Those marked with a * are excluded from the longitudinal analysis because 
of data unavailability.  
 
The area consists of mill towns
 and mill suburbs, towns in which the actual 
production took place, and residential suburbs from which men would  
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travel to the mill towns for work.
68 The mill towns’ definition includes the 
municipalities in which the mills are/were physically located (see Figure 
4.3). The definition excludes Munhall, West Mifflin and Swissvale which, 
although they physically contain a mill (or part of a mill), are large 
geographical areas and the mill was never as central as it was to the 
smaller mill towns. The mill towns are: 
 
Braddock borough 
Clairton city 
Duquesne city 
Homestead borough 
McKeesport city 
North Braddock borough 
Rankin borough 
                                                 
68 Of the mill towns Braddock and Homestead were already in some distress by 1980 as 
their decline has begun earlier, though they have suffered further in the last 25 years.   
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Figure 4.3: Mon Valley mill towns 
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4.3   The secondary data analysis  
 
Secondary data analysis included the production of LMAs as well as 
descriptive analyses drawing on census and other large data sets, local 
survey and study evidence. In both countries, where possible, some data 
are updated to include any changes which might have occurred since the 
2000/1 census. For Northumberland this includes unemployment and 
benefit statistics. For the Mon Valley it includes population loss figures, 
poverty statistics, and some partial coverage of labour market indicators.  
 
Labour Market Accounts (LMAs): 
 
LMAs detail how a local economic shock (a mass lay-off) is absorbed by 
other labour market adjustments (Owen et al, 1984; 472). At the heart of 
the technique is the estimation of a jobs shortfall, ‘a measure of the 
extent to which employment creation has failed to match the increase in 
labour supply between two dates’ (Green and Owen, 1991; 297).  
 
Previous applications 
 
LMAs were pioneered by the Cambridge Economic Policy Group (1980; 
1982) to study regional labour markets (Owen et al, 1984; 472; Green and 
Owen, 1991; 297). The framework was then applied by Owen et al (1984) 
to Britain’s local labour market areas based on data from the 1971 and 
1981 censuses. More recently Beatty and Fothergill (1996) and Beatty et al 
(1997; 2005) have applied them to the male population in the UK’s 
coalfield areas. Turok and Edge (1999) have also used them to show 
adjustments in response to job shortfalls in Britain’s large cities in the 
1980s for both men and women; this work was expanded in Bailey and 
Turok (2000).   
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The construction of LMAs in this research follows the methodology outlined 
by Owen, Gillespie and Coombes (1984; 471-473). This enables the UK and 
US data to be directly compared. Other, more recent, examples of the 
framework include local demand figures enabling commuting adjustments 
to be described (Beatty and Fothergill, 1996; Beatty et al, 1997; Beatty et 
al, 2005; Turok and Edge, 1999; Bailey and Turok, 2000). The lack of data 
on the number of jobs located in the Mon Valley study area in 1980 and 
1990, however, means that net commuting figures cannot be calculated. 
Attempts are made, where possible, to supplement this absence of 
commuting and local demand components with other information aimed at 
gauging the importance of commuting. In Northumberland this task is 
relatively straightforward, using flow data from the Census Interaction 
Data Service (CIDS). In the Mon Valley proxy measures such as travel-to-
work times have to be employed. Unlike in the UK there are no previous 
known examples of the application of the LMA framework in the US. This 
research therefore represents a significant advance in understanding the 
processes of industrial change in the Mon Valley.  
 
The sources for all the LMA components are the two national Censuses of 
Population (1981-91-01 for Northumberland; 1980-90-00 for the Mon 
Valley). Some figures used in the Northumberland accounts were 
calculated from those provided by Beatty and Fothergill. Others come from 
census data downloaded from the National On-line Manpower Information 
Service (NOMIS). Where Special Workplace Statistics (10% sample) are 
used, they are grossed up to compare with 100% data.
69 The 1980 US 
Census data used was sourced from hard copy volumes. All 1990 and 2000 
US figures were downloaded using American Factfinder via the Census 
Bureau. 
 
                                                 
69 For the 2001 Census all records are coded at 100% (Martin et al, 2002; 84)  
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What follows is an explanation of the components of the LMAs, followed by 
a worked example. The accounts, for any time period, are structured as 
follows: 
 
 
Natural population change 
 
PLUS/ MINUS          Participation rate change 
 
PLUS/ MINUS          Employment Change  
 
EQUALS                 Jobs shortfall/ surplus 
 
Jobs shortfall surplus absorbed by- 
 
PLUS/ MINUS          Net migration 
PLUS/ MINUS          Unemployment change 
 
 
Natural population change: The estimated change in the number of 
economically active population as a result of changes in the age structure 
(people entering and leaving the working-age).  
 
The estimated change is the number of people between 6 and 54 (or 49 for 
women) in the start year expected to survive until the end year (i.e., 1981 
to 1991) when they form the working-age population. This is calculated 
using a cohort survival model. Survival rates for the model were calculated 
using the Office for Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) Vital Statistics 
at District level for Northumberland
70 (see Beatty et al, 1997; 2060) and 
from US Department of Health and Human Services Decennial Life Tables 
for Pennsylvania (1979-1981; 1989-1991). The difference between the start 
                                                 
70 The Standardised Mortality Rate difference between the Northumberland coalfield Local 
Authorities (for the relevant wards by LA area) and the England and Wales SMR is used to 
adjust England and Wales life tables year on year to Northumberland’s mortality rate. A 
further adjustment is made for Castle Morpeth, the Castle Morpeth SMR for the ‘normal’ 
population is exaggerated by the area’s large institutional population (see OPCS, 1986; 6). 
For Castle Morpeth the SMR is therefore taken as the average of the other coalfield Local 
Authorities. For men and for women 1991-2001, these were calculated by Beatty et al.  
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year and end year population is then multiplied by the end year economic 
activity rate to give ‘natural change’. 
 
Participation rate change: Change in the economically active population 
arising from people who were inactive becoming active, and vice-versa. It 
is calculated by multiplying the working age population in the start year by 
the difference in the participation rates between the start and end years.  
 
For Northumberland 1981-1991 an adjustment is made to the 1981 working 
age population base to compensate for changes in the census definitions. 
Absent residents and ‘enumerated late’ and ‘imputed’ were included in 
1991 but not 1981 (see Beatty et al, 1997; 2060). This adjustment is made 
by using a ratio of the 1981 base total population (by gender) figure to the 
1991 population figure (changes to the population base are relatively small 
<1.5%). 
 
This is calculated assuming no net-migration. 
 
Employment change: The change in numbers of working-age residents in 
employment between the two dates. Working age refers to 16-64 for males 
and females for the US, and 16-64 and 16-59 respectively for males and 
females in the UK.  
 
This is calculated assuming no net-migration. 
 
Job shortfall/surplus: This is the difference between the expected change 
in the active population (as measured by natural change and participation 
change) and the change in employment between the start and end years; 
the extent to which changes in supply are matched by demand. 
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The jobs shortfall, or surplus, sums to (is balanced by) unemployment 
change and migration. 
 
Net-migration: The difference between the actual and the expected 
change (as calculated in the natural change component) in working age 
population between the start and the end years, multiplied by the 
participation rate in the end year.  
 
The 1981-1991 Northumberland figures are adjusted for the changing 
census definition (the 1991 figures being adjusted to the 1981 base). The 
1991-2001 figures are also adjusted because students studying away from 
home were recorded at their home address in 1991 but at their term-time 
address in the 2001. Students studying away from home have therefore 
been added to the population of their home area to avoid distortion of 
population change figures (see Beatty et al, 2005; 39).
71  
 
Unemployment change:  The change in the number of working age 
residents unemployed between the two dates. Unemployment is a self-
attributed status in the census in the UK and US.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 These adjusted figures were provided by Beatty and Fothergill  
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Table 4.3: Worked example of LMAs for the Mon Valley, 1980-1990, based on the methodology of Owen et al (1984)  
 
Component  Number  % of 1980 
working age 
population 
Calculation  Explanation 
1980; economically 
active 
52,627   
  Total number from census tables 
1990: 
economically 
active 
41,758   
  Total number from census tables 
Natural Change  -1,809  -3.4 
2279* 0.7936  The expected change in the working-age population who are 
economically active due to the age structure. Calculated by estimating 
the number of people aged 6 to 54 in 1980 who would survive until 
1990. This is achieved using a cohort survival model based on 
Pennsylvanian life tables (1979-1981) which provide age-specific death 
rates for each year. This difference in working-age population between 
the two years is then multiplied by the 1990 economic activity rate. 
Participation 
increase  -1,532  -2.9 
64,389*-
0.0238 
The change in the economically active population which results from 
people previously inactive becoming active, or those previously active 
leaving the labour force. This is calculated on the assumption of no 
migration, by multiplying the working-age population in 1980 by the 
difference in economic activity rates between 1980 and 1990. 
Employment 
change  -10,814  -20.5 
48,102-
37,288 
The difference between the number of working-age men employed in 
1980 and 1990 
Job shortfall  7,473  14.2 
(-1,809+ -
1,532) – 
10,814 
The difference between the expected change in the economically 
active population and change in employment between 1980 and 1990. 
The expected change in economic activity is the sum of natural change 
and participation change. 
Net-Migration  -7,531  14.3 
9,489*0.7936  Calculated as the difference between the actual working-age 
population in 1990 and the expected population calculated using cohort 
survival. This is multiplied by the 1990 economic activity rate. 
Unemployment 
change  48  0.1 
4,422- 4,470  The change in the number of residents unemployed between 1980 and 
1990  
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Technical application: the UK 
 
Ward boundaries in 1991 and 2001 have been matched as closely as 
possible to the 1981 ward definition of the Northumberland coalfield 
(see Beatty, et al, 2005; 38). Most of the boundary changes over this 
period were internal and as such have no impact on the figures. Where 
small changes have been made to the coalfield’s external boundary the 
impact of these have been judged by using descriptive characteristics 
of key variables of age, economic inactivity and unemployment in the 
affected areas accessed through Arcinfo. These changes will have a 
negligible impact on the figures because of the similar characteristics 
of the surrounding areas. 
 
Technical application: the US 
 
The main problem when producing the LMAs for the Mon Valley is the 
absence of commuting data. Job loss figures are therefore residentially 
referenced and come from the US Census.  
 
There is very limited data on local labour demand in Pennsylvania. The 
data which is available, the 202 dataset, references employees of some 
companies at head office locations rather than sites of production. 
Analysts at the PA Department of Labor advised that these issues, as 
well as other questions over the data accuracy make it unsuitable for 
incorporating into the LMA framework.  
 
Unlike in Northumberland, there were no changes to the Mon Valley 
boundaries in the period covered. Part of Trafford was transferred from 
Allegheny County between 1980 and 1990, but this does not affect the 
total area covered.  The Allegheny County Trafford figures are however 
excluded from some of the figures showing municipality change because 
these administrative changes mean that the individual municipality  
  121 
change figures are in some cases inaccurate. This does not affect any of 
the totals figures. 
 
Limitation of Labour Market Accounts 
 
LMAs offer a valuable overview of the relative strengths of different 
adjustment mechanisms in local labour markets. They have several 
limitations, however, which need to be acknowledged. 
 
•  LMAs make no distinction regarding job quality. A loss of 1000 
well-paid and secure full-time jobs might therefore appear to be 
balanced by a gain of 1000 part-time, minimum wage, high 
turnover jobs. This shortcoming, however, can be supplemented 
by using other employment data from the census to capture 
these other aspects of employment change, for example on hours 
of work and wages.  
 
•  LMAs provide a snap shot at a particular point in the economic 
cycle. The 1980/1 figures represent times of deep recession in 
both countries meaning there were already relatively high levels 
of unemployment and employment disadvantage prior to 
closures (Beatty et al; 2005; 22). A successful adjustment on 
paper would therefore not necessarily indicate economic revival. 
 
•  The US retirement age begins at 62 but figures must be produced 
for 16-64s. This will slightly over-inflate the numbers inactive 
compared to Northumberland. 
 
•  LMAs tell us nothing about the underlying casual processes which 
produce the adjustments which they describe. 
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Data sources 
 
UK census data  
 
While census data is useful for understanding variations at the small-
scale, and offers the ability to compare change through time, it has 
some limitations (Boyle and Dorling; 2004; 109). For example, residual 
inaccuracies can arise in the LMAs for 1981-1991 as a result of the 
underenumeration of the 1991 census which amounted to around 1.2 
million people (Simpson and Dorling cited in Martin et al, 2002; 1994; 
see also Turok and Edge, 1999; 61; Beatty and Fothergill, 1996; 639).
72 
The coalfield areas though are not thought to have been badly affected 
by this (Beatty et al, 1997; 2060). Undercounting was also a problem in 
the 2001 census, with, in general, areas which had a high level of 
undercounting in 1991 having an even greater level in 2001 (Simpson, 
2003; 2). Again the coalfields were less affected than many other areas. 
Such underenumeration may affect the absolute measures of the 
various adjustments, though not necessarily the magnitude of the 
components.  
 
There is also some problem of non-response or incorrect response to 
some questions in the census. Some of the data used in the accounts 
falls into the 5-10% non-response category at the national level for the 
2001 Census (Simpson, 2003; 3). These non-response items have been 
boosted with estimates from the ONS but these may produce some 
small degree of error. 
 
US Census data 
 
The 1990 US Census also suffered from some undercounting, estimated 
to be around 4 million people, or around 1.8% of the population (US 
                                                 
72 For the 1981 Census undercounting was small in comparison to 1991 (Martin et al, 
2002; 87).    
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Census Bureau 1994a; US Census Bureau 2004; 2). For Pennsylvania the 
net undercount was estimated to be very small, 0.3%. For the black 
population, however, it was substantially greater, at 4.5% (US Census 
Bureau 1994b). Changes made to data collection, to minimise 
undercount and to boost the response rates of hard-to-reach groups, 
meant that levels of undercount were significantly less for the 2000 
Census. Total undercount was just 0.1% although for the Black 
population it was still 2.8% (US Census Bureau c, 2004; 2). This should 
have little impact on the Mon Valley figures. 
 
How Labour Market Accounts are applied in this research  
 
With all the caveats, LMAs still offer the best framework for analysing 
labour market adjustment responses to industrial change, and an 
excellent method of contrasting responses in different areas. Bearing in 
mind the limitations, LMAs should be considered, as should Census data 
in general, as ‘an estimate of truth’ (Simpson, 2003; 15). There will 
invariably be a level of error in the data which, of course, needs to be 
minimised, but the magnitudes and directions of changes revealed does 
allow the dominant responses to be identified in the two study areas.  
 
In both countries, in addition to absolute figures, the changes are 
shown as percentages of total male/female working-age population in 
1980/1. This allows for direct comparisons of the relative strength of 
different changes.  
 
Other secondary data analysis 
 
The UK 
 
In addition to Labour Market Accounts other secondary sources offer 
key insights into the results of industrial change in the study regions. 
These include DWP benefits information across a range of key benefits,  
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wages data, data on educational attainment, and other information on 
social change derived from census variables. 
 
As chapter 3 showed, a key area for investigation is inter-generational 
change. With this in mind some aggregate data has been sub-divided by 
age cohorts. For the years 1991-2001 both levels of out-commuting and 
economic position are analysed by age. This provides an important 
insight into change or continuity in labour market decision making. For 
example have younger workers taken up commuting as a mechanism to 
cope with local employment loss more than older workers who have 
grown up in the context of a more insular labour market? How does the 
range and scale of economic position vary by age? Such questions are 
important in making future assessments about the local labour markets.  
 
The US 
 
As with the UK, LMAs produced for the US can be supplemented with 
other secondary analysis. This includes other descriptive data from the 
census on income, social change and poverty status. Figures are also 
produced that disaggregate the population by race to contrast the 
experiences of white and black residents in the area. As already 
indicated, the black population is seen to have suffered particularly 
badly from industrial decline. 
 
4.4   Interview research  
 
The quantitative comparative overview formed the frame for a series of 
semi-structured interviews with residents and stakeholders in the study 
areas. These were crucial in understanding how and why different 
forms of labour market adjustment took place. They were also key to 
understanding how initial short-term adjustments resulted in longer-
term path-dependent developments. Particularly important in this  
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regard were the insights they provided on inter-generational effects, 
cultural transmission and community change. 
 
The fieldwork element of this research was conducted in 
Northumberland in summer 2005 and in the Mon Valley in spring 2006. 
The structure of the fieldwork was modified from that originally 
proposed and subsequently presented at the upgrade seminar in spring 
2005. This modification generated changes in both the practical 
research design, and also to some extent to the research emphasis, and 
therefore the findings. The research shifted from a household based 
study of labour market decision-making, household coping strategies 
and household and inter-generational change, to a focus more broadly 
on the causal processes behind the different patterns of labour market 
restructuring in the two areas, and how this has shaped subsequent 
economic and social development within communities.  
 
The original research proposal prioritised household level perspectives, 
and details of household responses to, and coping mechanisms for, loss 
of (male) work. The focus of the original proposal was set-out as:  
 
With the feminisation of the workforce, and 
economic strategies defined at the household 
level, household studies will give a broader 
account of responses to deindustrialisation….A 
series of semi-structured interviews, comprising 
open questions, will be used to address people’s 
experiences of deindustrialisation..…Where 
relevant (i.e., in a household of marriage or 
cohabitation) interviews will be 
conducted….with both partners interviewed 
together…The aim of these questions is to 
investigate what factors have been influential in 
determining the labour market decisions made 
by that individual and household…A series of 
elite interviews will also be conducted in the 
study areas….they will offer supplementary 
information about the patterns of restructuring 
and labour market change in the study areas 
from individuals who have been involved in the 
regeneration processes’.   
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The proposal also intended conducting interviews with the working-age 
children of former industrial workers to explore issues of inter-
generational change in work attitudes and labour market experiences.  
 
The focus of investigation however began to shift away from such 
individual and household outcomes to broader community outcomes, 
themselves driven largely by dominant labour market adjustment 
process, and exploring the longer-term implications of these changes. 
The rationale for changing the research design was both practical and 
theoretical. The practical considerations are outlined in the Annex to 
this chapter, and revolve essentially around the difficulty of obtaining 
significant numbers of respondents willing to explore their family 
histories in detail. Greater emphasis therefore came to be placed on 
two other target groups, key community actors and local stakeholders.  
Theoretically also, it became clear that the dominant structural 
contrasts between the two regions, as their impacts emerged over a 25 
year period, could be better reflected in a labour market/community 
approach than in one based on detailed studies of individual household 
experience, however ethnographically interesting this would have been.  
 
In Northumberland 23 interviews were conducted and 21 in the Mon 
Valley. Those interviewed included stakeholders involved in economic 
and community development as well as a range of local residents, 
including those involved in local community groups and activities, local 
council members, and former industrial workers. Details of respondents 
are shown below.  
 
The interviews investigated how industrial workers had responded to 
job losses. They examined both the macro level influences on 
restructuring, such as government welfare and employment policies, 
and more localised influences, including levels of demand for labour 
and social and cultural trends. They also explored how the initial  
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processes of restructuring had influenced long-term growth and change 
in the communities. 
 
The interviewees 
 
Northumberland 
 
Elite stakeholders: 
1.  Amble Development Trust- Employment opportunities manager 
2.  East Ashington Development Trust- Manager 
3.  National Union of Mineworkers- National Chairman and secretary 
4.  Northumberland Community Council- Assistant director 
5.  Northumberland County Council- Regeneration Manager 
6.  One Northeast- Economic Inclusion manager 
7.  South East Northumberland and North Tyneside Regeneration 
Initiative (SENNTRI)- Director 
8.  Trinity Youth- Youth Worker 
9.  Wansbeck Community Empowerment Network- Network 
development officer 
10. Wansbeck District Council- Business and Enterprise coordinator 
11. Wansbeck District Council- Regeneration initiatives Officer 
 
Community interviews: 
12. Bedlington Station Residents Association- Chair 
13. Cambois Community Association- Chair 
14. Choppington Community Association- Chair 
15. East Ashington Community Area Partnership- Chair 
16. Lynemouth Day Centre- Manager 
17. Lynemouth Parish Council- Chair 
18. Wansbeck Council- Councillor, Ashington  
 
Former miners: 
19. Former miner [N1]  
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20. Former miner [N2] 
21. Former miner [N3] 
22. Former miner [N4] 
23. Former miner [N5] 
 
Mon Valley 
 
Elite stakeholders: 
1.  CareerLink- Allegheny County East and West - Executive director 
2.  Heritage Health Foundation- Vice-president for Development 
3.  McKeesport City- City Administrator and Director of Community 
Development 
4.  Mon Valley Education Consortium- Executive Director 
5.  Mon Valley Initiative- Community Organiser  
6.  Mon Valley Initiative- Senior real estate manager  
7.  Pennsylvania House of Representatives- State Representative: 
District 39 (Elizabeth Township) 
8.  Pennsylvania House of Representatives- State Representative: 
District 34 (Turtle Creek) 
9.  Steel Valley Authority- Chairman  
 
Community interviews: 
10. City of Clairton- Councilman /Clairton Community Development 
Corporation member 
11. East Pittsburgh Community Development Corporation- Member 
12. Homestead Borough- Mayor 
13. Homestead Economic Redevelopment Corporation (HERC)- 
Chairman 
14. Homestead Economic Redevelopment Corporation (HERC)- 
Founding member 
15. Mon Valley Unemployed Committee- Co-director (former mill 
worker)  
16. Munhall Borough- Mayor  
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17. North Braddock CARES- Member 
 
Former mill workers: 
18. Former mill worker [MV1] 
19. Former mill worker [MV2] 
20. Former mill worker [MV3] 
21. Former mill worker [MV4] 
 
Most of the former industrial workers interviewed were involved in their 
local union as, from a practical perspective, it was easier to contact 
union members while, 20 or so years after closures, it proved much 
more difficult to contact a more random sample of affected workers.
73 
Of course, union members tend to come with a particular political 
view, and opinion about closures, which it is important to acknowledge 
in the analysis of interviews. 
 
Initial contact with the union in Northumberland was through the local 
branch secretary. The secretary then provided further contact details 
of former miners. In the Mon Valley, a former local union secretary, 
who I was introduced to by another community contact, provided some 
contact details of former millworkers which were supplemented with 
others from the Steel Industry Heritage Center’s oral histories 
database.  
 
Former industrial workers were asked to reflect on their own 
experiences, and also on those of friends, family members and former 
colleagues. They were, of course, reflecting back over a long period 
since the closures. Their responses were compared with those of other 
stakeholder interviewees, and also with some valuable local oral history 
projects undertaken nearer the time of closures. This included an oral 
                                                 
73 Finding former mill workers in the Mon Valley, even union ones, proved somewhat 
difficult. I was told that most had left the area (or died), and those that remained 
were too bitter to talk about it (Former mill worker [MV3]). This problem had been 
found by previous researchers in the area (Carroll, 1992; 120; Sturdevant, 1993; 20; 
Lease, 1992; 2).   
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histories programme undertaken in different mill towns by the Steel 
Industry Heritage Corporation in the early 1990s, and an oral history 
project undertaken in the late-1980s by Bob Anderson on workers 
immediate post-closure experience. This allows for the triangulation of 
peoples’ reflections on the past with information gathered at the time. 
 
In Northumberland local statutory agencies including Northumberland 
County Council and Wansbeck District Council acted as ‘gatekeepers’ to 
facilitate contacts in local community organisations.
74 This was 
combined with a process of selective snowballing. In the Mon Valley 
local agencies similarly provided details of community contacts, of 
particular help here was the Mon Valley Initiative (MVI) and the 
Heritage Health Foundation.  
 
The aim of the interviews with those involved in formal economic 
development was to explore the longer-term labour market and social 
implications of industrial change, as well as to evaluate the policy 
response and future prospects. This was complemented by interviews 
with individuals, both paid and voluntary, engaged in community 
development and local community groups who served to give a sense of 
community and social change in the period since closures.  
The themes which the interviews addressed derived from three key 
elements identified from past research. They are, i) the local and 
regional demand for labour including the number and type of jobs 
within commutable distance; ii) the public welfare context of 
government support for people and places and; iii)  the historical and 
cultural context, including the existing norms and values in the areas.  
 
                                                 
74 Gatekeepers are ‘those individuals in an organization that have the power to grant 
or withhold access to people or situations for the purposes of research’ (Burgess, 
1984; 48 cited in Flowerdew and Martin, 1997; 115).  
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The following headings served as a template for the interviews, suitably 
adjusted to each type of interviewee:   
 
•  The experiences of industrial workers 
•  Labour market decision-making  
•  The labour market since closures 
•  The cultural legacy of mining and restructuring  
•  Inter-generational change 
•  The effectiveness and limitations of policy interventions 
•  Regeneration 
•  Public welfare 
•  Community change 
•  The social impacts 
•  The geography of change 
 
The interviews with all participants, which had been recorded, were 
selectively transcribed in a series of notes and quotes of their 
responses. Coding was then used to help interpret the material 
collected (Payne and Payne, 2004; 36; Cope, 2003; 445). First, using 
relatively basic descriptive codes to reflect the main areas of interest 
of the interviews, significantly derived from the LMA framework, to 
categorise and organise data. Broad categories, for example, included 
local job opportunities, commuting, and migration. Then, topic coding 
was used to provide relatively interpretive labelling of the main codes 
and sub-codes that were judged to be important from the interview 
responses, such as work aspirations, public welfare system roles, and 
cultures of mobility. How the central and subcategories related to each 
other was then explored (Strauss, 1987; 4).  These relationships are 
defined in terms of varieties of ‘conditions’, ‘interactions’, ‘strategies’ 
and ‘consequences’ (ibid; 64). This served to establish links between 
the important variables which form the basis of people’s decisions, as 
well as the different influences on long-term patterns of social and  
  132 
economic change and how these fit together. The coding was then used 
to develop themes running through the data  which brought together 
the dominant causal structures and processes at work in the areas, 
producing a network of explanation for the different forms of 
restructuring and subsequent development (see Richards and Morse, 
2007; 143). The data were coded without the use of specialist 
qualitative software and the text was held in a database, with the 
outputs of different codes and themes linked, analysed and interpreted 
manually.   
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ANNEX TO METHODOLOGY 
 
This Annex details changes to the fieldwork schedule and analysis 
during the course of the research and their significance for the project 
outcomes.  
 
Interview schedule 
 
Recruiting former industrial workers proved to be very difficult, largely 
because of the time that had lapsed since closures, and, in the Mon 
Valley, the fact that so many had moved away
75. In Northumberland, a 
local community contact was initially arranged with the secretary of a 
local union branch, still operating an advice remit in the area, including 
pension issues and claims for past industrial injuries. Through this 
respondent, arrangements were made to contact four men who still 
maintained some union contact (in addition to which a further miner 
was identified later by a separate local contact). It became clear early 
on that the household interviews initially proposed were unlikely to 
succeed. The men who were contacted were not happy to be 
interviewed in a family setting but would participate alone. There were 
probably several reasons for this, including reluctance to allow a 
stranger into their homes, perhaps some degree of embarrassment 
about speaking in front of other family members, suspicions about why 
a study of mining decline would need to interview other family 
members and, the most widely cited reason, that family members were 
either too busy or would not want to participate. The men were 
therefore interviewed individually on two separate days at a local 
community centre
76. These interviewees were asked if they could 
provide further contacts among their cohort, but no further contact 
details were secured, with most of the men reporting the others they 
                                                 
75 Industrial communities remain relatively difficult for researchers, particularly ones 
with limited resources, to penetrate. This was particularly apparent in residents 
being unwilling to volunteer other people’s time by providing their contact details.  
76 The fifth was interviewed at home  
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knew would ‘not want to talk’. This closed off a potentially useful 
method of recruiting further participants.  
 
In the Mon Valley former industrial workers were identified through 
contacts from a former local union secretary whose details had 
previously been provided by a community contact. This approach 
yielded one other former millworker to interview, in addition to which 
another former millworker was identified but interviewed in his role as 
a community contact and the founder of the Mon Valley Unemployed 
Committee, an organisation developed to help steelworkers after 
closures. A further two former millworkers were contacted using details 
held on the Steel Industry Heritage Center (SIHC) Oral Histories project 
database
77. These men were more comfortable being interviewed in 
public places, including a local café and in a room lent by the SIHC. All 
the former industrial workers were interviewed on the understanding of 
anonymity.  
 
A significant group of former industrial workers was therefore recruited 
for the research, but greater emphasis came to be placed on two other 
target groups, key community actors and local stakeholders, than was 
originally anticipated at the research planning stage. These were used 
as key informants; according to Payne and Payne, individuals whose 
‘social positions’ in the research setting mean they have ‘more 
information to impart’ (Payne and Payne, 2004; 134-135). Such 
information need not be obtained only in formal setting, such as 
through local councils, local police or doctors. It can also be garnered 
by virtue of the place of informants in informal networks within a 
community; they can be ‘informal key informants’ (ibid, 135 -137). The 
use of key informants is part of a purposive (or purposeful) sampling 
procedure, where respondents are atypical, and are selected because 
                                                 
77 These two had lost jobs in the closures of the 1980s while many others on the 
database, which was part of a broader oral history of the steel industry in the area, 
had retired prior to this and so were not considered for interview. Several other 
relevant cases which were identified were found to have out of date contact details.  
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of their potentially greater knowledge and insights into the research 
questions, as well as their willingness to participate (ibid; 137; Richards 
and Morse, 2007; 195). 
 
A process of snowball sampling was adopted to recruit participants, 
involving interviewees being asked to identify other relevant cases and 
provide contact details (Hay, 2005; 72). This strategy followed several 
channels locally with multiple starting points, it therefore ‘fanned out’ 
rather than simply producing a small inner circle provided by one key 
gatekeeper which can often privilege a particular representation of 
society (Payne and Payne, 2004; 136).  
 
Worker interviews 
 
The original interview topic guide was heavily focused on individual 
labour market experiences and histories, though questions in the latter 
sections did expand the focus to look at issues of broader social and 
community change. The initial interviews however emphasised the 
difficulties which might be faced in pursuing such a detailed oral 
history approach. The men were reluctant to speak directly about their 
thoughts and feelings about their personal experiences, beyond 
providing relatively basic descriptive information; they were also 
largely unwilling to engage in discussion about household coping 
strategies. Although the interview focus was on personal histories, the 
participants would direct the discussion to wider issues of labour 
market change, the experiences of others they knew, and the broader 
community. It became clear that the original approach was unlikely to 
yield useful information. When talking more generally about local 
community and social change, however, and reflecting on the collective 
experiences of people they knew in the area, respondents opened up to 
a much greater extent to engage with the processes of labour market 
and social change. After discussions with the NUM contact who 
suggested that ‘embarrassment’ may be a reason, the topic guide was  
  136 
revised to give more weight to broader questions about the experiences 
of peers, and social and community change, to complement attempts to 
secure oral history material.
78 This change meant rebalancing the 
emphasis of the research questions, away from individual and 
household coping strategies to greater concern with the causality of 
labour market restructuring, wider community experiences of social 
and economic change, and long-term developments.  
 
This reformulated approach to questioning drew on the men’s 
experience in a more structural way and in some senses used sections 
of the interviews as an ‘indirect strategy’ of research, asking questions 
about an individual’s cohort or social networks’ experiences (Richards 
and Morse, 2007; 117-118). Various types of questions were therefore 
used in this phase of the research. These included descriptive questions 
–factual details of events, changes, people and experiences; 
storytelling – particularly aimed at forming causative links through in-
depth description of experiences or observations; and structural – 
encouraging the discussion and acknowledgement of how ‘events and 
experiences may have influenced opinions and perspectives’ (Hay, 
2005; 84). The useful outcome of this approach is a broader coverage, 
compared to the handful of detailed oral histories which would have 
otherwise been attained. While undoubtedly interesting 
ethnographically, these may have been limited in the extent to which 
they could be generalised to the wider area experience of labour 
market restructuring.  
 
Community interviews 
 
Because of the difficulties in securing interviews with former industrial 
workers, and as these interviews were yielding less fruitful insights than 
                                                 
78 These attempts were less successful in the Northumberland coalfield than they 
were in the Mon Valley. In the Mon Valley men were more willing to reflect on their 
own experiences than in Northumberland, however, because of the need for 
comparative data the interview design was not altered for this phase of fieldwork.  
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had been hoped, a new round of community focused interviews was 
also established to add to, and triangulate, industrial worker insights. 
The inclusion of community interviews in some senses further shifted 
the emphasis of the original research questions from the direct 
exploration of causality in the labour market to the broader community 
impacts of the closures which, when read alongside the industrial 
worker and stakeholder interviews, could link causality in labour 
market adjustment to broader social and community adjustments. Such 
community impacts became highly significant in setting the social 
environment in which newer generations learnt about and entered the 
labour market, adding an important dimension to the long term 
perspective central to the research.  
 
The community actors were key informants who were highly 
knowledgeable about the issues facing their local communities. The 
majority had also been resident in their communities through the 
processes of industrial decline and had seen the initial adjustments 
followed by the subsequent changes. They were able therefore to 
comment authoritatively on the experiences of former industrial 
workers from their local knowledge. Most had also some more formal 
knowledge of these issues through their roles in local councils and 
community organisations offering services to meet local needs (their 
roles are detailed on pages 129-131). Most of these respondents had no 
direct relation to the main industry (e.g. they or their spouse had not 
worked there) but of course many had indirect relations. This group did 
not exhibit the understandable bitterness and regret over closures of 
many who had been directly employed. They were thus able to offer 
more measured accounts which could be triangulated with those 
offered by the men themselves. These contacts were again asked for 
details of other former industrial workers for interviews, but people 
were similarly reluctant to volunteer others. In the single case where 
they did, the miner himself was unwilling to participate.  
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Other stakeholder interviews 
 
The worker and community interviews were complemented by a series 
of other stakeholder interviews, which had always been planned to be 
added to those with industrial workers. The aim was to use key 
informants’ expert knowledge about how aspects of closures and initial 
labour market restructuring had influenced subsequent development in 
the areas up to the present. The majority of stakeholders interviewed 
were relatively local actors (as opposed to more senior regeneration 
professionals who tend to be more geographically mobile) and generally 
had long attachments to working in the areas. Indeed, many had in 
some form or another been directly involved in policy responses at the 
time of, and in the immediate aftermath of closures. 
 
In Northumberland interviews with stakeholders ran in parallel with 
those of former miners (i.e., they were conducted over the same period 
rather than completing one set of interviews before beginning the 
next). The community interviews were conducted after this. In the Mon 
Valley the three sets of interviews all ran parallel to each other. 
Saturation point was reached in both study areas relatively quickly, as 
the main findings largely became similarly recounted between 
interviewees and interview types. There were some different 
perspectives, however, when describing certain phenomena. For 
example stakeholders would often be more sympathetic to the needs 
and issues of poorer in-migrants to the communities than many 
residents  
 
Verifying findings 
 
The process of ‘multiple triangulation’ was important in verifying the 
research findings, as Berg (2006; 5) describes, this combination of 
‘several lines of sight’ helps to attain a ‘better, more substantive 
picture of reality’. The results were triangulated threefold:   
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■  Firstly, by the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods – 
‘between methods triangulation’.  
 
■  Second, between the different perspectives of interviewee types – 
‘theoretical triangulation’, as the findings of the different groups of 
participants were triangulated with each other (Richards and Morse, 
2007; 91). As all actors only have partial knowledge, the use of 
multiple viewpoints is advocated as producing fuller and more valid 
findings (Wengraf, 2001; 105). 
 
■  Third, between the fieldwork findings and the results of other 
studies which were undertaken nearer the time of closures – ‘in-
method triangulation’ (Payne and Payne, 2004; 230). Findings from 
interviews with former industrial workers in the Mon Valley were 
triangulated with oral history projects which were undertaken at the 
time of closures. These included two housed at the SIHC, their own 
oral histories project and a programme of interviews undertaken in 
the late 1980s by Bob Anderson with displaced steel workers in the 
area (both unpublished documents from the SIHC archive).  
 
Research validity 
 
The changes in research design presented some questions regarding the 
internal validity of the findings, the extent to which the results 
‘accurately reflect the phenomena studied’ (Richards and Morse, 2007; 
190). The causality in labour market decision-making, planned to be 
explored through workers’ own experiences, became to some degree 
weakened by the limited success of the oral histories-based approach, 
and the greater reliance on indirect findings.  By interviewing in this 
more structural way, however, the men were less inhibited and more 
confident about making causal assertions and providing examples than 
when discussing their own experiences. The findings were also  
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triangulated with those gleaned both from respondents with good long-
term community knowledge, and officials more formally involved in 
mitigating the impacts of closure and subsequent decline. This process 
of triangulation helped test and verify the findings of the worker 
interviews, as has been detailed.  
 
The research focus also, inevitably, broadened to the wider community 
and locality effects of labour market restructuring in the longer-term. 
The evidence this change produced, questioning many ongoing notions 
of community, and current understandings of the social reasons behind 
the labour market trends observed, such as relative immobility, proved 
to be some of the most important contributions of the study.  
 
It should also be acknowledged that the research process, set up and 
subsequently adapted as it was, tended to privilege certain, 
particularly male, views. Most (although not all) of the interviewees 
were men, with the attendant risk of presenting a ‘narrowly masculine 
view of how…society worked’ (Payne and Payne, 2004; 136). This raises 
a question of ‘external validity’ and the limits of generalisations of the 
findings. It was clear from the interviews that where people spoke of 
attitudes towards work, benefits and mobility (migration and 
commuting) they were largely recounted from a male perspective (by 
both men and women). Apart from the quantitative findings from the 
labour market analysis, and in a departure from the initial intention, 
female attitudes remain less well explored or explained by this work. 
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Chapter 5) The immediate impacts and adjustments to 
closures 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter examines evidence for the immediate and short-term 
individual and household responses to job losses in Northumberland and 
the Mon Valley during the 1980s, and their social and community 
effects. Chapter 6 will then trace longer-term labour market, 
community and social changes. Working forwards in this way will help 
to reveal the cumulative structural forces that have caused persistent 
and acute employment disadvantage through to the current time.  
 
Although there is an inevitable conceptual problem in distinguishing 
between short-term and long-term effects, the issue is to some extent 
sidestepped here because of constraints of data availability. 
Quantitative analysis drawing largely on national census data 
conveniently fixes the time-periods of analysis. The short-term effects 
are therefore defined as those occurring during the 1980s. Most of the 
major closures in both areas occurred in the middle of this decade, so 
this period represents a useful approximation of the short-term 
impacts, compared with the pre-closure situation. Relatively rapid 
adjustments by individual workers, for example through migration or 
finding alternative employment, should be picked up in the figures. 
 
There may be inconsistency between what is considered short-term in 
the figures and understanding of short-term by interviewees in their 
description of social and economic trends. This difficulty was to some 
extent mitigated by asking questions framed by specifying the time-
periods covered by the data, for example ‘the late 1980s’. The 
reflections back on this period by interviewees are triangulated with 
other sources of similar information collected closer to the time of  
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closures, for example the oral histories carried out by the Steel 
Industry Heritage Corporation and research carried out by the Mon 
Valley Unemployed Committee. 
 
Earlier research identifies several ways in which we might expect the 
two areas’ labour market restructuring processes to vary. Generally it 
has been shown that new job creation has only partially compensated 
for the loss of industrial jobs in deindustrialised areas, although there 
is some diversity of experience. Restructuring is therefore likely to 
involve other adjustments. Greater labour mobility would be expected 
in the US, while we have seen that there is a well documented trend of 
increasing sickness benefit claims in the old industrial areas of the UK.  
 
Sets of Labour Market Accounts (LMAs) have been calculated for the 
Northumberland coalfield and the Mon Valley to describe the main 
adjustments in labour supply and demand. Accounts for males are 
complemented by those for females. In many cases partners respond to 
male jobs losses by supplying their labour instead, or as well. From a 
more competitive point of view, as industrial jobs disappeared men and 
women would be increasingly competing for the same jobs. 
Adjustments in male and female supply and demand clearly interact 
and cannot therefore be viewed in isolation.  
 
LMAs provide a framework for assessing the relative importance of 
particular forms of labour market adjustment. As was outlined in the 
methodology, a weakness in the LMA approach is the inability to 
produce commuting statistics. This is addressed in this chapter by 
drawing on other available census data to make some assessment of the 
relative importance of the commuting response. More detailed local 
analysis then allows the factors producing these patterns to be explored 
at the local level, including local and regional labour demand, the 
public welfare system, transport infrastructure, education and skills, 
and established work cultures.   
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The later sections of this chapter begin to give greater focus to the 
social and community impacts of job losses. First, the social effects on 
individuals and households are described, including evidence for the 
stress of unemployment, damaging trends of substance abuse by 
workers unable to adjust, family breakdown, and, in rare cases, even 
suicide. The focus is then broadened to examine the ways in which 
initial individual and household decisions were already beginning to 
have wider community implications, establishing trends which would 
become of increasing significance over the next decade. These wider 
impacts included the loss of social structures, public services and local 
social capital. 
 
Table 5.1 reiterates evidence presented earlier, showing that total job 
losses during the 1980s in the Mon Valley occurred in greater number 
than in Northumberland. This partly reflects the greater numbers 
employed in steel in the Mon Valley than in coal in Northumberland.  
There was also some growth in other sectors that partially offset the 
loss of coalfield jobs in Northumberland, with little compensatory 
growth in the Mon Valley. The proportion of men losing employment in 
the primary industry was likewise higher in the Mon Valley with 21% of 
those working age economically active losing work compared to 14% in 
Northumberland. These statistics suggest a more difficult labour market 
in the Mon Valley, making the prospects for finding alternative local 
work more problematic. This more difficult situation must be borne in 
mind when discussing subsequent trends. 
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Table 5.1: Employment characteristics in the Northumberland coalfield and 
the Mon valley 
  Northumberland 
coalfield 
Monongahela Valley 
Working-age male 
population 1980/1 
43,000  67,000 
Number employed in 
primary industry in 
1980/1
79 
11,000  17,000  
% of working-age men 
employed in primary 
industry 1980/1 
25%  25%  
Number of jobs lost in 
primary industry during 
the 1980s 
8000  14,000  
Number of jobs lost in 
primary industry during 
the 1980s as a % of 
working-age men 
19%  21% 
                                                 
79 Mon Valley figures are estimates produced by calculating the ratio of men employed 
in durable manufacturing employed in primary metals for those municipalities for 
which data are available and applying this to all municipalities. 
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5.2   Labour market Accounts 
 
Table 5.2:  Labour Market Accounts: Northumberland: 
 
a) Male working-age population, 1981-1991 
     
     
 
Male 
working 
age 
population 
As % of 1981 
EA 
population 
1981; economically active  38,670   
1991: economically active  35,829   
Natural change  458  1.2 
Participation change  -2,927  -7.6 
Employment change  -5,440  -14.1 
Job shortfall  2,970  7.7 
Unemployment  807  2.1 
Net out migration  920  2.4 
Government Schemes 
change  1257  3.3 
(Source: Census) 
 
 
b) Female working-age population, 1981-1991 
     
 
Female 
working 
age 
population 
As % of 1981 
EA 
population 
1981; economically active  23,082   
1991: economically active  26,995   
Natural change  528  2.3 
Participation change  3,321  14.4 
Employment change  2,550  11.0 
Job shortfall  1,300  5.6 
Unemployment change  334  1.4 
Net out migration  268  1.2 
Government Schemes 
change  715  3.1 
(Source: Census) 
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Table 5.3 Labour Market Accounts: Mon valley 
 
a) Male working-age population, 1980-1990 
 
     
 
Male 
working 
age 
population 
As % of 
1980 EA 
population 
1980; economically active  52,627   
1990: economically active  41,758   
Natural change  -1,809  -3.4 
Participation change  -1,532  -2.9 
Employment change  -10,814  -20.5 
Job shortfall  7,473  14.2 
Unemployment change  48  0.1 
Net out Migration  7,531  14.3 
(Source: Census) 
 
 
b) Female working-age population, 1980-1990 
 
     
 
Female 
working 
age 
population 
As % of 
1980 EA 
population 
1980; economically active  34,780   
1990: economically active  35,505   
Natural change  -2,668  -7.7 
Participation change  8,348  24.0 
Employment change  1,587  4.6 
Job shortfall  4,092  11.8 
Unemployment change  -855  -2.5 
Net out Migration  4,957  14.3 
(Source: Census) 
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The male LMAs (Tables 5.2a and 5.3a) show a marked contrast between 
supply-side adjustments in the two study areas. Declining participation 
rates were the most significant adjustment to job losses in 
Northumberland, accounting for more than half the loss of 
employment. In the Mon Valley out-migration was most important, with 
around three-quarters of the number who lost employment moving 
away.  
 
In contrast the female figures (Tables 5.2b and 5.3b) for the two 
regions tell a very similar story of strongly increasing female supply 
outstripping demand. In Northumberland the excess was absorbed 
through small increases in unemployment, out-migration and those 
undertaking government schemes. In the Mon Valley it was again 
mitigated mainly through migration.  
 
Northumberland coalfield 
 
The most significant adjustment to job loss among males was 
withdrawal from the labour force, declining participation, largely 
comprising a combination of early retirement and increasing numbers 
claiming inactive sickness benefits (Table 5.2a). Of the 5,440 fewer 
resident males employed in 1991 (14.1% of 1981 Economically Active 
[EA] population), 2,927 (7.6%) were absorbed through lower 
participation rates. This left a job shortfall of 2,970 (7.7%) which was 
accounted for by a variety of smaller responses, in unemployment 807 
(2.1%), out-migration 920 (2.4%), and participation in government 
schemes 1257 (3.3%).  
 
Female activity rates by contrast increased rapidly with 3,321 (14.4%) 
women added to the labour force over the decade (Table 5.2b). 
Employment grew by 2,550 (11.0%), leaving a job shortfall of 1,300 
(5.6%). More than half of these were absorbed through government  
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schemes (715 - 3.1%), with also small rises also in unemployment and 
out-migration of 334 (1.4%) and 268 (1.2%) respectively. 
 
The Mon Valley 
 
In the Mon Valley, 10,814 fewer men of working age were employed in 
1990 than in 1980 (Table 5.3a). Demographic trends meant there was a 
natural decrease in the working age population of 3.4%.
80 There was 
also a small withdrawal into inactivity through negative participation 
change of -2.9%. This left a job shortfall of 7,473 (14.2%) which was 
absorbed entirely by large-scale out-migration.  
 
As in Northumberland there was a significant increase in female 
participation, rising by 8,348 (24.0%) (Table 5.3b). Employment grew by 
just 1,587; again there was some natural decline (-2,668), leaving a job 
shortfall of 4,092 (11.8%). This was also absorbed through substantial 
out-migration (14.3%).  
 
These accounts illustrate the crucial role played by out-migration in 
absorbing the Mon Valley’s surplus labour, in response to both male and 
female job shortfalls. Shortfalls which were generated in different 
ways; employment decline for men and increasing participation rates 
among women. In Northumberland the most important adjustments 
were those that enabled people to stay ‘in-place’, most significantly 
while withdrawing their labour, but also through growing numbers 
enrolling in government schemes and through some increasing 
employment (mainly for women), which did not happen in the Mon 
Valley.  
 
 
 
                                                 
80 The reason for this negative natural population change is related to previous rounds 
of suburbanisation from the area of middle-aged workers with young families leaving a 
relatively aged population behind.   
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Elements of explanation 
 
The LMAs clearly set out the contrast between the short-term ‘place-
based’ and ‘mobility-dependent’ coping mechanisms adopted by 
workers in the two study areas during the 1980s. The explanations 
sought through the interviews explored the importance of three main 
determinants identified from past research as influencing labour market 
restructuring:  
 
1.  Local and regional demand for labour: the availability of 
alternative work within, or commutable distance from, the local 
labour market. Both the number of, and the type of jobs, are 
important as there can be issues of skills mismatch. This demand 
is of crucial importance as it sets the opportunities base within 
which workers make decisions. 
2.  The public welfare context: the extent to which government 
provides support for people and places. Support for places 
includes funding public services, education and regeneration. 
Support for individuals includes benefits, (re)training, 
healthcare, as well government legislation and policies towards 
redundancy, labour markets and economic development. 
3.  The historical and cultural context: this involves a wide range of 
cultural and social norms which operate within an area. 
 
The balance of these interrelated determinants influences the scale of 
different labour market adjustments.  
 
5.3   The impacts of closures on local labour markets 
 
Northumberland 
 
Deep mining in Northumberland collapsed in the 1980s, with the loss of 
almost 8,000 jobs (Census 1981; 1991). These losses, almost exclusively  
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of male workers, were only partially offset by small increases in 
construction, distribution, hotels and catering, and other services.
81 
Figure 5.1 shows that of the 7,880 mining jobs lost, only 3,310 were 
‘replaced’ by increases in other sectors.  
 
The net loss of male jobs, in some ways, was compensated for by the 
increased local demand for female labour, as 4,130 new jobs were 
created between 1981 and 1991 which were filled by women (Figure 
5.2). These were concentrated in public administration, medical 
services, and other public services, as the importance of public sector 
employment grew. Around half of all employed women however were 
working part-time.
82 In some cases, at the household level, the 
increase in female workers was an attempt to maintain household 
incomes.  
 
With the pits shutting, with the better paid 
jobs, lads had to work all hours for less money, 
and the wives had to go out to work to make 
ends meet (Former miner [N4]).  
 
As a result the coalfield area lost a net of 440 jobs between 1981 and 
1991, and the gender distribution of employment changed significantly. 
In 1981 men filled 63% of the jobs in the coalfield area; by 1991 this 
was down to 53%. As the ‘well-paid’ jobs lost in the coal industry were 
largely replaced by low-wage employment in the service sector. 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 Much of the growth in ‘other services’ was in the public sector. 
82 53% of employed women living in the coalfield were working 31 hours or more in 
1991  
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Figure 5.1: Change in number of jobs located in the Northumberland coalfield area filled by 
men, 1981-1991
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Figure 5.2: Change in number of jobs located in the Northumberland coalfield area filled 
by women, 1981-1991
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Mon Valley 
 
There was an even greater loss of jobs in the Mon Valley, as mills 
closed at Homestead, Duquesne, Clairton, and at National Works and 
Christy Park in McKeesport.
83 It is estimated that around 14,000 Mon 
Valley residents lost jobs in the steel industry between 1980 and 1990 
(calculated from the Census). These produced significant negative 
multipliers in supply industries. The River Communities project (1986) 
estimated that, for every 1000 jobs lost in primary metals, a further 
130 additional manufacturing jobs were lost in supply industries in the 
Mon Valley (Cunningham and Martz, 1986; 4). There were also 
significant negative effects on retail jobs, local shops and services.
84 
 
It wasn’t just steel. Steel supported a whole 
plethora of industries that fed the steel 
industry. So potentially for every steel job 
there might have been a further three other 
jobs that depended on the steel industry. … 
Most easily evidenced of that would have been 
the service industries not even directly 
supporting steel… In town we had four clothing 
stores when the steel industry was booming. So 
it wasn’t just the steelworker but it was the 
steelworker’s family and they had disposable 
income and they used the stores…[when the 
industry closed] the numbers of folks that then 
participated in those things diminished and the 
competition is only [for] so many dollars. Those 
stores either disappeared or were reduced in 
number. All the way down to the liquor stores 
… it meant that the shopping pattern of the 
downtown changed (City Administrator and 
Director of McKeesport Economic Development) 
 
Local labour demand figures directly comparable to those of 
Northumberland are not available for the Mon Valley because of the 
                                                 
83 There were additional jobs lost at Edgar Thomson in Braddock and the Irvin Works in 
West Mifflin, which shed labour but remained open. 
84 The loss of retail and services was further exacerbated by the growth of shopping 
malls, and the movement of retail away from town centres and into suburban 
locations.  
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absence of local workplace employment data. Analysis therefore has to 
be based on residential figures which show that total male job losses 
exceeded 10,000 between 1980 and 1990 (see Table 5.4). This decline 
was particularly pronounced among those manual occupations on which 
the mills and their associated industries depended. Including ‘precision 
production, craft and repair’, and ‘operators, fabricators, and 
labourers’, numbers employed in the latter halved over the period, 
with the loss of some 8,406 jobs. The biggest growth in male 
employment was in ‘service’ and ‘sales’ occupations, jobs which 
generally entailed a substantial drop in wages and benefit levels. 
 
By contrast, total female employment grew slightly over the period, 
generally in professional occupations (Table 5.5). It is somewhat 
doubtful though the extent to which growth in these higher order 
occupations was the result of household coping strategies of displaced 
workers. In absolute terms female employment remained dominated by 
lower-end service activities, particularly in administrative support, 
sales and other services. 
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Table 5.4: Male employment change by occupation in the Mon Valley, 1980-1990 
 
         
  1980  1990 
Change 
1980-
1990 
% change 
1980-
1990 
Employed men 16 and over  47,714  37,216  -10,498  -22.0 
Managerial and professional speciality occupations  6,829  7,252  423  6.2 
Executive, administrative, and managerial occupations  3,403  3,714  311  9.1 
Professional speciality administrators  3,426  3,538  112  3.3 
Technical, sales, and administrative support occupations  8,003  8,352  349  4.4 
Technicians and related support operations  1,634  1,807  173  10.6 
Sales occupations  2,967  3,567  600  20.2 
Administrative support occupations, including clerical  3,402  2,978  -424  -12.5 
Service occupations  4,337  5,140  803  18.5 
Private household occupations  6  38  32  533.3 
Protective service occupations  1,075  1,414  339  31.5 
Service occupations, except protective and household  3,256  3,688  432  13.3 
Farming, forestry and fishing occupations  153  529  376  245.8 
Precision production, craft and repair occupations  11,480  7,438  -4,042  -35.2 
Operators, fabricators, and labourers  16,912  8,506  -8,406  -49.7 
Machine operators, assemblers and inspectors or Machine operators and tenders, 
except precision; Fabricators, assemblers, inspectors, and samplers  7,418  2,674  -4,744  -64.0 
Transportation occupations; Material moving equipment operators  4,902  2,906  -1,996  -40.7 
Handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, labourers  4,592  2,926  -1,666  -36.3 
(Source: Census) 
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Table 5.5: Female employment change by occupation in the Mon Valley, 1980-1990 
         
         
 
1980  1990  Change 
1980-
1990 
% change 
80-90 
Employed females 16 and over  31,394  33,335  1,941  6.2 
Managerial and professional speciality occupations  5,459  7,706  2,247  41.2 
Executive, administrative, and managerial occupations  1,715  2,908  1,193  69.6 
Professional speciality administrations  3,744  4,798  1,054  28.2 
Technical, sales, and administrative support occupations  15,819  16,536  717  4.5 
Technicians and related support operations  883  1,448  565  64.0 
Sales occupations  4,103  4,345  242  5.9 
Administrative support occupations, including clerical  10,833  10,743  -90  -0.8 
Service occupations  6,948  6,900  -48  -0.7 
Private household occupations  188  214  26  13.8 
Protective service occupations  216  306  90  41.7 
Service occupations, except protective and household  6,544  6,380  -164  -2.5 
Farming, forestry and fishing occupations  45  54  9  20.0 
Precision production, craft and repair occupations  548  624  76  13.9 
Operators, fabricators, and labourers  2,575  1,515  -1,060  -41.2 
Machine operators, assemblers and inspectors or Machine operators and tenders, 
except precision; Fabricators, assemblers, inspectors, and samplers  1,340  764  -576  -43.0 
Transportation occupations; Material moving equipment operators  317  261  56  -17.7 
Handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, labourers  918  490  -154  -16.8 
 
(Source: Census) 
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5.4   Accessing alternative local employment opportunities 
 
Northumberland 
 
The two most important structural determinants of individual outcomes 
in Northumberland were age, and position in the colliery’s division of 
labour. Those with transferable skills, particularly tradesmen, generally 
had fewer difficulties in finding alternative employment. Although 
there would typically be some downward adjustment in wages it would 
generally be much less pronounced than for a face worker. Re-training 
was also more appealing for those with transferable skills, involving re-
adjusting skills for a different occupation rather than starting again. 
 
I mean your craftsman. They would have found 
work more easily…[The] miners were skilled 
people at the colliery, but didn’t have a trade 
(Former miner [N5]). 
 
Sadly, many older workers would never work again. There was 
perceived to be age discrimination by local employers, and many older 
workers felt they stood little chance of gaining alternative employment 
when there was such weak demand for labour.
85  
 
When ma friends went and asked for 
employment and were turned away, told 
“you’re too old”. I wasn’t going through that 
indignity… when you’re going at that age 
seeking employment and, “oh you’re too old 
we want younger people”, I wouldn’t lower 
meself to that. So I never ever looked for 
employment (Former miner - was in his early 
50s at the time of closures [N4]) 
 
For men who were nearing retirement age, redundancy money would 
often support them until they reached the age to qualify for state and 
occupational pensions at 65. But, for the workers in their late 40s and 
                                                 
85 Some also believed that local companies did not want to employ ex-miners because 
of their strong Union views and high wage demands.  
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early 50s, closures were a particularly difficult pill to swallow. Many of 
this cohort considered themselves too old to retrain, but not old enough 
to retire.  
 
This perception of the lack of local employment opportunities was partly 
responsible for the rising number of Incapacity Benefit claimants which 
followed pit closures.
86 Indeed, the availability of IB for some former 
miners, allowed them to exercise selection in refusing to take 
employment which they considered to be inappropriate. 
 
They would say employers can’t be ageist, but 
most employers were like “oh you’re over fifty 
we don’t want you”… So if you wanted the sick 
it had to be something good, it had to be 
convincing; but that was the alternative – 
either go on the sick or take a job (Former 
miner [N2]) 
 
Wage levels presented perhaps the biggest obstacle to finding new 
employment. Typically the wages offered in alternative employment 
would be compared (often very unfavourably) with those paid in the 
mining industry. There was a historical and cultural understanding that 
work would pay a decent wage which many saw as sacrosanct, refusing 
to settle for less than this. In addition, there were other cultural 
barriers, since many former miners would prioritise finding what they 
considered ‘male work’; work which was physical in nature. It is clear 
therefore that the level of local demand was not the sole barrier in 
finding alternative work, the type of demand was equally important.  
 
There was an offer of taxi driving and 
delivery jobs. People are worth more than 
that (Former miner [N1]) 
 
One of the biggest problems was that jobs 
weren’t offering the salaries… they would 
say, “I’m not doing that job. I was getting 
that money 10 years ago”, so they wouldn’t 
                                                 
86 At the time this was known as Invalidity Benefit but Incapacity Benefit (IB) is used 
for the sake of clarity between this and the following chapter.  
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work for it. Obviously in those days we didn’t 
have national minimum wage, and a lot of 
them put themselves out of the jobs market 
(Employment opportunities manager, Amble 
Development Trust, formerly redundancy 
counsellor with British Coal Enterprise). 
 
These attitudes represented a cultural mismatch between individual 
aspirations and the new economic realities which was in some respects 
mitigated by the public welfare system. Redundancy and benefits 
allowed many who were not sufficiently ‘flexible’ to retain an element 
of selectivity, and often remain ‘in-place’ without having to take 
alternative work. 
 
For many older workers therefore the easiest transition to make was to 
retire early. This transition was made possible by the relatively large 
redundancy payments which workers who had been in the industry for 
many years were entitled to. 
 
I had me redundancy money which helped me 
through.... never looked for work (Former 
miner [N4]). 
 
A lot of them, like I say, had this buffer; had 
some money in the bank. It’s a case of, you 
think what would you really like to do, so a lot 
of them would want to do something to do 
with the outdoors. They liked their allotments 
or their gardens, but they were more for that 
than a factory job (Employment opportunities 
manager, Amble Development Trust, formerly 
redundancy counsellor with British Coal 
Enterprise). 
 
Mon Valley 
 
Alternative employment opportunities were also scarce in the Mon 
Valley, and those that were available were often low-waged, and 
lacked important healthcare benefits. A United Way study in 
Southwestern Pennsylvania found that during a six-month period in 1983 
the average wage of the 6,748 jobs created was $3.83 an hour. This  
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contrasted with the $13.43 an hour basic rate of which was paid in the 
steel industry (Cunningham and Martz, 1986; 5).  
 
Most people ended up working for less than half 
of what they were working for in the mill 
(Former mill worker [MV3]). 
 
In an attempt to compensate for the loss of household income more 
women were drawn into employment. However, often even when dual 
incomes were combined they paid less than the previous single male 
earnings.  
 
In years past you had this worker in the steel 
industry…making enough money to support their 
family. Then you had a husband and a wife, you 
know, working in Wal-Mart or K-Mart. Both of 
them working, not making nearly as much as the 
one breadwinner made working in the steel 
industry (Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives, State Representative. District 
39). 
 
People, not only them but their wives, had to 
go to work, and them and their wives were 
probably working two or three jobs and making 
less than they were making in the mill for one 
person (Former mill worker [MV3]). 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the precipitous effect of the loss of mill jobs on 
wages, as household incomes in most municipalities declined by 
between 15 and 30% between 1980 and 1990, amounting to a loss of 
between $5,000-$10,000 a year. These losses were heaviest in absolute 
terms in the mill suburb areas, like Munhall, West Homestead and North 
Versailles where the better paid industrial workers were more likely to 
live.
 87 It is worth noting that this loss occurred even though more 
women had entered the labour market which should have boosted 
household incomes. 
 
                                                 
87 It is unclear why Braddock bucks this trend, as we shall see in the following chapter 
it too was at a loss by 2000.  
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Figure 5.3: The change in real median household income for Mon Valley municipalities, 1979-1989
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Compared with the experience in Northumberland, displaced workers in 
the Mon Valley were generally much less selective, accepting low-wage 
jobs as being better than nothing. Two factors shaped this different 
attitude. First, the public welfare context of small redundancy 
payments, time-limited unemployment benefits and the absence of 
universal healthcare drastically narrowed the scope for selectivity. 
Unemployment Insurance for workers usually lasted for six months but, 
in part because of the campaigning of the Mon Valley Unemployed 
Committee (MVUC), some were able to have their benefits extended, 
sometimes for up to 18 months, depending on fulfilling certain criteria, 
through Trade Readjustment Assistance (TRA). Healthcare insurance 
would generally not be extended, however, and this would make 
finding alternative employment imperative. Secondly, and more 
intangibly, interviewees gave the impression that the culture of 
dependence was largely absent from the Mon Valley, and that change in 
the economy was viewed as being somehow natural, even if it was 
often regrettable. 
 
Displaced workers in the Mon Valley received only small redundancy 
payments, typically of only ‘a couple of thousand dollars’, even for 
relatively long periods of service (Interview with former mill worker 
[MV3]). This made finding alternative work quickly a priority, leading to 
workers taking jobs at whatever wage was available.  
 
You really had nothing, nothing available at the 
time, so you took whatever you could take. It 
was tough, like I said it was really tough. You 
took whatever the heck you could find (Former 
mill worker [MV4]). 
 
[I found work with] a company that was trying 
to run on a shoe-string, you know, where I’d 
left here getting 12 dollars an hour now I was 
back getting 5.50 an hour which is just barely  
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enough to sustain you (Former mill worker 
[MV2]).
 88 
 
The absence of universal healthcare coverage was also another critical 
driver in the need to find alternative work quickly.  
 
Hospitalisation disappeared, which we were 
just hoping that nobody was going to get sick. 
But we still had to have the kids covered, and 
that’s what really wiped us out of any savings, 
trying to pay for that... we were just trying to 
live day by day at that point (Former mill 
worker [MV2]). 
 
We had all these kids that weren’t getting 
healthcare…It was like, “This sucks. We want to 
be able to go to a doctor if we want to”, you 
know? (Co-director, Mon Valley Unemployed 
Committee, former mill worker) 
 
The general trend therefore for those who remained in the area was 
that workers were substantially financially worse off, spending time 
unemployed and in low-wage jobs. Working multiple casual jobs was 
also commonplace.   
 
In that period of time it was hell, and that’s 
about as plain as you can put it. It was hell – 
you try to work tending bar, working with 
contractors in the evening, whatever else you 
could pick up – try and work three jobs at one 
time to try and make ends meet…and I’m not 
alone – there’s awful lot of guys that did the 
same thing (Former mill worker [MV4]). 
 
If I knew somebody then maybe they gave me a 
helping hand to find some kind of employment 
somewhere… No benefits or nothing, it’s all 
temporary or part-time (Former mill worker 
[MV1]). 
 
In the Mon Valley, as in Northumberland, individual outcomes were 
again heavily structured by age and transferable skills. In addition, race 
                                                 
88  An hourly wage of $5.50 an hour in 1988 is equivalent to $9.64 in 2007 (BLS 
inflation calculator); well below the average hourly wage for production and non 
supervisory workers of $17.71 (BLS, December 2007)  
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was an important factor in the Mon Valley, as the historical division of 
labour in the mills saw black workers in the least skilled occupations. 
Workers who were close to retirement and who qualified for pensions 
(usually this depended on 20-25 years of service), would in many cases 
be able to take a reduced early pension as a lump sum to live on until 
they qualified for social security at 62.
89 For the majority who didn’t 
have such early pension entitlements, the situation was more difficult; 
in particular for the older and less-skilled. Indeed there were workers 
in their mid 50s who did not have such entitlements.
90  
 
They got out of high school, they worked in the 
mill; you know, that was their livelihood and 
they had no other training, and, you know, at 
age 50 or age 55 how do you start over?… you 
know it’s hard to go into training when you’ve 
been working at the same job for 20 or 30 years 
(Member, North Braddock CARES). 
 
Workers in this cohort also felt that age discrimination limited their 
options for alternative work: 
 
At my age, when I was applying for a job I’d get 
this bit of over-qualified, which meant I was 
too old…Nobody wanted to hire a guy who was 
in his 40s, nobody wanted to pick up 
hospitalisation, things like that (Former mill 
worker [MV4]). 
 
‘As soon as they find out he’s 50 years old, they 
make excuses. Because of age discrimination, 
they won’t come right out and say, “we’re not 
going to hire you because you’re 50 years old.” 
Most of the time they say, “we’re not hiring 
laid-off steelworkers because if they get called 
back to the mill, we’re going to lose them.” 
He’s got applications from one end of the state 
to the other and some in West Virginia.’ (Linda 
                                                 
89 Workers are entitled to some payments from age 62 onwards and become eligible 
for full-entitlements at 65. 
90 One former mill worker who had been involved with the Union said he had seen 
evidence that the company’s strategy was to skirt their pension liabilities by cutting 
workers first who were coming up to their 25 years of service and early pension 
entitlement (Former mill worker [MV3]). 
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Ganczak [wife of a former mill worker] quoted 
in the MVUC oral histories, 1983; 86). 
 
In addition, job losses had a big impact on the black community, since 
even unskilled mill jobs offered good wages which black workers often 
could not get elsewhere.  
 
Huge loss in the African-American community 
because those were the best jobs. There 
weren’t a lot of high-income jobs of any type 
for the black community, manufacturing jobs 
were it. They’d broken into those racist hiring 
practices, but not into others; management, 
other kinds of industry. So it was devastating 
for the black communities (Co-director, Mon 
Valley Unemployed Committee, former mill 
worker). 
 
The disadvantages faced by black steelworkers in finding alternative 
employment partly resulted from their overrepresentation in the low-
skilled positions in the mill’s division of labour. They tended to have 
fewer trade or transferable skills to help them find alternative 
employment (Ray Henderson [a black mill worker at Braddock] quoted 
in Carroll, 1992). This racial division of labour was picked up in a 1980 
report to the Equal Opportunities Commission, which showed that in 
the Pittsburgh SMSA area (the five county region around Pittsburgh 
which includes the Mon Valley), black male workers were more highly 
concentrated in operative and labouring positions than white workers 
who were better represented in craft and white-collar positions (U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, 1980; II252) – see Figure 
5.4.  Data from 1973, specifically for steel mills, further highlight the 
concentration of black workers in the lower skill/lower wage positions, 
with a greater proportion in operative and labouring positions – see 
Figure 5.5. The black population had a greater reliance on the types of 
semi-skilled and unskilled positions readily available in the mills, but 
which became scare after closures. Mill jobs, although requiring few if  
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any formal qualifications, had paid good wages and offered some 
upward mobility for black workers.  
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Figure 5.4: Occupational employment by race of men in the Pittsburgh MSA working in 
manufacturing durable goods, 1980
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Figure 5.5: Occupational employment by race of men in the Pittsburgh MSA working in 
manufacturing basic steel products, 1973
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Officials and
managers
Professionals Technicians Sales workers Office and
clerical
Skilled craft Operatives Labourers Service
workers
Occupations
% of total employed by race
White employees
Black employees
(Source: Equal Opportunities Commission, 1973) 
  169 
5.5 Unemployment 
 
Increasing unemployment was not as significant a trend in either area 
as might have been expected. Although periods of time spent 
unemployed were common amongst workers in the immediate period 
after closures, aggregate rises were tempered by interactions between 
unemployment and inactivity in Northumberland, and the time-limited 
nature of benefits in the Mon Valley. The census data therefore 
probably miss the immediate and short-lived spike in unemployment 
which occurred in both areas. 
 
Some increase occurred in Northumberland, with rising unemployment 
among men accounting for around 15% of the total employment change 
over the decade (i.e., unemployment increases explained the outcome 
of almost one-in-seven jobs lost). In some wards there had also been 
relatively high levels of unemployment before the closures. The rise in 
unemployment, combined with the statistical impacts of declining rates 
of economic activity, meant that by 1991 many wards had 
unemployment rates over 15%, some over 25% and, if those on 
government schemes are included, the rate touched 30% in the most 
deprived wards, those in the worst hit parts of Blyth and Ashington 
towns. In 1981 the rate had exceeded 15% in only a handful of wards 
(see Figure 5.6).
91  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 Unemployment rates are calculated as a percentage of the working-age 
economically active population  
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Aggregate male unemployment in the Mon Valley barely changed, 
growing by less than 50 persons. Because of out-migration, however, it 
did increase as a proportion of the economically active population from 
6.9% to 8.5%, while under-employment and cyclical unemployment 
became serious concerns. There were also relatively high rates of 
unemployment in some municipalities, particularly some of the mill 
towns like Rankin, Clairton, McKeesport and Duquesne, before the 
closures which were exacerbated by the job losses (see Figure 5.7). In 
this context many workers became long-term unemployed and 
exceeded unemployment insurance time limits. 
 
‘I’ve had younger guys coming to see me to see 
if they could get me to sell their cars. They’re 
not doing anything. A lot of them went back 
home and are living with their parents. A 
couple of them are going to school to be 
retrained for something. But as far as benefits, 
they’re out of benefits. The majority of them 
went back home.’ (Rich Pomponio quoted in 
MVUC Oral history project, 1983; 80) 
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Figure 5.6: Change in the male unemployment rate in Northumberland coalfield wards, 1981-
1991
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Figure 5.7: Change in male unemployment rates for Mon Valley municipalities, 1980-1990
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5.6   Retraining 
 
The mainly industry-specific skills of many of the workers coming out of 
the coalmines and the steel mills meant that retraining would often be 
needed to enable displaced workers to gain alternative productive 
employment. Attempts to retrain displaced workers for other industries 
however were only partially successful in both areas, though for 
different reasons. In Northumberland many workers failed to take up 
retraining provision as a result of bitterness over job losses, and doubts 
about the quality of retraining outcomes. In the Mon Valley the out-
migration of the most productive and more highly skilled workers left 
behind the older and more difficult to retrain.  
 
The result of these failures was a general de-skilling in both areas, with 
the skills base associated with previous industrial work not being 
replaced with skills appropriate to new industries and investment. In 
both areas, retraining efforts were somewhat ad hoc, with little 
evidence of strategic planning between economic development planners 
and training providers to direct skills towards potential growth sectors. 
A more general approach was adopted, for example, retraining in 
aspects of construction, driving and warehouse work.  
 
Northumberland 
 
Age and skill levels primarily determined who retrained in 
Northumberland. Older workers who wanted to return to work were 
more likely to be looking for a job to tide them over until retirement 
age, rather than seeking what might be termed a new career. Those 
who already had some trade skills were more likely to convert these into 
relevant qualifications for alternative work. The effectiveness of these 
retraining efforts, however, was limited by weak local demand. It was 
perceived by many that the opportunities available were of insufficient 
quality for retraining to be worthwhile.   
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We’d put you on a three week course and 
hopefully you’d be a welder at the end of it. 
Well you were lucky to get your welding codes, 
and most civvy street employers wouldn’t 
employ you without your codes. So if somebody 
wanted to be a jobbing builder or get a job as 
a labourer on a building site, the courses they 
would have put them on would have given 
them enough to be a plumber’s mate or a 
brickie’s assistant or whatever. But never 
would they get a job as a brickie, or a 
plumber, or a plasterer, or whatever, because 
you needed much longer training, and the 
people who would provide that, the specialist – 
the employers as opposed to the training 
establishment – they could get a young lad and 
train them up for peanuts by comparison, 
whereas they were wanting a good wage to do 
it…Which again meant they had difficulty in 
finding work (Employment opportunities 
manager, Amble Development Trust, formerly 
redundancy counsellor with British Coal 
Enterprise). 
 
Unemployment agencies demanded all the 
miner was good for was a forklift driver 
(Former miner [N1]).  
 
In some cases bitterness at the loss of jobs would stop workers 
accessing the help that was made available, embedding a sense of 
dependency and not wanting to move on.  
 
They built a brand new industrial estate there 
[Ashington], and British Coal Enterprise built 
the first of the buildings and they used that as 
a job shop - come skills counselling shop, for 
all their ex-employees to come in and receive 
advice and guidance, and hopefully funding 
towards retraining etc. Like I say not 
everybody took them up on that. Some were 
just I suppose angry and annoyed at having lost 
their jobs, and that made them blinkered in 
their way of thinking sometimes. What is it you 
say cutting themselves off? They’re their own 
worst enemy you know (Employment 
opportunities manager, Amble Development  
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Trust, formerly redundancy counsellor with 
British Coal Enterprise). 
 
Mon Valley  
 
Efforts to retrain displaced workers in the Mon Valley were only 
minimally effective because many of the younger and more skilled 
workers chose to migrate, leaving behind the older and more difficult 
to retrain.
92 This left real issues about whether in many cases retraining 
was possible. 
 
I think for a lot of people the frustration came 
in as to what are we being retrained for? You 
know, what were the growing jobs? And can you 
take a worker that was working as a millwright 
or did more of a labourer job in a mill; are you 
going to be able to retrain them to work in 
biotechnology or computer software 
engineering? Maybe their kids, but the reality 
is, when you’re in your 40s or 50s there’s only 
so much retraining that can be done with you 
…See that’s why I think personally, job 
retraining efforts were only minimal; you know, 
were only somewhat effective. It’s because the 
best and the brightest left the region, and what 
was left was the more difficult to retrain… So 
people that basically engaged in physical work, 
with physical skills, certainly had a really hard 
time in going through job 
retraining (Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives, State Representative: District 
39). 
 
There was similarly also the real worry, given the weak local demand, 
as to whether retraining would lead to employment. 
 
                                                 
92 There are no official figures for the numbers who undertook retraining. A Gallop 
poll in Allegheny County in the mid-80s found that 40% of respondents had undergone 
some form of retraining. In a larger study of 401 households in Duquesne, Cunningham 
and Martz (1986; 45 & 52) found that few households contained a member who was 
seeking a form of retraining; just 5%, even though some 21% reported being 
unemployed. The contradictory evidence suggests that the uptake of retraining may 
have been geographically differentiated, with fewer in the mill towns (often the 
lowest skilled workers) undergoing retraining, but a greater number of those living in 
the mill suburbs.   
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Take the medical field. A lady called me today. 
She wants to get me into school, but the list of 
enrolees is really expanding. Before, that was a 
good job opportunity. But it seems like now, 
everybody got in and their enrolment is really 
high. It’s the Median School, they call it (a 
school that trains people in Allied Health 
careers). Some of the schools—the 
automechanics, diesel mechanics…It’s good if 
you can get a job, but are there any jobs out 
there? (Richard Grace quoted in MVUC Oral 
History project, 1983; 122) 
 
Again these failures were associated with a general deskilling in the 
area. As a huge industry specific local skills base was eroded, and no 
coherent plan was put in place for replacing it with new skills with the 
potential to attract new investment or to foster endogenous growth. 
 
[The attitudes of local business and policy-
makers was]  we don’t really care about or need 
the skills of these former industrial 
workers…There was no easy transition, nor was 
there an easier sustainable path for workers to 
transition their skills towards new sectors. 
(Chairman, Steel Valley Authority) 
 
 
5.7   Commuting for work 
 
In the absence of suitable work locally, commuting can potentially play 
a significant role in alleviating labour market disadvantage by linking 
workers to jobs in the broader travel-to-work area. While both areas sit 
within commutable distance of relatively large urban labour markets, 
during the 1980s both Newcastle and Pittsburgh were suffering their 
own problems of deindustrialisation. This loss of industrial jobs within 
the cities themselves, and in other parts of their hinterlands, created 
large regional imbalances in labour supply and demand which limited 
the role commuting was likely to play in either area. However it was 
not just demand, there were other aspects to this lack of commuting 
which are now explored.  
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As has been explained, one of the main weaknesses in the LMA 
approach adopted here is the absence of commuting data which would 
allow for the role of wider regional labour demand to be explored. 
Fortunately, there are several ways in which the LMAs can be 
supplemented to allow regional demand to be addressed. In the UK this 
is relatively straightforward. Flow data, accessed through the Census 
Interaction Data Service (CIDS), provide evidence of how out-
commuting from the coalfield area changed during the 1980s. In some 
ways such an approach is preferable to the direct incorporation of net-
flows into the LMAs. Previous applications of LMAs have tended to 
exaggerate the importance of the commuting response, since much of 
what they show reflects declining in-commuting to areas, rather than 
adjustment to job losses by local workers. In the Mon Valley the 
problem is less easy to overcome and often proxy measures for 
commuting change, such as travel to work times, have to be used.  
 
Northumberland 
 
While Newcastle was suffering similar problems of industrial change in 
the 1980s, the city clearly presented more opportunities for 
employment than the coalfield itself. Some adjustments to patterns of 
commuting might therefore have been expected. In practice, the 
increase was paltry, with male commuting from the coalfield area to 
North Tyneside and Newcastle combined growing by less than 500 
between 1981 and 1991 (CIDS 1981; 1991).  
 
Even these small increases were strongly structured by age and skill 
levels, with older workers and those in lower-skilled employment much 
less likely to commute to work elsewhere. There was also some 
distance decay effect, as a higher proportion of the commuting 
increase came from workers from the urban coalfield rather than the 
rural coalfield, though even from the urban coalfield the increases 
remained modest at around 5% (see Figures  5.8 and 5.9). Female  
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commuting increased in line with that of men, illustrating the extent to 
which women also heavily depended on highly localised demand for 
labour.  
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There are two main reasons for this very limited commuting response. 
First, depressed regional demand limited the realistic scope for 
accessing alternative commutable opportunities. Secondly, there were 
both physical and attitudinal barriers to commuting. The physical 
barriers included relatively low levels of car ownership and poor public 
transport infrastructure. The ongoing implications of these are more 
fully developed in the next chapter. 
 
It’s 35 miles to Newcastle - a lot of them 
wouldn’t go that far, certainly not on public 
transport because the cost and location, 
and/or the times (Employment opportunities 
manager, Amble Development Trust, formerly 
redundancy counsellor with British Coal 
Enterprise). 
 
Perhaps of even greater significance was the cultural reluctance of 
workers to look outside their own locality. This was associated with the 
inherited tradition of highly localised live/work arrangements; the 
relatively self-contained nature of the communities where houses, jobs, 
recreation and services were available locally. This cultural barrier left 
many solely dependent on what happened to employment locally, with 
all the difficulties that entailed. 
 
There was an expectation that when you’ve 
worked in a community where your housing is 
based as well as your job, you actually assume 
that you know you walk out your house round 
the corner and into your job (Assistant 
director- Northumberland Community Council) 
 
I hadn’t realised how much of a dependency 
culture [there was] in the local villages. They 
were very institutionalised. You had the Co-op 
was your main shop, you didn’t need your own 
transport to go to work because it was either 
walking distance or there was a bus laid on. 
You had very much camaraderie, the social 
clubs existed at the end of the street or the 
pub and there was much more neighbourly, you 
know, all the miners had allotments or 
gardens, so they were very insular…They didn’t  
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venture outside their own community … Once 
the mine was shut, quite often that was the 
only business in the town, the only large 
employer. And the work was in major 
conurbations, major towns…They were really 
flummoxed and a lot of them didn’t take to it 
(Employment opportunities manager, Amble 
Development Trust, formerly redundancy 
counsellor with British Coal Enterprise). 
 
Mon Valley 
 
It is more difficult to describe the impacts of job losses on commuting 
patterns in the Mon Valley because neither flow data nor local demand 
figures are available. Where data has been collated, for example 
commuting times, combined with local interview evidence, they 
suggest only small increases in out-commuting during the 1980s. Figure 
5.10 uses time as a proxy for distance, showing small increases in 
commuting time from most municipalities between 1980 and 1990.  
 
There is also an important difference in the comparison with 
Northumberland. Many mill workers had moved out to mill suburb areas 
as they became wealthier, so that many already commuted to work.
93 
At the time of closures, commuting patterns in and around the Valley 
were thus much wider than in the Northumberland coalfield, and a 
change in job could often not necessarily entail a longer, but simply a 
different commute.  
 
 
 
                                                 
93 This process was explained by a former mill worker, Mike Bilcsik, as part of the SIHC 
Oral History Project: ‘Munhall was where, when you worked in the mill and you got 
enough money to buy a house and get away from the mill, you moved up on top of the 
mill in Munhall’. Munhall sits above Homestead, the immediate town around the 
Homestead works.  
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Figure 5.10: Change in mean travel to work times by Mon Valley municipalities, 1980-1990
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More generally, the Mon Valley area is more closely linked to Pittsburgh 
through commuting than is Northumberland to Newcastle. By 1990, 
more than a third of employed residents of the Mon Valley were 
working in Pittsburgh, almost three times the proportion commuting 
from Northumberland to Newcastle. The main factor limiting further 
growth in commuting to Pittsburgh, was the broader regional collapse 
in demand for labour. There was little sense of a lack of mobility 
among the workers but finding employment which paid enough to 
compensate for travel costs was far from easy. The established 
suburban lifestyle, the historical culture of mobility, and the higher 
levels of car ownership therefore meant that transport, and especially 
attitudinal, barriers to commuting were much less pronounced than in 
Northumberland. The geographical scope of job searches by displaced 
workers was therefore often much wider. 
 
I was looking anything from Pittsburgh east. I 
didn’t want to have to go into Pittsburgh if I 
could help it, but if that’s where I found a job, 
and I did look in there, if I found a job down 
that way then I would have had to contend with 
that  (Former mill worker [MV2]). 
 
I went to Little Washington in Washington PA 
[the other side of the city] and put an 
application in there. I remember that, that was 
a plastic place I think. But I was willing to take 
whatever I could get if it was worthwhile, and 
I’m not saying big bucks. Just where I could 
live, not even comfortable, just where I could 
just make ends meet (Former mill worker 
[MV4]). 
 
 
5.8   Migration 
 
The scale of the response to localised job loss through migration was 
the biggest difference in the adjustment processes between the two 
areas. In the Mon Valley for many workers migration was the only 
realistic option to find alternative employment. In many respects this 
was positive - workers who moved could almost certainly access better  
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opportunities than those available locally, and this to some extent 
alleviated supply-side labour market pressures by reducing competition 
for those who stayed. The Mon Valley’s experience contrasts sharply 
with what happened in Northumberland, where a range of place-based 
coping mechanisms enabled workers to stay in place.  
 
Northumberland  
 
At the aggregate level, in Northumberland, there was a small net out-
migration of both men and women during the 1980s. Some of this was 
undoubtedly accounted for by ex-miners. A limited number who had 
lost jobs and who wanted to stay in the industry, for example, left for 
other coalfields such as Nottinghamshire and Selby (Interview with 
Former miner [N2]).  
 
Generally, however, the migration response was small, for several 
reasons. First, the economic collapse was not as far reaching as in the 
Mon Valley. Some growth in other industries partially compensated for 
the loss of industrial jobs, perhaps even enough to convince people 
that the area had a brighter future, if not for them but for their 
children. Secondly, the public welfare context served to keep people 
‘in-place’. Even beyond the payments of unemployment and Incapacity 
Benefits, the funding of local governments was maintained, so that 
service provision remained relatively strong and schools were well 
funded. The national healthcare system also took away one of the main 
drivers to find work of greatest importance in the Mon Valley. In short, 
the non-work related quality of life aspects, including the public goods 
of education, healthcare and the environment, were available 
regardless of income from employment, and were maintained in a way 
that did not happen in the Mon Valley. Combined with income 
replacement benefits for some, this allowed people to exercise the 
preference not to move away from their homes and communities.  
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There was less need for migration as a ‘strategy of last resort’ (Castree 
et al, 2004; 199).   
 
A further important factor tied people to place. Miners would often use 
redundancy money to purchase the NCB properties in which they were 
tenants or to pay-off their mortgages. This thus served to limit the 
mobility of workers, as they became not just emotionally but 
economically tied to the fortunes of the area. The area’s subsequent 
social problems meant that house prices remained relatively depressed, 
making moving more difficult. 
 
A lot of the people who bought, when they 
bought them from the Coal Board and there 
was a lot of money spent on them, [they 
became] trapped in them because they 
couldn’t sell for anything like that you could 
buy an equivalent elsewhere (Chair Lynemouth 
Parish Council) 
 
At a more localised scale some migration flows began to change the 
micro-geographies of the coalfield, as houses formerly owned by the 
NCB were transferred to local authorities or housing associations, or 
sold to private landlords. Such transactions, however, were limited in 
scale compared to the Mon Valley.  
 
Mon Valley  
 
In comparison to Northumberland, major out-migration flows took place 
from the Mon Valley during the 1980s. It lost 13% of is working-age 
population between 1980 and 1990 through migration, and a further 5% 
through natural change. The places mentioned in interviews suggest 
that destinations were widely dispersed across the US, including Texas, 
the Carolinas, the Rocky Mountain States, Atlanta, Washington DC, 
Alexandria Virginia, Missouri, North Dakota, California, Florida, and 
New Jersey.   
  
  187 
Most of the people who worked in the mill had 
to move out of town and move out of state to 
find jobs. There were just no more here 
(Former mill worker [MV3]). 
 
Now in the early 80s there were no jobs. You 
couldn’t even get a job in fucking places like 
this [Eat n’ Park Diner], or even worse (Co-
director, Mon Valley Unemployed Committee, 
former mill worker) 
 
Migration was selective, and decisions were strongly influenced by age 
and skills levels, with those most likely to be able to effectively 
compete for employment the most likely to leave. Interview evidence 
from those who knew people who had left suggests that the experience 
has generally been positive for those migrating, and had played an 
important role in maintaining their labour market positions. These 
experiences contrast with the often significant loss of wages 
experienced by those who stayed in the Valley.  
 
The older workers… many of those had 
purchased their homes and were going to stay 
regardless, even if they took a reduced wage, 
early pensions. The middle-income group who 
had college loans to pay back, and car loans and 
all those other kinds of things, they were forced 
to move to find better salaries (City 
Administrator and Director of McKeesport 
Community Development). 
 
My brother had worked over at Edgar Thomson. 
He was a mechanical engineer, so him finding 
another job in another state at a decent 
amount of money was not really too much of a 
problem for him, so they upped and moved to 
Florida. Me, I’d have been going down for a 
minimum wage job or something…so we kind of 
decided to stick it out here (Former mill worker 
[MV2]). 
 
Population loss affected every municipality in the Valley, but was 
particularly pronounced in the mill towns of Braddock, Clairton,  
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Homestead and McKeesport, who lost nearly one-fifth of their 
population (see Figure 5.11).  
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Figure 5.11: Population loss by Mon Valley municipalities, 1980-1990
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Migration from the Mon Valley may be considered as a strategy of last 
resort in several respects. Time-limited benefits, small redundancy 
payments, and the absence of universal healthcare necessitated finding 
work quickly, either locally or elsewhere. Declining tax revenues also 
affected local government and school provision, making the Valley a 
less attractive place to stay. There was thus a declining maintenance of 
public goods to prop up communities and keep people in place. 
 
5.9   Inactivity 
 
Northumberland 
 
As we have seen from the LMA estimates, declining levels of economic 
activity were the most significant labour market adjustment to the loss 
of industrial jobs in Northumberland. There were two components to 
this: those who retired early, and those who claimed inactive benefits, 
mostly Incapacity Benefit (Invalidity Benefit at the time). The decision 
by an individual to withdraw their labour was heavily influenced by 
their age, being concentrated among the older age groups, particularly 
54-64, with a significant increase also among the 35-54 year-olds. As 
Figure 5.12 shows, the inactive proportion of the oldest cohort (54-64) 
of men rose by over 20 percentage points during the decade, compared 
with 6 percentage points for those aged 35-54. An often de facto early 
retirement was supplemented in some cases by claiming sickness 
benefits to provide a replacement household income. Figure 5.14 shows 
the extent to which individuals were inactive due to ill-health, finding 
that some 26.0% of the oldest cohort, and  7.6% for the next oldest 
were permanently sick. Female inactivity by contrast declined across all 
age bands except those 55-59 (see Figure 5.13).  
 
They almost took a view, ‘am I young enough 
to retire?’  ‘Am I happy enough to be on 
benefits?’ And after a while I think it’s a case 
of, if you’re in that situation you tend to get 
used to it…And after a while, they start to get,  
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‘I haven’t had a job in three months, I haven’t 
had  a job in six months, and they start to get 
used to less money. There’s not a lot to spend 
it on, no cinemas, no big supermarkets. OK 
they get their cheap ‘backy from the 
continent. The social club’s always existed. I 
suppose they might prop the bar a bit more 
than they done in the past, but most were 
likely quite reasonable drinkers to start with 
(Employment opportunities manager, Amble 
Development Trust, formerly redundancy 
counsellor with British Coal Enterprise). 
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Figure 5.12: Change in the male economic inactivity rate by age in the Northumberland 
coalfield, 1981-1991
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Figure 5.13: Change in the female economic inactivity rate by age in the Northumberland 
coalfield, 1981-1991
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Figure 5.14: Economic position by age for the men in the Northumberland coalfield, 1991
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There may be several explanations for the rising numbers on sickness 
benefits. First, mining left a significant legacy of ill-health, particularly 
of respiratory and muscular-skeletal injuries. Workers often struggled 
on with such conditions while in employment, but once they were made 
redundant their conditions made competing for other work difficult. 
The rational decision was therefore to get ‘signed off’ as sick.  
 
The mining industry has created problems in 
these communities, with fingers, backs, heads, 
knees, accidents, and rather than claim 
benefits if you’re bad but you can manage to 
get to work and work, then fine. But if your 
job’s taken away from you, but you’re still 
bad, your illness isn’t taken away so people 
would, I think rightly, say to the doctor, “look 
I’m injured here” or, “I’ve got a bad chest or 
whatever” (National Chairman and secretary- 
National Union of Mineworkers). 
 
Individuals who had suffered sickness or injuries during work might also 
have been kept on in lighter duties above ground, and their health 
problem might also limit their ability to find subsequent alternative 
work. 
 
If you were sick, if you were injured, this is 
another benefit of the old school, the old 
generation. If you were sick, or you were 
injured and you couldn’t do face work, you 
weren’t put on the scrap heap. You weren’t 
said “there’s your cards, bugger off”. They 
would find you a job where you could manage, 
and that’s how it progressed, and that’s what 
happened so they could find you another job 
you could do, maybes on the surface if you 
weren’t fit to do your job (Former miner [N2]) 
 
In addition, jobs were also provided in the pits for men who might 
otherwise struggle to find jobs in other private industries. Individuals 
with some degree of physical or mental disability would often be found 
above ground work or light duties. 
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I mean even people with special needs normally 
managed to get a job on bank or something on 
the top. You know, there was jobs just made to 
employ the community, but once you actually 
got out of there into the real world and you’ve 
got to earn your pay, you know we can’t carry 
anyone who’s not pulling their weight for 
whatever reason…unfortunately it’s harder to 
get work in civvy street, who really wants their 
pound of flesh (Employment opportunities 
manager, Amble Development Trust, formerly 
redundancy counsellor with British Coal 
Enterprise). 
 
Secondly, increasing illness was associated with the stresses of losing 
employment, which can trigger further deterioration where substance, 
particularly alcohol, misuse becomes the means by which this stress is 
managed.  
 
There were a lot more who were depressed, 
who managed get onto a doctor’s certificate 
and stay that way…a lot of them didn’t see a 
future for themselves; that was all they knew. 
It was all they could see you know? 
(Employment opportunities manager, Amble 
Development Trust, formerly redundancy 
counsellor with British Coal Enterprise). 
 
Thirdly, a greater ‘awareness’ of the benefits system developed locally 
among individuals and institutions. This allowed some diversion from 
unemployment to sickness benefits.   
 
[That was] the way it went with older guys. 
They were just going on the sick rather than 
actively look for work (Former miner [N2]). 
 
Finally, the dependency or paternal culture of the coalfield also 
‘prevented’ some individuals from moving into other employment.  
 
It was a whole lifestyle, the whole way of life; 
the whole social activity just disappeared, as 
well as the money to play with. So I think 
people hit the ground much harder over here, 
to the extent that obviously dependency  
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culture sort of grew up from that, and people 
started to say, “well you’ve taken my job away 
what are you going to do for me?” (Assistant 
director – Northumberland Community 
Council).  
 
A lot of them wrote themselves off straight 
away or they found themselves in a market 
place which they weren’t accustomed 
to…because they’d been so, using this word, 
‘institutionalised’. They found it extremely 
hard to adapt to what the marketplace was 
wanting in the way of transferable skills, or 
different shift patterns, or ‘you’ve got to 
travel here from A to B’ (Employment 
opportunities manager, Amble Development 
Trust, formerly redundancy counsellor with 
British Coal Enterprise). 
 
These factors combined with the lack of appropriate local employment 
opportunities to swell the numbers of sickness claimants in the area 
which, as we shall see, had profound longer-term implications. 
 
Mon Valley 
 
In the Mon Valley there was a much less pronounced rise in levels 
of inactivity. The lower redundancy payouts associated with 
closures made early retirement less likely, and there was not the 
rise associated with sickness benefits, as in the UK. Generally, 
once workers had exhausted their Unemployment Insurance there 
was no other public income support on which they could draw.  
 
There was, you know really, really nothing else. 
Welfare was available but welfare paid you like 
50 bucks a week right. So it’s like fuck that, the 
only way you’d survive on welfare is if you had 
no assets. And most of the workers, we had too 
much in cash assets, cashable assets, like they’d 
include your cemetery plot counted against 
it…so dislocated workers couldn’t make it into 
those categories, so there wasn’t any 
healthcare for your kids right (Co-director, Mon  
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Valley Unemployed Committee, former mill 
worker). 
 
We have seen that some older workers were able to take early 
retirement by accepting an early company lump sum buy-out of 
their pension, and use this until they were eligible for social 
security. This was only realistic however for those with a relatively 
short period to retirement age.  
 
5.10 The social impacts of closures 
 
So far, we have explored the experience of industrial change at the 
individual and household level, and their effects on short-term labour 
market adjustments. There were also wider consequences for ex-miners 
and steelworkers, however, as well as broader community impacts. 
Multiplier effects on other jobs and services affected the whole social 
fabric of areas previously underwritten by the dominant employer.  
 
Northumberland 
 
The loss of employment, and a way of life, left some miners struggling 
to cope with the future, resulting in divorces, heavy drinking, and even 
death. Such incidents affected a minority, but they reflected the 
struggle and depression which pervaded at the time.  
 
There was a lot of guys who just couldn’t cope 
– a few instances where they’re dead now, they 
drunk themselves to death ‘cos they couldn’t 
cope… Like I say people got considerable 
amounts of redundancy money. What they did 
with that it was their choice. There was a few 
divorces and stuff like this. This was a small 
element of the workforce that couldn’t cope. 
This was the cry you would hear: “Well what 
can I do?”, I mean after work (Former miner 
[N2]) 
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The pit closures also had a knock on effect in the closure of local shops, 
as disposable incomes dried up, and the loss of recreational and leisure 
activities, many of which had been funded by miners.  
 
At one time we had three cooperative societies 
in this village. We’ve none now; we had a 
barber’s shop; we’ve got none now; we had two 
or three small shops like general dealers, 
they’re all gone (Cambois Community 
Association, former miner). 
 
These changes in some respects marked the end of the relatively 
coherent coalfield communities. 
 
Mon Valley 
 
Many individuals and households suffered significant difficulties in 
making mortgage and bill payments. Such hardships befell not only 
those unable to find alternative work, but also many who did so. There 
was a significant difference between being workless but financially 
protected in Northumberland, and working but broke in the Mon Valley.  
 
All the savings that we had accumulated, with 
savings bonds or whatever, had been lost…So we 
just wiped ourselves out of everything (Former 
mill worker [MV2]). 
 
You were living, you can’t even say pay day to 
pay day, doing whatever. Everybody’s on your 
back saying, “you’re behind on your bills”. I 
almost lost my house, you know mortgage wise. 
It was just constant pressure – it was unreal 
(Former mill worker [MV4]). 
 
After the mill closures, unemployment also led to increasing substance 
misuse, rising divorce rates and even suicide.
94 
 
                                                 
94 Milke (1984; 131) found increasing incidences of psychological problems among 
unemployed former steelworkers.   
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You had, you know, domestic dissolution, and 
alcoholism, drugs, and all that kind of 
stuff (Chairman, Steel Valley Authority) 
 
You know people were losing homes, marriages 
were breaking up. Even down here there was – I 
heard a story about the old open-hearth that 
we had where a guy, and he was in 
management… they found him he had hung 
himself behind one of the furnaces down there 
you know. I mean things were that bad because 
he was about to lose his job and everything, and 
people were having trouble coping (Former mill 
worker [MV2]). 
 
The closures also left the towns’ shopping facilities increasingly run 
down.  
 
Devastating, devastating. I mean this was an 
area that was moving and on, I mean booming, 
we had all kind of activity. If you take a ride 
down through our businesses district now 
there’s more buildings boarded up than there 
is actual businesses, so to me that was a direct 
impact from the job losses (Councilman, City 
of Clairton, Clairton Community Development 
Corporation (CDC) member). 
 
In Homestead, this loss of services even extended into illicit activities, 
such as the prostitution businesses which lined 6
th avenue around the 
mill. Although most closed, two that stayed open moved onto the main 
street, 8
th Avenue. This further damaged the town’s reputation as a 
shopping facility and eroded business. This was compounded when a 
soup kitchen for ex-steelworkers was opened with the loss of more 
retail. It attracted down and outs from other areas who, “would just 
loiter all along the avenue. They wouldn’t go home. They’d stay, 
they’d urinate in the alleys, sometimes on the street, and that tended 
to have an intimidating effect on shoppers” (Founding member, 
Homestead Economic Redevelopment Corporation (HERC)). This began a 
pattern of cumulative structural decline. 
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5.11   The response of local government 
 
As well as welfare policy differences, there were also significant 
contrasts between the UK and the US in the capacities of local 
governments to maintain levels of service provision. In England the 
majority of local government spending is financed by central 
government, paid for by general taxation. On average only around 20% 
of local government funds are raised locally through council tax (Parker, 
2002). Local Authority funding levels are calculated through a formula 
which attempts to assess and sum the ‘unit costs’ of needs-defined 
services provided by each authority (Centre for Economic Policy 
Research). Generally,  although there are concerns about the equity of 
the formula, and the reliability of some of the data on which it is 
based, this model of funding serves to insulate local government 
revenues and spending from the impacts of rapid local economic decline 
(ibid). 
   
In the US, the structure of municipality financing meant that mill 
closures seriously impaired local government’s ability to act.
95 A 
substantial percentage of local government revenues came from both 
direct property taxes on the mills, and wage taxes on the jobs 
generated. In contrast to the revenues provided by central government 
in the UK, the federal, state and county governments together provided 
less than 20% of the mill towns’ revenues, with the majority of the rest 
dependent on local taxation and service charges (Municipal Statistics, 
2004). US Steel had also previously taken care of some structural 
aspects of municipal repair, which the municipalities then had to take 
on. This funding structure imposed severe impacts on the services which 
local government could provide after the major closures, and their 
ability to mitigate the consequences of industrial change. 
 
                                                 
95 For example the Mon Valley’s largest city, McKeesport, has been on the verge of 
going Act 47 bankrupt since the mills closed (McKeesport Renaissance Plan, 2005).  
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You know the effects were felt when our 
receipts were missing probably over a million 
dollars. All of a sudden you’re down to virtually 
nothing. You can imagine what effect it would 
have on how many employees you have, how 
many police you have, what you’re able to do, 
how many roads you could fix. You know all the 
borough services were greatly affected by it…so 
it was really a major effect on our resources 
(Mayor, Munhall). 
 
Figures 5.15 - 5.17 show the impact which mill closures had on 
municipal finances. Tax revenues declined by over a quarter for all but 
one of the mill towns, and by nearly half in most. Total municipal 
revenue also declined by around a quarter, since there was no increase 
in governmental transfers from federal, state and county governments 
to compensate.
96 This loss of revenue fed into a comparable decline in 
the levels of spending, the impacts of which were clearly seen in the 
physical infrastructure of the mill towns, the damaged street 
architecture and derelict recreational spaces. 
 
There was therefore little to support people ‘in-place’ through support 
for community functions affecting their quality of life, or even their 
educational prospects, since public schooling is also dependent on local 
funding. Here are the real manifestations of policies to enhance the 
mobility of labour to meet the needs of capital. The reality for those 
left was holes in the road and schools starved of resources.  
 
                                                 
96 Where towns attempted to compensate for lost income it was through increasing 
levels of service charges on the population, putting further pressure on residents who 
were already financially stretched.   
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Figure 5.15: Change in real total municipal revenue collected by Mon Valley mill towns, 1980-1990
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Figure 5.16: Change in real tax revenues collected by Mon Valley mill towns, 1980-1990
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Figure 5.17: Change in real expenditures of Mon Valley mill towns, 1980-1990
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5.12   The prospects for the 1990s 
 
The short-term adjustments of the 1980s which have been outlined 
offered ominous pointers to the direction which subsequent 
developments would take. In both areas inertia was particularly 
significant, although taking different forms. In Northumberland, it was 
a characteristic of former workers, unable to respond to change and 
increasingly dependent on public welfare. In the Mon Valley, inertia 
inflicted public institutions, through their dependence on the dominant 
local industries, and their inability to gain access to alternative sources 
on income.  
 
In both areas there were also signs that strong industrial communities 
were already beginning to disintegrate. Job loss, migration and the 
breakdown of the established models of social organisation began to 
stretch community bonds as local social capital began to erode or 
migrate away. 
 
Northumberland 
 
In Northumberland the immediate experience of many industrial 
workers presented a kind of stasis. They were simply unable, or 
unwilling, to move into alternative employment. Such inertia was, at 
least partially, the product of the public welfare context of decline. 
This provided elements of choice and selectivity. In the short-term, this 
would not have been particularly problematic. As we shall see, 
however, the growth in inactivity among all age groups and the slow 
speed with which local employment demand was being rebuilt became 
the basis of longer-term problems.  
 
There were also elements of housing market sorting which contributed 
to continuing socio-spatial isolation. Some NCB housing stock was 
purchased by local councils and housing associations for use as social  
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housing, and some were purchased by private landlords. The latter 
typically looking to renting at the lower end of the housing market, 
primarily targeting those qualifying for Housing Benefit, which offered 
them a guaranteed income. This change of ownership resulted in some 
population turnover in several of the coalfield wards. Where large 
numbers of properties were transferred into housing association 
ownership, many in the local communities associated this with decline, 
feeling that those coming in were “undesirables”. 
 
The housing association took them over in the 
80s...the ones that nobody else was interested 
in and since then we’ve been really on a 
downward spiral (Chair Lynemouth Parish 
Council).  
 
Mon Valley 
 
In the Mon Valley, housing changes began to have a more marked effect 
than in Northumberland.  As large numbers of people moved out so 
quickly, the housing market became severely depressed, with the 
average house price in many of the municipalities declining by over 
$10,000 (in real terms) between 1980 and 1990, losing over 20% of their 
value. These losses were widespread through the Valley affecting mill 
towns and suburbs alike (see Figure 5.16).  
 
Everybody, you know like the area I lived in, 
you could just drive up and down the streets 
because of J and L shutting down, and US Steel 
shutting down. You could find 70 something 
homes up for sale all at the same time (Former 
mill worker [MV2]). 
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Figure 5.18: Percent change in real median values of owner-occupied houses in Mon Valley 
municipalities, 1980-1990 
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The housing market collapse left a fertile ground for absentee 
landlords. Speculation was driven, in part, by changing federal policy, 
as its emphasis moved from federally built housing towards the 
provision of housing vouchers and reliance on private landlords. 
Designed as an effort to decentralise poverty, it led to enclaves of 
Section 8 housing in places like the Mon Valley, as people have been 
attracted to the area by cheap rents.  
 
The towns’ populations thus began to change, as skilled workers left 
and were replaced by poor, less skilled individuals, often with public 
housing vouchers. This began a significant social-demographic shift, 
with profound implications for the subsequent capacity of communities, 
in terms of the skill levels, incomes and education of their residents, 
and their organisation and ability to act.  
 
The people who stayed in Homestead after the 
mills closed for some reason or other couldn’t, 
basically get out of town, and that’s the way I 
felt. So what was left after everybody left was 
the cheap housing stock and then a lower class 
of people moved in to fill those houses who 
probably in my opinion have little or no skills 
OK. So they’re basically eking out a living in the 
former houses owned by the steelworkers 
(Chairman, Homestead Economic 
Redevelopment Corporation (HERC). 
 
‘[It’s the] the best, brightest, skilled workers 
who have left the region. They went to Florida, 
to Tennessee, to California. So the best and the 
brightest have migrated out of Clairton and out 
of the Mon Valley. Sort of what some people 
call brain drain…That’s a tragedy because when 
you try to redevelop the region…our best and 
brightest are gone’ (David Levdansky quoted in 
Domike, 1992; 15). 
 
There was also a clear racial dimension to the movement from, into and 
around the Mon Valley. The black population grew slightly, while the 
white population sharply declined, creating the beginnings of a process 
of ’white flight’ (see Table 5.6).   
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Table 5.6: Mobility in the Mon Valley in the five years prior to the census by 
race, 1980-1990.    
 
White population 
 
White: Number of people     
    1980  1990 
Persons 5 years and older  86,720  71,665 
Same House    62,981  53,020 
Different house in the United States  23,491  18,567 
  Same County  19,677  15,452 
  Different County  3,814  3,115 
  Same State  1,830  1,549 
  Different State  1,984  1,566 
Abroad    248  78 
       
       
White: Percentage     
    1980  1990 
Persons 5 years and older  100  100 
Same House    72.6  74.0 
Different house in the United States  27.1  25.9 
  Same County  22.7  21.6 
  Different County  4.4  4.3 
  Same State  2.1  2.2 
  Different State  2.3  2.2 
Abroad    0.3  0.1 
       
Black population 
 
   Black: Number of people     
    1980  1990 
Persons 5 years and older  16,181  16,492 
Same House    9,872  9,198 
Different house in the United States  6,275  7,279 
  Same County  5,251  6,434 
  Different County  1,024  845 
  Same State  232  259 
  Different State  792  586 
Abroad    34  15 
       
 
Black: Percentage     
    1980  1990 
Persons 5 years and older  100  100 
Same House    61.0  55.8 
Different house in the United States  38.8  44.1 
  Same County  32.5  39.0 
  Different County  6.3  5.1 
  Same State  1.4  1.6 
  Different State  4.9  3.6 
Abroad    0.2  0.1 
 
                                                           (Source: Census)  
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The other important emerging characteristic of these changes was an 
institutional inability to act. Local municipalities lacked the resources 
to mitigate the impacts of decline, and they also lacked the relevant 
administrative structures to foster new economic growth. They 
consisted of a mosaic of very small volunteer governments, with no 
overarching strategy of action to respond to the difficulties they faced. 
They suffered from an institutional lock-in to old structures that were 
no longer appropriate in the post-industrial era. These carried on, 
directionless and under-funded, as the towns entered a cumulative and 
structural decline. 
 
Very noticeable and very destructive, ‘cos it 
was at every level like there was no political 
leadership; the management had run most of 
the politics in these small towns…The 
politicians and they’d all have these big fucking 
gatherings to cry for leadership, and then look 
around and go “oh fuck it must be us”, and then 
fumble the ball, repeatedly, it was, it was sad 
(Co-director, Mon Valley Unemployed 
Committee, former worker Homestead Works). 
 
 
This institutional inertia, combined with housing market collapse, and 
under-funded public services, suggested there would be no short-term 
recovery in the Mon Valley. 
 
5.13   Some conclusions  
 
Individual workers’ decision-making processes were strongly influenced 
by several factors. Most significant were the alternative forms of work 
available locally, the opportunities and constraints of the public 
welfare systems, and the broader community cultures which had 
developed around work. By 1990/1 these combined to produce an 
emerging distinction between reliance on ‘place-based’ coping 
mechanism in Northumberland, and the ‘mobility-response’ in the Mon 
Valley.  
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In the Mon Valley the absence of universal healthcare coverage, small 
redundancy payments, and the more limited welfare provision meant 
finding alternative employment quickly became critical for redundant 
workers. Many of the younger and middle-aged simply left the area in 
search of opportunities elsewhere. The public welfare context, 
combined with a greater cultural acceptance of economic change, 
meant those who remained would often take whatever employment 
was available even if, as it often did, this entailed a significant 
reduction in wages. In the Northumberland coalfield the greater 
availability of welfare support, more generous redundancy payments, a 
greater culture of ‘dependency’ and feelings of political victimisation 
meant many older, and some middle-aged, miners would never work 
again. Coal decline was partially offset by growth in other industries, 
however, offering some the opportunity to move into other sectors, 
although often with some reduction in wages. 
 
While the aggregate patterns of adjustment were sharply contrasted 
between the two areas, in both individual outcomes were strongly 
influenced by age and skill levels. It was the oldest workers, and those 
with the fewest transferable skills who were less able to compete for 
alternative employment. In the Mon Valley race may also be added to 
these determinants, as black workers who had traditionally held the 
least skilled jobs within the mill’s division of labour, also struggled to 
compete. 
 
It is clear that the public welfare system gave displaced workers 
somewhat more of a choice over whether to work, and what types of 
work they would take in Northumberland compared to the Mon Valley. 
There was a contrast between the in-situ restructuring in 
Northumberland and the broader network restructuring of the Mon 
Valley. While this meant that individuals in Northumberland could often 
be ‘comfortable’ without accessing alternative employment, this gave  
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little impetus for them to move on. A form of stasis, or inertia 
therefore developed among displaced workers. For those in the Mon 
Valley with little choice but to move on, either metaphorically or 
physically, there was no guarantee that work meant a living wage. 
Those left behind also faced severe implications, as declining public 
revenues, obsolescent institutional structures and housing market 
processes left communities unable to cope with, or even mitigate the 
worst impacts of industrial decline. 
 
The further implications of these initial patterns of labour market 
restructuring and social change as time progressed will be examined in 
the next chapter.   
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Chapter 6) The longer-term impacts and present situation 
 
6.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter explores how the short-term labour market adjustments 
described in chapter 5 evolved into longer-term development 
trajectories. The concern is no longer primarily with industrial workers, 
but with new patterns of socio-spatial marginalisation that have 
developed since the 1980s. These follow the consequences of the 
critical distinction made in chapter 5 between the importance of 
geographical mobility in the Mon Valley, contrasted with in-place 
coping processes in the Northumberland coalfield.  
 
Much of the initial analysis describes change during the 1990s, drawing 
extensively on the 2000/1 censuses. Where possible, however, this is 
extended to trace more recent trends, setting the context for the local 
interview work undertaken in 2005/6. The LMA analysis for 1990/1 to 
2000/2001 shows that, broadly speaking, the most significant trends of 
the 1980s continued through the next decade. These included 
increasing inactivity among men in Northumberland and out-migration 
in the Mon Valley. Local labour market demand had also not recovered. 
Once more, the role of commuting in mitigating the paucity of local 
opportunities was limited in both areas.  
 
The longer-term implications of large-scale out-migration in the Mon 
Valley will then be considered, showing how the area’s development 
trajectory has been radically altered by this process. Similarly rising 
inactivity in Northumberland has had damaging longer-term inter-
generational and area effects. Attention is then given to geographical 
patterns of poverty and disadvantage, as new sections of the 
community find themselves socially and spatially marginalised. The 
chapter ends with an evaluation of the extent and effectiveness of 
regeneration policies.  
 
 
215 
 
6.2 Labour Market Accounts 
 
Table 6.1: Labour Market Accounts: Northumberland 
 
a) Male working-age population, 1991-2001 
  
     
     
 
Male 
working age 
population 
As % of 
1991 EA 
population 
1991; economically 
active  35,829   
2001: economically 
active  33,859   
Natural change  137  0.4 
Participation change  -2,951  -8.2 
Employment change
97  241  0.7 
Job shortfall  -3,055  -8.5 
Unemployment change  -2,073  -5.8 
Net out-migration  -846  -2.4 
(Source: Census) 
 
 
b) Female working-age population, 1991-2001 
     
     
 
Female 
working age 
population 
As % of 
1991 EA 
population 
1991; economically 
active  26,995   
2001: economically 
active  28,287   
Natural change  165  0.6 
Participation change  748  2.8 
Employment change  1,879  7.0 
Job shortfall  -965  -3.6 
Unemployment change  -355  -1.3 
Net out-migration  -377  -1.4 
(Source: Census) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 Figures include losses in those employed in Government Schemes as separate figures 
are not available for 2001  
 
 
216 
Table 6.2: Labour Market Accounts: Mon Valley 
 
a) Male working-age population, 1990-2000 
 
     
     
 
Male 
working age 
population 
As % of 
1990 EA 
population 
1990; economically 
active  41,758   
2000: economically 
active  37,625   
Natural change  -427  -1.0 
Participation change  11  0.0 
Employment change  -2,397  -5.7 
Job shortfall  1,981  4.7 
Unemployment 
change  -1,736  -4.2 
Net out-migration  3,717  8.9 
(Source: Census) 
 
 
b) Female working-age population, 1990-2000 
     
     
 
Female 
working age 
population 
As % of 
1990 EA 
population 
1990; economically 
active  35,505   
2000: economically 
active  36,009   
Natural change  -1,652  -4.7 
Participation change  4,805  13.5 
Employment change  417  1.2 
Job shortfall  2,736  7.7 
Unemployment 
change  87  0.2 
Net out-migration  2,651  7.5 
(Source: Census) 
 
The LMAs reflect the continuing contrast between place-based and 
migration-dependent coping mechanisms in the two areas. In 
Northumberland the dominant trend for men continued to be 
withdrawal from the labour force, with a decline in participation of -
8.2% of the working-age population, while in the Mon Valley it was out- 
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migration (8.9%). These trends incorporate various residual effects from 
the 1980s, for example when a former miner who finds alternative 
work, may be made redundant again and moves onto sickness benefit, 
or a former mill worker responds to the same experience by migrating. 
However, it is clear that in general motivations for trends in the 1990s 
were not the same as those in the 1980s. They are no longer driven by 
the decisions of former industrial workers but by subsequent conditions 
in the local economies and communities.  
 
Northumberland coalfield  
 
The 1990s saw a continued decline in male participation at a marginally 
faster rate than in the 1980s (Table 6.1a). There was also a reduction in 
unemployment levels -2,073 (-5.8%). This suggests the consequence of a 
tightening up of unemployment benefits was growing numbers claiming 
sickness benefits.  There was also a small growth in population through 
in-migration 846 (2.4%). Much of this increase in labour supply resulted 
in more inactive workers (declining participation), with a much smaller 
growth in employment (241).  
Female employment growth was markedly stronger through the 1990s, 
rising by 1,879 (7.0%) (Table 6.1b) Participation levels also continued to 
increase, but at a slower rate. There was therefore a job surplus, filled 
by a small amount of in-migration and a slight reduction in 
unemployment.  
 
Mon Valley 
 
Migration was not simply a short-term response to the loss of mill jobs. 
The continuing social impacts of the primary job losses, the consequent 
multiplier effects, and continuing decline in labour demand meant that 
out-migration continued to be the most significant trend through the 
1990s.  
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Local employment levels for men declined through the 1990s by 2,397 
(-5.7% of the 1990 EA population), leaving a job shortfall of 1,981 (-
4.7%) (Table 6.2a). Unemployment levels also fell, mainly reflecting the 
continuing restructuring of welfare provision. There was no change in 
the participation rate, however, indicating a much weaker relationship 
between unemployment and inactivity than observed in 
Northumberland. These changes were again balanced by continuing 
substantial out-migration of 3,717 (-8.9%). 
 
Female participation again increased significantly by 4,805 (13.5%) 
(Table 6.2b). With employment growth of only 417 (1.2%), the job 
shortfall was 2,736 (7.7%). As with men, therefore, this was absorbed 
through high levels of out-migration, 2,651 (7.5%).  
 
6.3  New employment opportunities and commuting 
 
Northumberland 
 
By 2001 there remained a persistent ‘jobs gap’ in Northumberland, with 
the number of local jobs still around 5% below the pre-closure levels. 
Its peripheral location and comparatively poorly skilled workforce 
meant that much of the area remained a development “cold spot”, 
where the risks were perceived to be too high to attract private sector 
investment (EDAW 2002, 26 & 30). These difficulties were compounded 
by the stigma attached to being an ex-coalfield area. The Director of 
SENNTRI (South East Northumberland and North Tyneside Regeneration 
Initiative), a local regeneration agency manager, commented on the 
difficulties of their work. 
 
This designation as an ex-coalfield area which I 
don’t think is entirely helpful…always looking 
backward because history is important but if 
you’re going to promote yourself you’ve got to 
look at the current assets (Director, SENNTRI). 
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Local regeneration managers also point out that the area’s long-term 
growth prospects have suffered from major policy decisions which 
largely favour parts of Newcastle. Northumberland’s experience may 
thus be contrasted with North Tyneside’s ‘A19 corridor’. This was 
granted Enterprise Zone status between 1996-2006, and has seen strong 
growth, at least by regional standards, with upgraded infrastructure 
and an increasing availability of quality premises (EDAW, 2002; 26). The 
coalfield area’s unattractiveness to potential investors has been 
exacerbated by the lack of similar incentives. This is a bugbear, and, to 
some degree, provides a get out clause for local regeneration 
professionals.  
 
Our policies have been trying to bring jobs 
here. As I’ve said we’re on an uphill battle in 
competing with Enterprise Zones on Tyneside. 
We haven’t had the success we might have had 
in bringing in major new job opportunities into 
new business parks or existing industrial areas 
(Regeneration Manager Northumberland County 
Council). 
 
North Tyneside had an Enterprise Zone status 
which from a policy point of view is disastrous 
for us. They’ve had special initiatives for 
enterprise to settle into North Tyneside which 
was to our detriment. It’s very difficult to 
attract any sort of investment here 
(Regeneration initiatives Officer Wansbeck 
District Council, Worklessness themed group). 
 
During the 1990s there were also low-rates of local business start-ups 
compared to national averages, as a consequence of both past 
dependence on wage labour and the depressed local economy. This has 
created an over-dependence on public sector employment. Even this 
may begin to decline, however, as many public services, for example in 
healthcare, become more regionalised and concentrated into Newcastle 
and North Tyneside.  
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Growth in the rural coalfield in the 1990s was largely in tourism, in 
which jobs tend to be seasonal, low paid and low skilled. In the urban 
coalfield, growth was more orientated to unskilled packing and 
assembly work.
98 There is often a reluctance to take, and certainly to 
persist with, such employment. The problems created by these 
patterns were summarised by an employment counsellor on a local 
regeneration initiative in the rural coalfield, and then by a youth 
worker in the urban coalfield. 
 
We are now a tourist area full-stop. But that 
means that the vacancies tend to be low-paid, 
anti-social hours, split shifts; you know they’re 
waiting, food preparation in a hotel, bar 
work… Normally the only vacancies we have on 
the board are for catering and hospitality, 
which can be picked up quite easily by 
anybody. There’s no major skill involved, but a 
lot of people won’t do it for the anti-social 
hours or the poor salary or the localities of 
getting to these places (Employment 
opportunities manager, Amble Development 
Trust, formerly redundancy counsellor with 
British Coal Enterprise). 
 
Finding the jobs is not that hard…Where you 
stand there and pack all day. There’s plenty of 
that but it’s how the young person gets there, 
and a lot of the time the young people are 
forced into doing them jobs as well [by 
Jobcentre Plus New Deal]. They kind of say 
“you’ve got to go there or your money will get 
stopped” and actually they don’t want to do it 
(Youth Worker, Trinity Youth). 
 
By the early 2000s there were still serious concerns about the quality of 
locally available jobs, reflected in low wages. Average earnings in 
Northumberland were low compared to both national and regional 
averages standing at £341.50 per week, 10% below the Northeast 
average (£380.80) and 25% below the national average (£451.50) 
                                                 
98 Though automation is now beginning to reduce the number of these opportunities  
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(Learning and Skills Council, 2004 cited in Northumberland Strategic 
Partnership, 2005; 13).  
 
Over time there have been some signs of a shift in the type of work 
which men have been willing to accept, and the labour market has 
become gradually less gender segregated. In the 1990s more men 
began to take part-time work and, more significantly, moved into 
sectors traditionally regarded as ‘women’s work’.  Men took less than a 
quarter of the growth in service jobs between 1981 and 1991, but filled 
more than half between 1991 and 2001 (see Table 6.3). There 
nevertheless remain some strongly gendered patterns, particularly in 
the dominance of manufacturing by men, and healthcare by women 
(Table 6.4). In banking, finance and insurance, men and women took 
newly created jobs in equal numbers, but men dominated construction 
jobs and women transport and communication. 
 
Table 6.3: Local growth sectors in Northumberland coalfield and the gender 
ratio of jobs filled, 1981-2001 
 
Growth 
1981-
1991 
Proportion 
going to 
men 
Growth 
1991-
2001 
Proportion 
going to 
men 
Other services  3360  0.24  1920  0.52 
Banking, finance, insurance, 
leasing etc  1200  0.63  3050  0.50 
Construction  460  0.74  640  0.71 
Transport and communication  0     610  0.16 
(Source: Census) 
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Table 6.4: Industry sectors employment by gender in Northumberland 
coalfield, 2001 
  Men  %  Women  % 
Total  30,836     27,384    
A; B.  Agriculture; hunting and forestry; fishing  685  2.2  140  0.5 
C; E. Mining and quarrying; electricity; gas and 
water supply  1,098  3.6  120  0.4 
D. Manufacturing   7,193  23.3  2,648  9.7 
F. Construction   3,983  12.9  448  1.6 
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repairs   4,063  13.2  4,728  17.3 
H. Hotels and restaurants  1,011  3.3  1,767  6.5 
I. Transport; storage and communications   2,405  7.8  913  3.3 
J. Financial Intermediation   572  1.9  894  3.3 
K. Real estate; renting and business activities  2,695  8.7  2,049  7.5 
L. Public administration and defence; social 
security   2,941  9.5  2,466  9.0 
M. Education   1,117  3.6  2,782  10.2 
N. Health and social work  2,033  6.6  6,919  25.3 
O; P; Q. Other  1,040  3.4  1,510  5.5 
(Source: Census) 
 
Even in this difficult environment unemployment fell across the 
coalfield area. This reflected policy changes, and interactions with 
other benefits systems, however, more than the impact of economic 
growth. In January 2006, male unemployment rates were 5.7%, above 
both the regional and national averages of 4.9% and 3.7% (DWP; Mid 
Year Population Estimates). As with the other indicators described in 
this chapter there is a distinct geography of unemployment, with 
claimant rates fluctuating widely between coalfield wards, standing at 
over 10% in the most disadvantaged (see Figure 6.1). These tend to be 
the same wards which suffer from the greatest disadvantage in most 
other indicators, the wards worst affected by industrial change, the 
ones with the highest proportions claiming other benefits and the 
highest proportion of council and social housing, primarily they are the 
central wards of Ashington (like Hirst and Park) and Blyth (like Croft 
and Cowpen).   
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Figure 6.1: Jobseeker's Allowance claimant rate in Northumberland coalfield wards, January 2006
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Commuting 
 
There remains a low jobs density in the Northumberland coalfield with 
only one job for every two people of working age
99. As attempts at local 
employment creation have failed to alleviate labour market 
disadvantage more attention has been placed on increasing commuting 
levels. The economic inclusion manager for One North East, the 
regional development agency, summarised this change of direction by 
reiterating their perception that they cannot bring jobs to people, and 
so they must bring people to jobs. 
 
In the past we have tried to create local 
employment opportunities in these areas but 
we haven’t been able to attract private 
investment, so people will need to travel to 
jobs. It’s not a very palatable political 
statement to say “we can’t attract jobs to 
these areas” so we say “we can and will” and 
we build business and enterprise parks and 
have tried to create local opportunities, but 
we can’t attract the private sector, and people 
will need to travel to the city for jobs 
(Economic Inclusion manager – One North East) 
 
Improving links to Newcastle and North Tyneside has been a central 
tenet of local economic development policy since the early 1990s. This 
has been largely unsuccessful, however, for two reasons. First, there 
remain relatively low levels of car ownership, and significant 
difficulties in relying on public transport to get to work from parts of 
the coalfield (EDAW, 2002; 7). Secondly, attitudinal barriers and 
aspirations to work locally have proved to be entrenched even over the 
longer-term. Such attitudes are now found not just among former 
industrial workers, but across the generations, linked both to past 
household experiences of travelling to work, and also to broader area 
effects, the low aspirations which can result from sustained long-term 
worklessness within an area.  
                                                 
99 For a full explanation of job densities measures see Hastings (2003).  
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The commuting flows from the coalfield still suggest that the 
commuting to the Newcastle conurbation
100 remain limited.
 From the 
urban coalfield male commuting flows to the local industrial estates of 
Cramlington, Blyth, and to a lesser degree Wansbeck still dominate 
while from the rural coalfield the main flows centre on the area’s 
larger settlements of Alnwick and Amble as well as Castle Morpeth. 
Women do show a marginally greater propensity to commute to 
Newcastle from both the urban and rural coalfield areas but the 
difference between male and female patterns is not highly significant. 
The data show the ongoing importance of highly localised employment 
opportunities to coalfield workers. Tables 6.4 – 6.7 are illustrative and 
set out the largest flows for men and women from the urban and rural 
coalfield which show these patterns.
 101 These are abridged tables of 
the full calculations which are produced in Appendix III. 
 
Table 6.4: Main commuting flows from the rural coalfield of male full-
time workers, 2001 
     
Destination ward  Out-Commute 
As % of  
total  
employed 
Chevington (Castle Morpeth)  416  6.5 
Alnwick Castle (Alnwick)  384  6 
Amble East (Alnwick)  296  4.6 
Ellington (Castle Morpeth)  249  3.9 
Morpeth Central (Castle Morpeth)  239  3.7 
(Source: CIDS) 
 
                                                 
100 Defined as Newcastle, Gateshead, North Tyneside, South Tyneside and Sunderland. 
101 Due to changes in the census between 1991 and 2001 the total figures produced for 
1981 and 1991 cannot be replicated. In 2001 to protect anonymity all flows between 0 
and 3 have been randomly adjusted to either 0 or 3, with no 1s or 2s. The level of 
error can be calculated using the formula 0.8*sqrt(n) (where n equals the number of 
0s and 3s in a flow) (Simpson, 2003). Very small flows from aggregates of wards to 
local authorities, where the majority of ward to ward flows (from which the figure 
must be calculated) are true 0s, are subject to an unacceptably high error and are 
therefore not given. The tables show flows large enough for the level of error to be 
calculated and to be acceptable. These flows make up 65% of the total flows. As the 
main flows are based around flows to employment centres the figures give a strong 
indication of aggregate commuting patterns.   
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Table 6.5: Main commuting flows from the urban coalfield of male full-
time workers, 2001 
Destination ward  Out-Commute 
As % of  
total 
employed 
Cramlington West (Blyth)  1311  6.1 
Morpeth Central (Castle Morpeth)  836  3.9 
Sleekburn (Wansbeck)  800  3.7 
Kitty Brewster (Blyth)  797  3.7 
Newbiggin East (Wansbeck)  592  2.7 
(Source: CIDS) 
 
 
 
Table 6.6: Main commuting flows from the rural coalfield of female full-
time workers, 2001 
 
Destination ward  Out-Commute 
As % of  
total  
employed 
Alnwick Castle (Alnwick)  237  7 
Morpeth Central (Castle Morpeth)  162  4.8 
Amble East (Alnwick)  158  4.7 
Alnwick Hotspur (Alnwick)  153  4.5 
Chevington (Castle Morpeth)  152  4.5 
(Source: CIDS) 
 
 
Table 6.7: Main commuting flows from the urban coalfield of female 
full-time workers, 2001 
 
Destination ward  Out-Commute 
As % of total 
employed 
Central (Wansbeck)  702  5.8 
Kitty Brewster (Blyth)  583  4.9 
Haydon (Wansbeck)  562  4.7 
Dene (Newcastle)  472  3.9 
Croft (Blyth)  465  3.9 
(Source: CIDS)  
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Commuting behaviour also remained highly structured by occupation. 
Figure 6.2 provides commuting figures for an amalgamation of coalfield 
local authorities (LAs) for men in 2001. It shows that over 40% of those 
working in managerial and professional occupations were travelling to 
the Newcastle conurbation. Many of these come from the new build 
estates in the area, which have attracted workers from the overheating 
Newcastle housing market. For semi-routine, and routine occupations, 
however, flows to Newcastle were only around 20%. Figure 6.3 
reproduces these figures for women, showing that because more 
women in semi-routine and routine occupations work part-time there is 
an even smaller proportional commute to the city-region from the 
coalfield LAs. Clearly, workers in less-skilled occupations are much less 
likely to commute, which has significant implications for the role of 
commuting in tackling employment disadvantage. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 
present the age breakdowns of these commuters, showing that age has 
relatively little impact on the propensity to commute for either males 
or females. With commuting to Newcastle as a proportion of total 
employment actually highest among the 45-59 age group for men, at 
20% of the total employed. For women commuting tends to decline with 
age, though this is most likely linked to lifecycle and family 
responsibilities than any changing attitudes. The figures therefore do 
not suggest that commuting barriers are significantly more pronounced 
among older generations, confirming that the problem is ongoing and 
inter-generational.    
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Figure 6.2: Commuting flows from coalfield local authorities of full-time male workers, 2001
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Figure 6.3: commuting flows from coalfield local authorities of female full-time workers, 2001
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Figure 6.4: The main commuting flows by age for males from the coalfield local authorities, 
2001
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Figure 6.5: The main commuting flows by age for females from the Northumberland coalfield 
local authorities, 2001
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In 2001 more than 30% of households in the coalfield did not have 
access to a car, and again low car ownership was concentrated in the 
most deprived wards suggesting the barrier is cost. Poor public 
transport has also limited workers’ ability to travel to opportunities 
elsewhere in the region. These difficulties were emphasised by a 
development worker in the rural coalfield as well as by a community 
activist in the urban coalfield. 
 
Transport’s very difficult, in particular in the rural 
areas of Northumberland, very few and far 
between and when it does come you usually find 
that it’s at the wrong times (Assistant director – 
Northumberland Community Council). 
 
This is a very difficult village to get out of if you 
don’t have your own transport. We have a bus 
service that might as well not be here if I’m quite 
honest with you. It runs every two hours it finishes 
at 6 o’clock at night so anybody working 
continental shifts or something like that will find 
it very very difficult to get out of here. (Cambois 
Community Association, former miner). 
 
With the growing popularity of continental working shift patterns, 
requiring people to commute outside peak served hours these transport 
barriers have become increasingly pronounced in recent years. The 
reliance on buses, their cost, routes and timetabling can make 
commuting even relatively short distances a costly and arduous process. 
To travel from Amble to central Newcastle, for example, takes an hour 
and twenty minutes, and from many other villages it involves one or 
more changes, making it impractical for many. As a local community 
worker summarised, this limited peoples’ work-search scope. 
 
[It] doesn’t enter their head to look for work 
on Tyneside. It’s about resources to get there. 
The bus service is very poor. For example you 
know if you want to get to Newcastle it’s going 
to take you a good hour each way, and if 
you’ve got to work shift work, well forget it if 
you haven’t got a vehicle. Then it’s chicken 
and egg isn’t it if you’ve not worked for a few  
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years and somebody comes along and says 
“we’ve got you a canny job on Tyneside”, “well 
how am I going to get there if it’s shift work?" 
(Network development officer, Wansbeck 
Community Empowerment Network). 
 
Areas which are on the rail-link north through Castle Morpeth and 
Alnwick are more likely to become commuter towns but Blyth, 
Ashington and the coastal villages remain far removed from this.  
 
In addition to these physical barriers there remain attitudinal barriers 
to commuting. Local officials believe that aspirations to work locally 
have proved particularly stubborn. While better equipped and more 
confident individuals have not been averse to travelling to Newcastle 
for work, in some areas commuting remains an alien concept; a ‘mental 
barrier’ or a ‘psychological distance barrier’ persists. This has been an 
important finding of the local group set up to tackle worklessness. 
 
You’ve got some people who find it impossible 
to perceive that they live on one side of the 
town and would go even to the other side of 
the town to find work, never mind 15 miles 
away (Business and Enterprise coordinator 
Wansbeck Council, worklessness themed 
group). 
 
These barriers are, in part, linked to received wisdom within household 
and other family networks - the perceptions about work gained from 
older generations that would have prioritised local work. This situation 
was described by both a regeneration manager working at a more 
strategic level and by a local youth worker in the urban coalfield. 
 
Local people from the mining areas, certainly 
towards the north of the Northumberland 
coalfield area [there is] still a feeling that 
those opportunities are a long way away and 
it’s not for us…People still have that attitude 
that the opportunities there might be further a 
field in the region are not for them. You know 
it’s a culture that maybe to some extent been  
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passed down to youngsters, there still is a 
sense of isolation, distance from 
Newcastle…But that’s still a culture I think 
people will expect to work locally and not to 
have to travel (Regeneration Manager 
Northumberland County Council). 
 
It still does apply for the younger generations 
very much so, it’s where you were brought up 
and where your family was brought up was 
where you had to work. The idea that you 
could commute outside to work and then come 
back again for the majority of young people is 
just beyond their comprehension…because none 
of them have had that experience or been 
accessed to it because their families haven’t 
and the problems that come with that you 
know, the generations before them were 
working five hundred yards away down the 
coalmine, but now that’s not there (Youth 
Worker, Trinity Youth).  
 
Again this is in part the result of a type of dependency culture, as 
discussed by the manager of a local community organisation. 
 
[The older generations had] been used to the 
coalmining industry where everything was 
provided for them, job, work, welfare, social 
activities, the whole lot. They were used to 
being able to walk to work and have everything 
there around them. Well now that’s gone but 
that imprint is still there and [younger] people 
still try to follow those, in general try to 
follow those sort of patterns (Manager – East 
Ashington Development Trust) 
 
These local outlooks are however no longer shaped solely by previous 
industrial live/work patterns and are increasingly linked to the 
generally low aspirations and very localised activity spaces among 
younger people in the area. They want to work locally because they 
have had little experience of travel, and few resources to explore the 
opportunities which are available. This was the view both from a more 
strategic perspective of the County Council’s regeneration manager, 
who perhaps has a vested interest in individualising such problems, but  
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also from a community worker in the rural coalfield who has more 
direct experience. 
 
You hear it anecdotally that people hardly ever 
go into Newcastle, you know from youngsters 
in Ashington and further north (Regeneration 
Manager Northumberland County Council). 
 
We tend to have a residual number of people 
who will probably never leave the village; the 
furthest they’ll go is maybes Morpeth on a 
Saturday night (Assistant director – 
Northumberland Community Council). 
 
Mon Valley 
 
The Mon Valley continued to lose manufacturing jobs during the 1990s, 
with additional multiplier losses, particularly in ‘transport, 
communications and utilities’. While there was some growth in the 
numbers employed in ‘other services’, these jobs were largely filled by 
the expanding supply of female labour. In total the area lost some 
1,372 jobs.
102 These ongoing sectoral shifts continued to impact 
negatively on wages, as many of the jobs in the growing sectors paid 
less and offered fewer benefits, most critically healthcare.
103  
 
There is no sign that the continuing loss of employment in the Mon 
Valley will be arrested in the foreseeable future. Baseline employment 
forecasts from the South Western Pennsylvania Commission (2003) 
indicate that the area will lose a further 10% of its employment base 
over the period 2000-2010, most significantly through the continuing 
contraction of manufacturing. This is likely to compound the significant 
employment disadvantage already prevalent in the area.  
 
                                                 
102 Figure refers to residential rather than workplace statistics which are not available 
103 Some 10% of workers in Pennsylvania were without health insurance in 2000 (SAHIE, 
2005), the proportion in the Mon Valley is likely to be significantly higher.  
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By 2000 the largest employment sector was ‘education, health and 
social services’, a sector dominated by female labour (see Table 6.8). A 
substantial portion of this was in the two large University of Pittsburgh 
Medical Centre (UPMC) hospitals located in Braddock and McKeesport. 
Retail and entertainment were also employing increasing numbers. This 
trend will continue as more of the old mill sites become centres of 
consumption, such as the Waterfront shopping complex at Homestead 
and the proposed re-use of the Carrie Furnaces as a leisure and 
entertainment complex. The Valley retains some of its past economic 
functions, and manufacturing remains an important source of 
employment, particularly for men. The main clusters are at Braddock, 
with the sole remaining blast furnace, Clairton, which still sites a 
coking plant, and West Mifflin, with a General Motors stamping plant 
(although its future appears less than secure) and a sheet rolling mill.  
 
While private sector growth has been limited, unlike Northumberland 
there has been no compensating growth in public sector employment. 
The area has therefore been wholly reliant on what little private 
investment and growth of private wage jobs it can attract (Table 6.9).  
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Table 6.8: Jobs located in the Mon Valley, by industry, 2000 
   
 
Mon Valley 
Total  Percentage 
Total  60,450  100.0 
Agriculture, forestry, mining  185  0.3 
Construction  4,684  7.7 
Manufacturing  10,698  17.7 
Wholesale trade  2,178  3.6 
Retail trade  9,690  16.0 
Transportation, warehousing, utilities  3,742  6.2 
Information  1,954  3.2 
Finance, insurance, real estate  2,153  3.6 
Professional, management, administrative 
services  4,428  7.3 
Educational, health and social services  10,858  18.0 
Entertainment, accommodations, food 
services  4,823  8.0 
Other services (except public)  3,337  5.5 
Public administration  1,593  2.6 
Armed forces  109  0.2 
(Source: Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP2000) accessed using 
Place-of-Work Drill Downs by the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
Employment and Training Institute) 
 
 
Table 6.9: The balance between public and private sector employment in the 
Mon Valley, 1980-2000 
       
As percentage of total employed       
  1980  1990  2000 
Employed persons 16 years and over   100  100  100 
Private wage and salary workers  84.4  84.8  84.4 
Federal government workers  2.1  2.8  2.4 
State government workers  1.8  1.6  1.5 
Local government workers  8.0  6.0  5.9 
Self-employed workers  3.5  4.3  5.5 
Unpaid family workers  0.3  0.4  0.2 
(Source: Census) 
 
The Valley has been hampered by a poor transport infrastructure, low 
skills base and an ageing workforce (37% of the population is over 50). A 
further difficulty relates to the poor image of the area, both in terms of 
its unionised history and more contemporary social problems. This 
depressing situation was graphically summarised by the director of a 
local organisation working for the unemployed. 
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Everything these old towns do to paint 
themselves up and make themselves attractive 
it don’t mean shit. I mean what do you get? You 
get an Echostar  [call centre] in the former 
National Tube works in McKeesport which has 7-
8 dollar an hour jobs calling around the country 
800 numbers. It’s, you know it’s really sad (Co-
director, Mon Valley Unemployed Committee, 
former worker Homestead Works). 
  
Particularly significant is the skills base, since the Mon Valley lacks the 
skilled labour force to attract high-end investment. This is symptomatic 
of a broader regional skills shortage in Southwest Pennsylvania. A 
recent study by the Pittsburgh Technology Council and Catalyst 
Connection research found that in Southwest Pennsylvania:  
 
‘• Forty percent of all high school seniors in the survey lack the applied 
math skills to be well-prepared for a lifetime of learning. 
 
• Forty-three percent of seniors received reading scores that may limit 
them to jobs that pay less than $20,000 a year. 
 
• Ninety-one percent of students lack the skills in interpreting graphs 
needed for professional occupations such as teaching and accounting. 
 
• And, on average, one-third of all applicants for local jobs are 
rejected because of inadequate reading or writing skills’ (cited in the 
Mon Valley Economic Development Strategy (MVEDS): Final Report, Trip 
Umbach, 2004; 169-170). 
 
The trend of declining incomes which began in the 1980s actually 
accelerated over the next decade. The Mon Valley stands out even 
within a declining wider regional economy; as shown in Figure 6.6 most 
municipalities had incomes below 90% of the county median, and some 
below 50%. These incomes have remained particularly low in the mill 
towns worst affected by closures, at under $20,000 in Braddock,  
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Duquesne, Homestead and Rankin and below $25,000 in McKeesport. In 
many mill suburbs they are closer to, though generally still below the 
Allegheny County average. 
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Figure 6.6: Median household income in the Mon Valley, 1999
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While income and unemployment data for the Valley are not available 
year on year, County figures showed no real wage growth between 2000 
and 2003 indicating no evidence of economic recovery. Figures for both 
the number of residents in employment (Figure 6.7), and the number 
unemployed (Figure 6.8) are provided for the two biggest municipalities 
in the Mon Valley, McKeesport and West Mifflin. Data is only available 
for towns with populations over 25,000 so these examples must serve as 
a guide. In both places, total levels of employment continued on a 
downward trend after 2000
104, while unemployment increased between 
2002 and 2005 before returning to around its 2000 level. Taken together 
these figures again indicate no recovery has occurred since the Census 
figures on which much of the analysis is based.
                                                 
104 This also reflects increasing out-migration  
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Figure 6.7: The number of employed residents in McKeesport and West Mifflin municipalities, 
2000-2008 
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Figure 6.8: Unemployment rate change in McKeesport and West Mifflin municipalities, 2000-
2008
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Commuting 
 
In response to the declining number of local opportunities there has 
been an upward trend in out-commuting.
105 In 2000, the Mon Valley had 
20% net out-commuting. Women were significantly more likely to 
commute out than men, though this is largely linked to the structure of 
the local economy, and the continuing local importance of sectors 
dominated by men.  
 
As we have seen, ‘attitudinal barriers’ to commuting are not so 
prevalent as in Northumberland. Processes of suburbanisation were 
already established, and car ownership was high (80% of Mon Valley 
households had one or more cars in 2001).  
 
Figure 6.9 shows this general upward trend in increased commuting 
from Mon Valley municipalities using travel to work times. This trend 
has been most pronounced in the more isolated mill towns, like Clairton 
and to a lesser extent Duquesne, as well as in the mill suburb areas 
which were in closest proximity to mills like North Braddock, 
Dravosburg and West Mifflin whose residents would then need to travel 
further for work. 
                                                 
105 As measured by workers filling employment outside their municipality of residence 
and mean travel to work times.  
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Figure 6.9: Change in mean travel to work time for the Mon Valley municipalities, 1980-2000
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6.4   The impacts of migration  
 
The LMA data show that, migration flows from the two areas are highly 
contrasted. In the Mon Valley they are essential in understanding post-
closure developments, while migration has been much less important in 
Northumberland. Both areas, however, have experienced some similar 
processes. For example, localised pockets of cheap housing have 
attracted a less employable, and often more problematic, population. 
In Northumberland local migrants have transferred into council or 
housing association properties from within the same local authority, as 
part of a localised process of housing market sorting. In the Mon Valley, 
there has been an influx of in-migrants from the City of Pittsburgh and 
further afield into the private rented sector. Both areas have also 
continued to lose their younger and more highly qualified workforce. 
 
Northumberland 
 
While total population has remained relatively stable, migration flows 
have impacted in diverse ways and have been important in shaping the 
micro-geographies of industrial decline. There have been three key 
migration flows, each with a distinctive geography: 
 
1.  Well qualified young people moving out of the area.  
 
2.  Residents from the Newcastle city-region moving into new 
housing estates in the area.  
 
3.  Low-wage or benefit-dependent families, attracted by the ready 
availability of social housing or the low rents offered by private 
landlords in parts of the area.  
 
Well qualified younger people are leaving in significant numbers 
because of the lack of opportunities locally. Migration of this type has  
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always occurred from the region, but it has taken on increased 
significance since industrial collapse. On the other hand, house prices 
in the area tend to be comparatively low. In Ashington in 2006 they 
were only 67% of the national average, in Blyth around 69% and in 
Bedlington 73% (calculated from the Halifax House Price Index).
106 In 
the 1980s these differentials served to limit the mobility of former 
industrial workers, but in the 1990s they encouraged a new trend. They 
made the area more attractive to incomers, supporting substantial 
house building, particularly in the villages with good access to the A19. 
These new estates, with cheaper property prices than in Newcastle and 
Tyneside, have attracted people from the city who commute back for 
work.  
 
As a result of the National Coal Board housing stock transfers in the 
1980s, the area also has a relatively large number of socially and 
privately rented properties. This has attracted criticism in some 
communities about the moving of ‘undesirables’ and problem families 
into local authority and social housing. Private landlords letting on 
short-term and social security lets have also been the source of 
disquiet. Such problems are often framed in terms of the influx of 
‘problem’ and benefit dependent families, with clear implications for 
the erosion of ‘community’. They were explained by a local community 
actor in the rural coalfield, and by a local community development 
worker in the urban coalfield. 
 
[The] people who have bought cheap houses 
here, and now they’re out to let. On the last 
count from Castle Morpeth we had 23 
landlords…and we also had the council and 
Cheviot Housing. So in all of that mix we had, 
you name it, we had it. If we did have a tenant 
who was creating all kinds of mayhem we had a 
problem finding the owner, and in fact the 
owner doing anything about it…All they really 
                                                 
106 These are the only coalfield post towns which are covered by the survey. 
Bedlington figures are 2004  
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want are people who are on benefits, and as 
long as they get their rent. However these 
people behave it’s very difficult for them to 
get to take any action (Chair Lynemouth Parish 
Council). 
 
[Properties have been] bought up by absentee 
landlords or landlords with no real interest in 
it, just letting on short term lets or social 
security lets. They’ve no sort of fibre to bond 
it together anymore (Network development 
officer, Wansbeck Community Empowerment 
Network).  
 
Mon Valley 
 
Out-migration from the Valley continued to be significant during the 
1990s, with some 9% of the working age population moving away. In 
addition, a further 5% population loss was estimated between 2000 and 
2005 (Census Bureau, 2005). During the 1990s this loss of population 
continued to be heavily focused on the mill towns, being particularly 
pronounced in Braddock, Clairton, Homestead and Duquesne, as well as 
in the more depressed mill suburb areas of Dravosburg and East 
McKeesport, while losses were less apparent in the less deprived areas 
for example Forward and Elizabeth Township (see Figure 6.10). Such 
migration has had a pronounced impact on the area’s human capital, 
particularly in these worst affected areas. 
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Figure 6.10: Population loss in the Mon Valley municipalities, 1990-2000
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By the 1990s, migration was no longer directly related to job losses, but 
more to the limited nature of local employment opportunities, and the 
general decline in the liveability of the area. The key flows were: 
 
1.  Outflows of the more qualified and employable. 
 
2.  Inflows of people attracted by the cheap rents available in the 
area. 
 
As had been the case historically those who were most highly qualified 
moved away as the area contains few jobs which would utilise their 
qualifications and skills. As in Northumberland, such migration takes on 
increased significance when new investment and indigenous growth is 
needed. 
 
There also began important inflows, although the ongoing population 
loss ensured that house prices continued to decline through the 1990s. 
In most municipalities the real median house value remained at less 
than 80% of its 1980 level, during a period when the US saw average 
property prices rise by almost 30% in real terms, to nearly $120,000 in 
2000 (US Census of Housing 
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/values.html).
107 
As Figure 6.11 shows the most depressed housing markets were in those 
mill towns which had suffered the greatest loss of population, in 
Braddock, Clairton, Duquesne, Homestead and McKeesport. Here there 
is no geographical proximity to Pittsburgh effect, indeed apart from 
Swissvale - Braddock, Rankin and Homestead are located the shortest 
distance from the city. Rather what the figures present is the declining 
liveability and population flight from the mill towns as they became 
increasing depressed. 
                                                 
107 Since 2001 County property values have fallen, making the prospect of any localised 
recovery in the Mon Valley unlikely. 
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Figure 6.11: Median owner-occupied house values for Mon Valley muncipalities, 2000
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The reduction in house prices has fostered a major social-demographic 
shift, as the former working class population was replaced by the 
working poor and welfare dependent. Increasing numbers of properties 
were let to the working poor by ‘slumlords’, or to those with Section 8 
housing vouchers by often absentee private landlords. While Section 8 
figures are not generally available, the published numbers for Braddock 
suggest that they account for around one-quarter of the area’s rental 
housing.
108 This process was detailed by a housing expert for a local 
not-for-profit. 
 
The demographic changed because the real 
estate just settled. Those houses that used to 
be vibrant, - and had these well paying 
manufacturing jobs-  as those houses started to 
wallow and deteriorate, you had the value just 
freefalling…and those people who are seeking a 
shelter at an affordable rate start moving into 
the neighbourhood (Senior real estate manager, 
Mon Valley Initiative). 
 
Absentee landlords have in many cases neglected the upkeep of their 
properties, leading to the further physical rundown of the area. A lack 
of code enforcement and property inspection, reflecting the lack of 
municipal resources, add to these problems. Such issues are particularly 
apparent in the former mill towns which have the cheapest housing. 
These migration flows have created marked divisions between 
established residents and newcomers, recounted in interviews with 
community workers and members alike. 
 
The houses have become low rent which means 
you get a big demographic shift. As poor people 
move to reasonable rents the whole 
demographic shifts. You know, you’ve got racial 
conflicts, economic conflicts that were never 
resolved, that just stewed. You know, it 
becomes a mess (Community Organiser, Mon 
Valley Initiative). 
                                                 
108 This figure was calculated using the number cited in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
(1999 E-1).   
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We have families moving in who are kind of 
transient. They move into apartments stay for a 
while and leave and don’t really care as much 
about the community as the citizens have in the 
past. So housing is one of our biggest problems. 
A lot of the houses here are very big so they’ve 
been converted into apartments. So there’s 
more renters than homeowners and a lot of 
absentee landlords (Member, East Pittsburgh 
Community Development Corporation). 
 
There is a racial dimension to these patterns. Much of the in-migration 
has been by the black population, who are disproportionately more 
likely to be found in the low-end rented and Section 8 housing. This 
movement has been mainly eastwards out from Pittsburgh because, 
‘houses and financing were more available than in other sections of the 
county’ (Pittsburgh Post Gazette, 1999: E1).
109 As described by Table 
6.10 the black population tends to be more transient, moving more 
often, some 46% of the black population had moved house in the five 
year period prior to the 2000 census, 41% of this was from within the 
same county, during the same period only 26% of the white population 
had moved. This difference in residential mobility is mostly accounted 
for by difference in tenures, with the black population much more 
likely to rent property while the white population are more likely to be 
in owner-occupied accommodation (see Table 6.11). While the black 
population has grown, the white population has declined rapidly, 
continuing a process of white flight. The increase in the black 
population has though been highly geographically specific, heavily 
concentrated in the mill towns like Braddock, Duquesne, Homestead 
and Rankin; the places in which housing collapse has been most 
complete and properties remain cheapest (see Figure 6.12). This racial 
shift is in large measure responsible for the tensions which are 
examined in section 6.7. 
                                                 
109 This continues a trend which began when parts of the city’s Hill District were 
demolished to build the Civic Arena (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 1999: E1)  
 
 
254
 
 
Table 6.10: Mobility in the five years prior to the census in the Mon Valley by 
race 
 
White: Percentage     
    1990  2000 
Different house in the United 
States  25.9  25.5 
  Same County  21.6  20.8 
  Different County  4.3  4.8 
  Same State  2.2  2.5 
  Different State  2.2  2.3 
Abroad    0.1  0.2 
 
       
Black: Percentage     
    1990  2000 
Different house in the United 
States  44.1  46.2 
  Same County  39.0  40.9 
  Different County  5.1  5.3 
  Same State  1.6  2.6 
  Different State  3.6  2.7 
Abroad    0.1  0.5 
 
(Source: Census) 
 
 
 
Table 6.11: Occupancy status by race in the Mon Valley, 2000 
 
Occupancy status  
Number of 
units  % 
White owner-occupied  43,772  69.7 
White renter  19,002  30.3 
Black owner-occupied  3,372  35.0 
Black renter  6,269  65.0 
                           (Source: Census) 
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Figure 6.12: Change in the percentage of population who were 'black' in Mon Valley municipalities, 
1980-2000
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6.5   Inactivity and worklessness 
 
The employment rate for working-age men in the Mon Valley was 74% in 
2000, only a single percentage point drop from 1980. This compares to 
a rate of 69% in Northumberland in 2001, a fall in excess of ten 
percentage points from 1981. The maintenance of a steady rate of 
employment in the Mon Valley has been achieved both by the high 
levels of out-migration, and the need for workers to take whatever jobs 
were available. There are also significant differences in the proportion 
of men not working because of sickness. The figures below in Table 
6.12 are not directly comparable, since those for the Mon Valley are 
based on self-selective categories while the Northumberland figures are 
for actual benefit claims. They nevertheless show the much greater 
extent to which sickness benefits support inactivity in 
Northumberland.
110 One in seven working-age men in Northumberland 
were on sickness benefits, compared to fewer than one in eleven off 
work because of sickness in the Mon Valley. The female figures are 
broadly similar, though the Northumberland data are for women 16-59 
while those for the Mon Valley are for 16-64. As health deteriorates 
with age it is likely that direct comparisons would show greater 
incidence of sickness among women in Northumberland.  
 
Table 6.12: Proportion of the working age population not employed because of 
sickness or disability 
 
  Men  Women 
Mon Valley(a) [2000]  8.8%  9.4% 
Northumberland(b) [2001]  14.4%  9.1% 
(Source: (a) Census: Counts individuals not working because of a disability. (b) DWP 
benefits data: Counts individuals claiming Incapacity Benefit or Severe Disablement 
Allowance, and, Census) 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 Those reporting to be not working because of ill-health in the Mon Valley do not 
necessarily collect any form of sickness benefits.  
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Northumberland 
 
In chapter 5, we saw that working age inactivity in Northumberland has 
two significant elements; early retirement and, a larger group claiming 
sickness benefits. The working age male IB claimant rate in the 
Northumberland coalfield was 13.2% in 2005, well above the national 
average of 8.0% (DWP 2005: Mid-year population estimates, 2005).
111 
This represents a small decline since 2001, around 400 men, primarily 
by those reaching retirement age, leaving around 6,000 claimants. The 
female rate was 9.2% compared to 6.0 nationally (ibid), and has risen 
slightly since 2001.  
 
The explanation for these high rates may begin with the story of 
redundant industrial workers, over the following decades it has become 
more complex, and worrying, as the group become younger. Figures 
5.14 (in the previous chapter) and 6.13 show the change in levels of 
economic inactivity by age for males between 1991 and 2001. Rising 
levels of inactivity are clearly not now directly related to pit closures. 
Those aged 55-64 in 1991, with a substantial proportion of former 
miners, would have been past retirement by 2001 however the 
proportion has actually risen. Inactivity rates among 25-34 year olds 
had also grown by around 5 percentage points and, for 35-54 year olds, 
by around 7 points. As the coalfield continued to lose skilled trades jobs 
and basic factory employment during the 1990s
112, the weak labour 
market produced an expansion of sickness benefits to other sets of 
manual workers and to younger cohorts of service workers.
113 The data 
indicate that, far from being a short-term adjustment of former miners 
                                                 
111 Figure refers to claimants of Incapacity or Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA) for 
England only. 
112 In 1994 Ellington colliery also closed with the loss of 1,200 jobs, though around a 
third of this number would go on to be employed when the mine re-opened as a 
private concern.  
113 The point should be made the that IB as a stop gap to until retirement, perhaps 
supported by some pension income and without mortgage payments, is a very 
different financial option to being on IB for the long-term.  
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moving onto sickness benefits, the area’s benefit dependency has 
become a continuing trend.  
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Figure 6.13: Economic position of men in the Northumberland coalfield by age, 2001
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
16-24 25-34 35-54 55-64
Age
% in economic position
Other economically inactive
Permanently sick
Retired
Unemployed
Employed
(Source: Census)
 
  
 
 
260 
 
There are several, partially overlapping, explanations for the 
persistence of inactivity and sickness claims after the immediate 
impacts of closures.  
 
1.  There were well-worn institutional paths to benefits claims in 
terms of local advice organisations and GP attitudes.  
 
2.  Because of weak local demand for labour, when employees 
dropped out of work for health reasons they became less likely 
to find alternative employment than in more economically 
buoyant areas. The low-wage local labour market also made the 
financial incentives of benefits more attractive than in other 
parts of the country. 
 
3.  Declining aggregate demand for labour and unemployment itself 
has had negative impacts on health. 
 
4.  There was a normalisation of worklessness in some households 
and communities. This is coupled with cultural “learning” of the 
benefits system. 
 
The original large-scale shift onto sickness benefits by redundant 
workers created local institutional channels for claiming Incapacity 
Benefits which seem to have outlasted the needs of the industrial 
workers themselves. The active diversion from unemployment to 
sickness benefits, which was encouraged at jobcentres in the 1980s 
largely ceased. But knowledge had begun circulating about ways to 
ease the path from work. Awareness of the benefits system became 
better, both within the community and among advisers (e.g., General 
Practitioners, Citizen Advice Bureau), some of whom saw IB as an exit 
route out of a difficult labour market for low-skilled workers with some  
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form of health limitation.
114 This has increased the propensity of those 
without work to claim beyond the normal range of unemployment 
related benefits. A benefit shift therefore occurred from increasingly 
worthless and punitive unemployment benefits onto more financially 
advantageous sickness benefits. This process was summed up by a 
community worker who covers parts of the rural coalfield. 
 
I work very closely with the Citizen’s Advice 
Bureau…[and]...there seems to be a greater 
awareness. And indeed the CAB are the ones 
perhaps who raise that awareness  of the 
availability of benefits for a range of things 
outside of the normal Jobseeker's Allowance, 
outside of the normal Income Support and so 
on. And Incapacity Benefit, Attendance 
Allowance, all these kind of things…There’s a 
lot more awareness of what you can get for 
being ill these days so perhaps that’s bringing 
more people into the health arena. And I think 
perhaps younger people, you know; you’ve 
been through the Jobseeker’s Allowance and 
you get, what is it, 26 weeks. What do you do 
after then? Do you go on Income Support or do 
you get diverted into Incapacity Benefit?…It’s 
just increasing the number of people who are 
allegedly in ill health, perhaps falsely, because 
they’re being diverted into these different 
types of benefit which are extra income 
streams (Assistant director – Northumberland 
Community Council). 
 
The low wages, high turnover rate, and increasing prevalence of agency 
work locally, has also made claiming sickness benefits more likely for 
those with some degree of health limitation compared with other parts 
of the country. In more buoyant labour markets individuals who have 
claimed IB might have remained in work for two reasons. First, their 
employer may have been more likely to retain them, or they may have 
been able to gain alternative employment more easily. Secondly, their 
                                                 
114 A national study of IB recipients found that the role of GPs and benefit officers in 
encouraging people to claim was particularly evident ‘until the late 1990s’. In more 
recent years these sets of professionals have become more likely to encourage people 
towards work (Houston and Sissons, 2008; 22-24)  
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health may not have been so bad if they lived in a less deprived part of 
the country (Houston and Sissons, 2008; 63). IB may also be combined 
with other non-income benefits, for example housing and council tax 
benefits, to produce a ‘benefit trap’, whereby financially it does not 
seem worthwhile going back to work. A recent survey of Incapacity 
claimants in Wansbeck district found that more than two-fifths of men 
would need to earn more than £300 a week after tax to come off 
benefit, for women the figure was almost one in four. Because of the 
complexity of calculating income and non-income benefits a further 
18% of men and 27% of women did not know (Beatty et al, 2007; 49). To 
put this in context a full-time job at the minimum wage would yield a 
net income of around £170-180 a week (ibid; 49).
115 As those on IB tend 
to have few formal qualifications, and often feel they could only 
manage part-time work, many would be unable to command these 
types of incomes, particularly in Northumberland’s low wage economy. 
This position was recounted both by those concerned at strategic levels 
and within the communities themselves. 
 
If you’re not forced to [go back to work] 
particularly on long-term sickness and 
Incapacity… you’d have to have a pretty 
attractive opportunity to want to break out of 
that (Regeneration Manager Northumberland 
County Council). 
 
They see it that if they come off their present 
state benefits they’ll probably, if it’s a low 
paid job they’ll be less well off. So they stay on 
state benefits and then the next generation 
does the same (Chair Lynemouth Parish 
Council). 
 
This is further complicated where benefit income is supplemented by 
work in the informal economy, as explained by a community worker in 
the rural coalfield. 
                                                 
115 Though in some cases there is scope for this to be increased through Tax Credits 
awareness of how these can boost income is generally low among IB claimants 
(Houston and Sissons, 2008; 33).  
 
 
263 
 
A lot of them get into the black economy, you 
know fiddle jobs doing whatever…if there’s a 
guy who’s a small builder, small mechanic 
whatever, and needs a bit of a hand now and 
again, there’s always somebody around. You 
know - few quid on the side - no names no 
national insurance. Just come along and you’ll 
get a bit of work…I know people who regularly 
do a little bit of work on the side like that and 
it’s sort of generally accepted in the 
community. (Assistant director – 
Northumberland Community Council). 
 
Long term changes in aggregate demand for labour and rising incidences 
of unemployment can themselves also impact upon peoples’ health. 
Worklessness, poverty and deprivation can exert a powerful negative 
impact upon health, further feeding rising sickness levels, in a self-
reinforcing circuit.  
 
The negative aspects of redundancies have also produced a longer-term 
process of the ‘normalisation’ of worklessness in particular households, 
streets and communities in parts of the coalfield. Again this is a 
mixture of established cultures passed down, and new attitudes 
engendering low aspirations and negative attitudes towards work which 
can be combined with some form of health problem. These issues were 
summarised by a local employment adviser working with young 
jobseekers in the rural coalfield. 
 
We get the second and third generations 
unemployed because they haven’t had the role 
models, or their parents have said to them “I 
wouldn’t do that job for that sort of money” 
(Employment opportunities manager, Amble 
Development Trust, formerly redundancy 
counsellor with British Coal Enterprise). 
 
The geographical concentration of worklessness in certain parts of the 
coalfield is suggested by Table 6.13 which sets out some correlations, 
all of which are significant to the 5% level, of employment data from  
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the 42 coalfield wards. There are strong positive correlations between 
the levels of male IB claimants and levels of youth unemployment 
among both men and women (16-24) of 0.72 and 0.72 there is also a 
relatively strong correlation between male and female youth 
unemployment of 0.60. This hints at the negative transmission effects 
of worklessness which may occur between generations. 
 
Table 6.13: Correlations of worklessness by age in Northumberland coalfield 
wards 
 
  
IB claim 
rate male 
aged 16-
64, 2001 
IB claim 
rate  
female 
aged 16-
59, 2001 
Male  
unemployment 
rate aged 16-24, 
2001 
Female 
unemployment 
rate aged16-24, 
2001 
IB claim rate male 
aged 16-64, 2001  1.00       
IB claim rate  female 
aged 16-59, 2001  0.93  1.00     
Male  unemployment 
rate aged 16-24, 
2001 
0.72  0.57  1.00   
Female 
unemployment rate 
aged16-24, 2001 
0.72  0.66  0.60  1.00 
(Source: Census) 
 
This process of negative transmission was described by interviews 
across the board, with local community members, local community 
workers and those in statutory agencies. 
 
Those who are second or third generation 
unemployed or on benefits, or whatever, tend 
to be the ones [for whom] this is the accepted 
norm. “This is what we do we sit here and we 
wait for our handout” (Manager – East 
Ashington Development Trust). 
 
You have a lot of people that don’t want to 
work, that have this sort of culture where 
they’re in a situation of maybe third 
generation unemployment. And they’ve seen 
that their dad hasn’t gone to work, their  
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granddad hasn’t gone to work since the pits 
closed, kind of thing, and why should they go 
out and try and earn a living when they can 
survive on the benefits that they receive? 
(Business and Enterprise coordinator Wansbeck 
Council, worklessness themed group).  
 
A lot of the people don’t know any way of life 
other than benefits (Chair East Ashington 
Community Area Partnership). 
 
There is also a strong correlation (0.93) between the levels of male IB 
claimants and female claimants in the coalfield wards (see Table 6.13). 
Whilst the data do not show whether these are located in the same 
households, the findings suggest a similar pattern to that found by 
Fieldhouse and Hollywood (1999) who explain how the design of 
benefits serves to encourage spouses or other household members to 
adopt the same status.  
 
You only have to do it once in a family before 
the word spreads [advice about benefits]…It 
should be a temporary situation but 
unfortunately people end up on these things 
long-term (Assistant director – Northumberland 
Community Council). 
 
Some 16% of parents with dependents in the coalfield lived in workless 
households in 2001. Just over half of these had both parents out of 
work, with the rest being lone parents (calculated from the Census). In 
cases of inter-generational worklessness the degree of household 
detachment from the labour market can become almost complete, as 
set out by a local community worker in the rural coalfield. 
 
…where their parents haven’t worked, or their 
father hasn’t worked, so it’s not just the lack 
of availability of work it’s the lack of the work 
ethic, ‘why should I get out of bed at you know 
sort of half past six in the morning to go to 
work? I haven’t had to do that, and it’s a hell 
of a thing…There’s been no system in the 
household for getting up and going to work and  
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the idea of going out of the house, doing work, 
coming back in at a reasonable time to get up 
in morning, they’ve just lost it. So you’ve got 
kids around nowadays who, and I’m talking 
about kids perhaps into their early 20s, who 
have just never done that. They’ve never had 
experience of that in their household. So I 
think that’s one of the hardest things perhaps 
to get over to them (Assistant director – 
Northumberland Community Council).  
 
Previous evidence suggests that some of those claming IB could be 
expected to be in work in a more dynamic economy (Beatty and 
Fothergill, 2005), while the Disability Rights Commission suggest that 
one-third of people on IB would like to work. However a recent survey 
of claimants in Wansbeck suggested the figure is lower, with only 17% 
of male IB claimants, and 24% of female claimants reporting they would 
like a job either at the time of the survey or further into the future 
(Beatty et al, 2007; 29). This represents less than 850 of Wansbeck’s 
claimants and indicates the significant difficulties faced in attempting 
to reduce levels of inactivity. 
 
Mon Valley 
 
As we have seen, inactivity is a much less readily available option in the 
Mon Valley. Nevertheless, in 2000, around 20% of working age males 
were inactive, and just over 30% of females.
116 The male rate had 
however increased by only 1 percentage point since 1980, while the 
female rate declined sharply. Within this picture, there are some 
pockets of high rates of unemployment and inactivity within the Valley 
primarily concentrated in the mill towns. Figure 6.14 shows that 
inactivity was particularly high in those areas which have suffered the 
most complete economic and housing collapse and which have 
undergone the greatest population turnover, in Braddock, Homestead, 
Rankin and Duquesne. While rates remain quite low in those mill suburb 
                                                 
116 These relatively high rates are partly linked to demographics, and the large 
numbers of people in the older cohorts of working-age.   
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areas in which housing remained relatively less affordable. This trend 
was in part linked to in-migration, as well as to the degree of 
employment disadvantage which existed prior to closures, as migration 
has to some extent imported some level of economic inactivity from 
elsewhere through housing market sorting processes. These mill town 
areas now tend to have higher levels of welfare claims as well as more 
people who are economically inactive living a marginal existence 
without income from either formal work or benefits. As a result of the 
selective migration they also have a larger number of older residents 
qualifying for full or partial retirement benefits. Inactivity in the Mon 
Valley therefore presents an even more distinct geography of that 
outlined for the coalfield, being so heavily concentrated in the mill 
towns.  
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Figure 6.14: Proportion of the male working age population in the Mon Valley municipalities 
who were inactive, 2000
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6.6   The geographical concentration of poverty and deprivation  
 
The decline of traditional industries has created increasingly complex 
localised patterns of deprivation in both study areas. While some places 
became commuter belts, others became areas characterised by high 
levels of worklessness. These changes did not radically redraw the map 
of relative deprivation. Rather, the wider area decline became most 
obvious and intractable in those areas which began from the lowest 
start point.  
 
There are clearly differences in the two areas’ experiences. In the Mon 
Valley there remains a greater degree of polarisation between top and 
bottom. Structures of decayed housing, unused brown field sites, under 
funded public spaces and run-down street architecture present a stark 
image of many parts of the area. In Northumberland, minimum housing 
standard regulations, public spending on physical regeneration, better 
funded local councils, and community funding have served to limit the 
visual impact of economic decline.
117 In both, however, while most 
areas have suffered to some extent, the situation in the worst affected 
places has become almost hopeless. As a result of housing market 
sorting processes, poverty, ill-health and low aspirations, economic and 
social disadvantages have come together to produce a poverty of 
opportunity and aspiration. Tables 6.14 and 6.15 draw together various 
indices to highlight the characteristics of the most deprived 
communities. In Northumberland they are characterised by there high 
rates of inactivity and benefit claiming, poor educational attainment, 
large numbers living in the socially and privately rented sectors and 
high rates of teenage pregnancies. These problems are concentrated in 
wards in Ashington and Blyth towns, areas hit particularly hard by 
industrial change, as well as in some of the less accessible and more 
peripheral villages like Lynemouth, a former pit village, and New Biggin 
                                                 
117 Though there are pockets of disused council and social housing in parts of the 
coalfield.  
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where population turnover has been pronounced.  In the Mon Valley 
such places are characterised by their collapsed local housing markets, 
low wages, high levels of poverty and inactivity and poor high school 
completion rates. These problems are highly concentrated in the 
former mill town areas. For these areas disadvantage has become 
cumulative, through damaging area effects in places where 
worklessness is normalised, and inter-generational effects, where 
households have become used to not working. High levels of 
worklessness, low skills and barriers to transport have bred a self-
reinforcing decline. People have not improved their expectations and 
aspirations because they feel ‘boxed in’ by the limited opportunity 
structure in which they now feel trapped.  
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Table 6.14: The worst performing wards in the Northumberland coalfield  
 
 
(Sources: Census; DWP benefits data; Mid-year population estimates; EMPHO) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
118 The IB figures have been adjusted to estimate working-age IB recipients. A proportional adjustment is made based on the ratio of non-working 
age claimants as a proportion of the total for coalfield Local Authority areas (for which age data is available). The 2005 population are MYEs 
adjusted using the ward ratio of 15 year olds in the 15-19 category to estimate working-age figures. 
  
Male inactive 200
1
 (16
-
64)
 %
 
Female inactive 2001
 
 
(16
-
59)
 %
 
Council and HA
 HHs
 
2001 %
 
Privately rented
 HHs
 
2001
 %
 
No car 
H
Hs 
2001
 %
 
Claiming IB males 
2005 
(16
-
64)
 % 
118
 
Claiming IB females 
 
2005 (16
-
59)
 %
 
 
Male claiming IS
 2005 
(16
-
64)
 %
 
Female claiming IS 
2005
 
(16
-
59)
 %
 
Males claiming JSA
 2005 
(16
-
64)
 %
 
Coal board housing in 
1981
 %
 
Teenage 
pregnancies
(<18)
 
: 2002
-
2004 
 
% of po
p with below 
level 2 qualifications 
(GCSEs A
-
C)
 
% of pop <25 with below 
level 2 qualifications 
(GCSEs A
-
C)
 
Hirst  31.9  42.9  31.1  15.2  49.3  22.3  14.9  9.7  21.4  8.3  9.1  High  70.4  49.4 
Lynemouth  29.6  36.2  31.7  10.7  35.6  22.9  16.3  8.6  19.0  8.6  24.6 
Not 
sig.  70.9  55.4 
Cowpen  29.1  41.1  50.3  5.4  46.3  19.9  12.9  10.7  14.6  7.1  2.7  Not 
sig.  72.3  50.5 
Newbiggin East  28.9  39.8  31.6  12.6  42.6  22.5  13.8  9.4  15.6  7.7  9.3  High  69.5  46.4 
Croft  27.6  37.8  33.1  14.9  48.1  23.5  14.1  12.2  18.9  10.8  0.6  High  65.5  48.4  
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Table 6.15: The worst performing municipalities in the Mon Valley 
 
  
Male inactivity 
2000 
(
16
-
64
) %
 
Female 
inactivity 
2000 
(
16
-
64
) %
 
Male 
unemployment  
2000 
(
16
-
64
) %
 
Female 
unemployment 
2000  
(
16
-
64
) %
 
Median HH 
income 2000 ($)
 
Residents 25+ not 
completed high 
school 2000
 %
 
No car 
HHs 
2000
 
%
 
Long
-
term vacant 
properties 2000
 %
 
Properties rented 
2000
 %
 
Living in
 poverty 
2000
 %
 
Public assistance 
income 2000
 %
119
 
Households with 
no wage or salary 
income 2000
 %
 
Rankin   36.2  35.8  11.8  7.2  13,832  20.3  50.3  4.6  58.1  45.0  12.8  45.2 
Braddock  34.1  40.2  10.6  7.9  18,473  22.1  39.1  16.3  49.9  35.0  9.4  44.0 
Homestead  33.1  37.5  6.4  8.0  16,603  24.4  46.7  12.0  58.2  26.6  9.5  43.5 
McKeesport city  27.5  37.2  9.0  6.5  23,715  22.4  29.5  5.2  40.0  23.0  7.9  35.8 
Duquesne city  27.2  32.0  7.9  8.3  19,766  21.8  39.1  6.5  47.8  34.7  13.5  40.0 
(Source: Census)
                                                 
119 Includes TANF and other cash welfare programmes.  
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Northumberland 
 
In Northumberland, growing pockets of worklessness and increased 
deprivation can be traced back to the patterns of labour supply and 
demand in the period after the initial shocks, particularly the rise in 
inactivity rates. As well as to processes of housing market sorting which 
resulted from industrial change. The 2004 indices of deprivation show 
that a substantial section of the coalfield remains relatively deprived, 
with 18 of the 90 Super Output Areas (SOAs), the smallest spatial scale 
for which data are available, among the worst 10% in the country (see 
Appendix IV). Within this pattern of deprivation there are pronounced 
divergences both within and between local authority areas. The Blyth 
and Wansbeck areas remain generally the most deprived, with Castle 
Morpeth and Alnwick doing significantly better. The last 25 years have 
seen a geographical concentration of disadvantage which is essentially 
linked to the structure of the housing stock, being concentrated in 
areas with high proportions of socially and privately rented housing.
120 A 
process of ghettoisation began in these areas with some communities 
becoming blighted by deprivation, teenage pregnancy, crime, and drugs 
and alcohol. This process was described by the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) chairman but also, from a more neutral perspective, 
by a local community worker. 
 
If you have a look round the area, it’s 
frightening. You couldn’t get up and walk 
around there and feel safe, even now 
[daytime], and back there is equally as bad 
(description of part of Ashington) (National 
Chairman and secretary – National Union of 
Mineworkers, former miner). 
 
[We’ve got a] ghetto type mentality starting to 
take place now where we’re having massive 
regeneration, relatively speaking, around the 
periphery of Ashington for example. And the 
old core areas we’re getting ghetto type 
                                                 
120 Of which the selling off of NCB housing is an important aspect.  
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mentality, a siege mentality taking place 
(Network development officer, Wansbeck 
Community Empowerment Network). 
 
Low aspirations and related problems became established over a 
relatively short period of time, but have created new stubborn and 
entrenched norms.  These developed from household and peer 
influences, a combination of inter-generational and area effects. Their 
damaging nature was summed-up by those in direct contact with young 
people in the local communities.  
 
Their peers’ aspirations are very low…the area 
that they’re living in, their peer group, their 
parents, their cousins - you know, brothers and 
sisters. It can be very hard for them to break 
that, for want of a better word, that 
‘stereotype’, because of where they live (Youth 
Worker, Trinity Youth). 
 
This is further complicated by an old norm that has proved remarkably 
robust - the desire among young people to fulfil a family role at a young 
age.  Without work, or with low paid work, social housing increasingly 
fills the role once provided by the NCB for (non) workers, as explained 
by an official charged with tackling worklessness in Wansbeck District. 
 
You’ve got to realise that it is a drummed-in 
culture, and unfortunately a lot of perceptions 
are that young people aspire to get themselves 
a family and a council house, so that they can 
live on their own. It isn’t really developed in 
them that they want to strive to achieve 
something, and that is something that we’re all 
driving to tackle. But from my perspective I 
haven’t seen any evidence to suggest that it is 
changing (Business and Enterprise coordinator 
Wansbeck Council, worklessness themed group).  
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Mon Valley 
 
Since closures, social problems have similarly developed in the Mon 
Valley. They include poverty, drugs, prostitution, physical decay and 
community conflicts. The extent of this social breakdown was detailed 
by a local council member in Clairton. 
 
I was trying to sell a business, and a broker that 
came to town one Saturday morning actually 
left. Before he met with me he was just taking 
a ride through the town to try to take a look at 
the business through the outside, and he was 
approached three different times for drugs or 
prostitution in a matter of five blocks. And that 
was our business area! (Councilman, City of 
Clairton, Clairton Community Development 
Corporation (CDC) member). 
 
These changes fed a heightened sense of danger in the communities, as 
outlined by a former mill worker. 
 
You had a lot of families move out, a lot of 
areas that were nice now become kind of run 
down, and you’re dealing with a lot of people 
that you really don’t care to deal with, as far as 
your safety or anything else goes (Former mill 
worker [MV2]). 
 
The official poverty rate in the Mon Valley in 2000 was 15%, though 
there were wide fluctuations between municipalities (as shown in 
Figure 6.15). With the highest poverty persisting in the mill towns 
themselves, particularly in Rankin, Braddock, Duquesne and Homestead 
which had more than one-quarter of their population living below the 
poverty line. Employing Cormier and Craypo’s estimate that the official 
poverty level underestimates the amount of money needed to live ‘at a 
customary standard of living’ by between a half and two-thirds, the real 
figure is probably nearer 30% and rising to 45% in the mill towns 
(Cormier and Craypo, 2000, 697; Mon Valley estimate calculated from 
2001 Census data).  Poverty figures for municipalities have not been  
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available since 2000, but can be obtained by school district for 5-17 
year-olds. Between 2000 and 2005 levels of poverty in the Valley’s 
school districts rose from 18.8% to 22.3%, indicating no recent 
improvement has occurred (calculated from the Small Area Income and 
Poverty Estimates Program, 2007). 
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Figure 6.15: The percent of the population living below the poverty level  for the Mon Valley 
municipalities, 1999
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The problems associated with economic decline are concentrated both 
racially and geographically in the mill towns of Braddock, Rankin, 
Homestead, Duquesne, McKeesport and Clairton. One in four people in 
the mill towns lived below the poverty line in 2000. The population was 
also more transient, with the housing market continuing to be 
particularly weak; 16% of the houses were vacant, 9.2% of these long-
term, with many derelict and in a state of disrepair.  
 
As we have seen, in part due to the division of labour when the mills 
were open, and also because of more recent in-movements of 
population, the Valley’s black population remained significantly more 
deprived than whites. The unemployment rate among black males in 
2000 was more than double that of white males. The inactive rate was 
also higher, and median wage earnings and household incomes were 
much lower (see Figures 6.16 and 6.17). Black males were also less 
likely to have graduated through high school than their white 
counterparts or to have a degree (see Table 6.16). Poverty levels were 
therefore very significantly higher among blacks; 39.2% compared with 
10.6% among whites. Both white and black poverty had increased during 
the 1980s, the period of mill closures. White poverty declined through 
the 1990s, however, although remaining above pre-closure levels, as 
black rates continued to increase. 
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Figure 6.16: Median income for white and black householders in the Mon Valley municipalities, 1999
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Figure 6.17: Earnings distribution by race of jobs within the Mon Valley, 1999
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Table 6.16: Educational attainment by race in the Mon Valley, 2000 
 
Percentage of over 25s who didn't graduate high school 
White male  14.9 
White female  18.1 
Black male  21.0 
Black female  19.0 
   
   
Percentage of over 25s who have a Bachelor degree or 
higher 
White male  16.0 
White female  12.4 
Black male  7.2 
Black female  8.8 
(Source: Census) 
 
 
6.7   Communities disunited  
 
A further product of economic change was community change, as the 
production bonds which had previously held communities together 
became broken. 
 
Northumberland 
 
As the model of a relatively coherent coalfield community has 
dissipated, the different sub-‘communities’ which developed in the 
aftermath of industrial decline in Northumberland have remained 
poorly integrated. Stark divisions have become apparent between the 
area’s former industrial communities, including benefit dependent and 
workless tracts, and the newly established residential areas based on 
out-commuting. There may not be the latent tensions of community 
relations in the Mon Valley but there is a sense of division by history, 
and certainly by wealth and opportunity.  
 
There is little evidence that the in-migration of commuters has been of 
any tangible benefit to the wider coalfield area. They make relatively 
little use of the limited local retail facilities, and have little contact  
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with older established communities. Instead of fostering positive 
multiplier effects, the new developments only serve to highlight the 
poverty and deprivation faced by the areas of acutest disadvantage. For 
example, new housing in Ashington stands in stark contrast to the 
neighbouring Hirst area, one of the most deprived wards in the 
Northeast. As a community worker in Ashington commented:  
 
It’s great that all this regeneration is 
happening on the edges, they’re building all 
this fancy new housing…but they’re all dashing 
off down the A19 to their jobs on Tyneside, 
you know with very little contact, social or 
economic contact, with the old communities, 
old neighbourhoods… I think it’s an extremely 
dangerous road we’re taking in terms of not 
putting enough resources back into those old 
established communities (Network 
development officer, Wansbeck Community 
Empowerment Network). 
 
On the other hand, many locals feel that the area has been brought 
down more by people who moved from elsewhere into the local 
authority, housing association and low-end private rented housing.  
 
I think with the housing associations coming in, 
and a load of private landlords, buying houses 
because they were cheap and renting them on 
to people…and you’ve got some local 
authorities swapping people into houses, 
maybe undesirables. So there’s not the close 
knit community that there used to be (Local 
resident; Lynemouth Day Centre Manager). 
 
This loss of community is often contrasted with a romanticised past, 
particularly by those who had lived in the communities for a long time, 
making the present appear even bleaker. 
 
In miner’s villages there you never locked your 
door. Now it’s locked and bolted top to 
bottom (Former miner [N4]). 
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Mon Valley 
 
The Mon Valley communities, which were so reactive and vocal during 
the shutdowns in the 1980s, have been “atrophied” by population loss 
(interview with the Vice-president for Development, Heritage Health 
Foundation).
121 The social-demographic shift has created considerable 
tensions, as communities became fragmented between newcomers and 
established residents, renters and owners, and black and white. The 
newcomers, renters and blacks are often blamed by existing residents 
for being the cause, rather than a symptom of, social decay. Sections 
of the community are therefore blaming each other, rather than 
searching for solutions, as this local community worker with the Mon 
Valley Initiative complained. 
 
The old folks that have been around remember 
the kind of community it was when it was 
thriving, and they, all the newcomers are seen 
as threats. They’re ‘causing the problems’, 
when they’re not really. They’re just looking 
for a place to live you know? So it becomes 
almost a Catch 22, where nobody’s solving the 
problems because they’re blaming each other. 
Except for the people who are making money 
off of it, and most of them don’t live here you 
know, they’re outside investors and speculators 
(Community Organiser, Mon Valley Initiative).  
 
Although the mill towns have always been places fragmented by 
ethnicity, these boundaries have increasingly become redrawn in terms 
of race. The Valley’s black population moves house more often, and has 
grown more rapidly, which lends itself to the belief among some 
                                                 
121 Examples of a determined community reaction against mill closures, and also to 
alleviating the impacts after closure, included the Save Dorothy Six campaign, the 
establishment of food banks for unemployed steelworkers, the Homestead Credit 
Union (see Cunningham and Martz, 1986) and the establishment of the Mon Valley 
Unemployed Committee.  These responses were organised, creative and aggressive, 
and showed real community solidarity (for an overview see Hathaway, 1993). 
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established residents that they are more transient and care less about 
their communities.
122 As summed up by these residents. 
 
You know no matter what nationality you are 
you know people like to be with their own 
kind…I don’t know - you know, they certainly 
didn’t come, at the time that the racial mix 
was changing it certainly wasn’t because it was 
a more attractive area. It was maybe a more 
affordable area…The only thing I can say is you 
know, whether they’re white or black, the 
community is more of a transient community 
than it was at the time that I was growing up 
(Member, North Braddock CARES). 
 
Clairton, it’s like blacks and whites kind of stay 
separate from each other. There is a club right 
at the corner of this street, Knights of 
Columbus, don’t allow any blacks in you know. 
So there is tension… I mean even the business 
area; whites don’t come in the business area 
too often (Councilman, City of Clairton, 
Clairton Community Development Corporation 
(CDC) member). 
 
Community tensions in the Valley are particularly apparent in relation 
to the issue of Section 8 housing, the federal housing vouchers given to 
low-income families to live in the privately rented housing. 
 
It’s very sad. You know, the house that’s next 
door to the house I live in was Section 8, and 
you know the landlord lived out in Wexford 
which is a nice community and it’s a good 20-30 
minute drive from here…She just got tenants in 
there who had public housing or Section 8 
vouchers, and, again you don’t want to 
generalise because the Section 8 programme is 
supposed to help people get on their feet. 
However, some of the people who were in there 
were not the most desirable people. They 
destroyed the place, and when I say destroy I’m 
talking firsthand knowledge because I live next 
to the apartment where this girl lived. She was 
                                                 
122 An ethnographic project undertaken in the Mon Valley by The Historical Society of 
Western Pennsylvania also found evidence of blacks being blamed for the decline of 
the mill towns; they ‘moved in and trashed the place’ (Carroll, 1992; 109).  
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all of 20, 21 years old and already had 5 kids. 
When she was evicted she was upset about it so 
she wrecked everything…They’re basically living 
off the system, so you know when a town gets a 
lot of those types of housing it’s not productive 
housing. It’s not families who are giving back to 
the community, it’s families who aren’t even 
working to pay taxes. They’re basically just 
living there, they’re existing (Member, North 
Braddock CARES). 
 
Often again there is a strong racial aspect to these issues as discussed 
by a local community worker based in Homestead.  
 
If all the poor people moving into Homestead 
were white, there wouldn’t be nearly as many 
complaints about Section 8…Only 15 years, 10 
years ago there were people burning crosses in 
Munhall when black families started to move 
across the cemetery you know? (Community 
Organiser, Mon Valley Initiative).  
 
The above quotes show the tensions within the mill town communities 
between ‘old timers’ and ‘newcomers’, ‘workers’ and ‘welfare 
dependents’, ‘homeowners’ and ‘renters’, and ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’.  
These fractious relationships create a sense of a community divided by 
history. To those who had lived through the good times those that had 
moved in are perceived to have taken advantage of, or even caused, 
the towns decline. At present little is done to address these 
disconnects or even acknowledge that such problems exist.  
 
6.8   Educational and training systems  
 
Northumberland 
 
Educational attainment in Northumberland has remained well below 
the national average, and there remains a ‘vicious circle’ in ‘significant 
parts’ of the coalfield of low motivations and aspirations, leading to 
poor educational attainment and low skills (Northumberland Strategic  
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Partnership, 2005; 15). This is, in part, created by the poor prospects 
perceived in the local labour market. A survey of young people in 
Wansbeck District in 2005, for example, found that less than 10% of 
respondents thought that there were a lot of jobs offering ‘good pay, 
job satisfaction or led to a good career’ in the area (Wansbeck Young 
People’s Survey, 2005; 52). Poor attainment is also linked to the 
cultural legacy of reliance on a single employer. In the past, people did 
not think much about generic skills and educational qualifications, and 
such attitudes have proved stubborn in the face of changing economic 
realities. Once more, inter-generational and area effects loom large. 
 
The culture was a single employer. You just 
started at the bottom and got your training 
and you didn’t think so much about getting 
generic skills. And that adjustment still hasn’t 
worked its way through, and I think it's 
something that is being passed down the 
generations (Regeneration Manager 
Northumberland County Council). 
 
We get this quite a lot. This “who do they think 
they are?” You know, even if they’re going to 
leave school at 16 and go and be unemployed, it’s 
still what you do because everybody in the estate 
does the same. It’s still very much that. Call it the 
‘caveman’ state - ‘we do this because we live 
here’, and to better yourself, or to try to better 
yourself through education would be seen to be 
stepping outside your tribe. So they’re still very 
tribalistic you see. So to step outside your tribe 
would mean you would be sent to Coventry - you 
would be outside the group (Youth Worker, Trinity 
Youth). 
 
For some young men in the area low aspirations are manifested in a 
desire to enter ‘masculine’ occupations. This phenomenon was linked 
less to the mining past, however, and more to a lack of confidence in 
the types of employment they could fill. This was detailed by a local 
youth worker. 
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The very masculine types of jobs; you know, 
builders, that type of thing, car mechanics… A 
lot of the people that I work with, the 
unemployed the long-term unemployed, 
there’s a huge literacy and numeracy problem - 
a huge literacy problem - and for a lot of them 
that’s the stumbling block for want of a better 
word. They think they can only get jobs where 
they don’t have to use any literacy or 
numeracy skills (Youth Worker, Trinity Youth). 
 
Mon Valley 
 
In the Mon Valley the educational system is similarly failing to prepare 
young people, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds, for 
the labour market. The Valley compares poorly with county averages in 
both the proportion of people who have graduated high school (82.9% 
compared to 86.3%), and, particularly, in lacking a highly educated 
workforce; just 13.5% of the Mon Valley’s population has a Bachelor’s 
degree or above, compared to 28.3% of the County population in 2000. 
Figure 6.18 indicates that no Mon Valley municipalities have above the 
county average rate of population with a degree, and many are well 
below this figure. Again this is particularly pronounced in the mill towns, 
but in many other areas as well fewer than one in ten of the population 
have degrees. These figures show the widespread problem the Valley has 
in offering a well-qualified workforce which would be attractive to 
potential investors.  
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Figure 6.18: Percent of the population over 25 with a bachelor's degree or higher in the Mon Valley 
municipalities, 2000
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Even more worryingly in 2000, some 8% of young people (16-19) were 
neither enrolled in, nor had finished high school. In some deprived 
municipalities, such as Rankin, Braddock and Duquesne this figure rises 
to over 20%. For individuals lacking even basic qualifications success in 
the labour market becomes even more unlikely. Poor attainment levels 
seem unlikely to improve in the near future, since the area’s School 
Districts all perform poorly (Gamrat and Haulk, 2003). Duquesne’s SAT 
scores were more than 300 below the national average in 2001 (67.9% of 
the national average), Clairton over 200 points below (80.2%), with 
Woodland Hills, McKeesport, and West Mifflin scoring better but still 
below the national level  at 90.3%, 92.1% and 92.4% respectively 
(Gamrat and Haulk, 2003; 9).  
 
As was described earlier these problems reflect the school system’s 
partial dependence on local funding. As a consequence, budgeting and 
performance issues in the poorer towns, led to the running of Clairton’s 
School District being taken over by the State, while Duquesne’s is under 
threat of being dissolved. The resulting poverty of opportunity was 
described by the director of the local CareerLink. 
 
The children don’t have the same kinds of 
opportunities for education as the kids in the 
more affluent communities. That in itself limits 
their opportunity. Plus the mindset of some of 
the parents, you know, is almost that they’re 
not encouraging because they don’t see a way 
out in some of these situations (Executive 
director, Allegheny County East and West 
CareerLink). 
 
The schools face more problem cases and violence, there is a high high-
school (and college) drop out rate, and many more children enter the 
schools system ‘troubled’ or ‘developmentally delayed’ (interview with 
the Executive Director, Mon Valley Education Consortium). There are 
also major concerns about the impacts of the economic changes on the 
aspirations of young people, who display increasingly pessimistic views  
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of the future, as explained by interviewees involved with non-profit 
organisations working with local children.   
 
The kids who come to our schools create a 
totally different environment than the kids who 
came to our schools 25 years ago…There are 
kids ready to succeed, and kids so far from 
being able to start that the schools see a 
polarisation in the skills levels of who’s walking 
in the door (Executive Director, Mon Valley 
Education Consortium). 
 
The problem is combining a lot of social and 
economic disadvantage with the educational 
system…Once they’re in school it’s usually too 
late for a lot of kids. I mean obviously they 
deserve a chance, they deserve an opportunity, 
they deserve all the resources. But very often, 
given the systems in education and curriculum, 
given the way they’re run, they’re not 
succeeding to take those jobs (Vice-president 
for Development, Heritage Health Foundation) 
 
Those more capable young people who do succeed are largely being 
‘educated to leave’, by learning skills for jobs that do not exist in the 
area (interview with the Vice-president for Development, Heritage 
Health Foundation). The Mon Valley Economic Development Strategy: 
workforce analysis found that the shortage of managerial and 
professional jobs in the Valley forces educated residents to seek 
employment away from the area, since the value of their ‘educational 
attainment will likely be lost in the Valley’ (Tripp Umbach, 2004; 17). 
Perversely however this polarisation, coupled with migration, means that 
where opportunities do exist locally they may go unfilled. This was a 
problem outlined by both a local political representative and a local 
economic development manager. 
 
I don’t know that our public education system 
does a good enough job. I don’t think it does a 
good enough job of preparing kids to enter into 
the workforce or for higher education. But 
there are often good jobs, good paying jobs,  
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that go unfilled because employers can’t find 
people with the right sets of skills. Increasingly 
I hear from employers that that’s a real 
problem; is that we’re not getting enough 
qualified applications, enough qualified 
applicants for these jobs (Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives, State Representative: District 
39) 
 
We’ve found a dearth of employees right here, 
and McKeesport has the highest unemployment 
rate in the region, the highest! Now you would 
think with the highest unemployment rate in 
the region, right across these tracks are 300 
unfilled requisitions for jobs starting at about 
$22,000 a year. How can you have an 
unemployment rate that is the highest in the 
region and a high school that generates 250 
graduates a year, and have 300 unfilled 
requisitions for jobs right in your own town? It’s 
because we’re not capable of doing those jobs. 
Is that the fault of the parent? The student? The 
educational system? I don’t know but that is a 
real issue that we do not have folks ready…In 
some cases they’re lost because they can’t 
handle the English language, they can’t read, 
they can’t write. They can use a computer but 
they can’t read or write, so there’s a complete 
disconnect between the educational system and 
the job opportunities. That’s a problem! (City 
Administrator and Director of McKeesport 
Community Development). 
 
Skills gaps have also been created by parents discouraging their children 
from entering vocational training in manufacturing, having been hurt by 
industry in the past.
123 This was commented upon by the director of the 
local CareerLink. 
 
There’s been a real prejudice against sending 
young people into the vocational training 
because the people are gun shy. They’re afraid 
that industry, they don’t trust industry, they 
don’t want their kids to go into manufacturing, 
                                                 
123 The image problem of the manufacturing sector in attracting workers was also 
flagged by the Mon Valley Economic Development Strategy (MVEDS): Final Report (Trip 
Umbach, 2004; 117).  
  292 
‘cos look what happened to us’. So there’s 
actually a shortage in some of the advanced 
manufacturing, kinds of things like biomedical, 
which is nowhere near the number of people 
employed, but it is a growing industry around 
here. But you talk to 9 out of 10 parents of a 
high school student they’re not sending their 
student towards vocation technical education 
(Executive director, Allegheny County East and 
West CareerLink).  
 
6.9   Regeneration? 
 
Northumberland 
 
In Northumberland the most important barrier to regeneration remains 
the lack of local demand for labour, since both physical and attitudinal 
barriers limit the role that travelling to work elsewhere might have in 
alleviating labour market disadvantage. The other related challenge lies 
in low aspirations and the normalisation of worklessness, which have 
become established in parts of the coalfield. Tackling this will require 
intensive work through schools, statutory agencies and central 
government. All of which must also be placed in the context of a 
population resistant to change.  
 
‘The loss of the pit therefore goes far beyond the loss of 
employment; it is the loss of a way of life, a culture. 
The greatest challenge is to replace that culture, over 
time, with new cultures relating to each of these areas. 
This challenge should not be underestimated in 
communities where there is reluctance to embrace 
change (Rural Coalfield Plan 2005-2010 Northumberland 
Strategic Partnership, 2005; 2)’.  
 
There has already been a significant public role in physical 
regeneration. On the positive side, the environmental damage caused 
by mining has largely been tackled. The area’s business infrastructure, 
in terms of facilities and business units, has improved. There has also 
been an increase in resources since 1997. Other aspects of physical  
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development, particularly the new house building, are linked more to 
outside economic pressures than to any indigenous regeneration or 
public intervention.  
 
A key future public transport infrastructure development will be the 
‘Stephenson Jobs Link’, which aims to connect a number of key 
employment sites in the A19 corridor in South East Northumberland and 
North Tyneside, including industrial parks, leisure services and retail 
parks (EDAW, 2002; 9). This will upgrade the bus transport 
infrastructure and interchange with the Metro (ibid, 2002; 39). It is also 
planned to be associated with the re-introduction of passenger trains 
along the freight lines between Ashington, Bedlington and West Blyth, 
improving access to North Tyneside. The South East Northumberland 
Public Transport Study concluded ‘that the re-introduction of passenger 
trains represented the most cost effective and feasible option, with 
good transport integration benefits’. This rail-link therefore forms a key 
aspect of the South East Northumberland – North Tyneside Regeneration 
Initiative (SENNTRI)
124. The national Strategic Rail Authority, however, 
cannot consider applications for financial support before 2009, and the 
proposed re-opening has been delayed until the 2011 Local Transport 
Plan, when it will again be considered (Provisional Northumberland 
Local Transport Plan 2006-11).  
 
The current regeneration priorities include providing premises and 
support for business incubation, workspace and support for SME growth; 
enhancing existing key employment sites (business parks); developing 
the key sectors of renewable energy and food and drink; and town 
centre development, in addition a significant role is planned for tourism 
(NSP Business, Enterprise and Skills plan, 2008; 23). There is little new 
about these approaches, however, which have so far had conspicuously 
limited success. More encouragingly perhaps, the geographical 
                                                 
124 Townsend and Hudson (2005; 57) similarly argue the importance of improving rail 
links between former mining areas and their proximate urban centres.  
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entrenchment of disadvantage is now being flagged as a major policy 
problem. Indeed, the Northumberland Strategic Partnership’s 
Sustainable Community Strategy 2021 specifically identifies the need 
for ‘differential support’ to disadvantaged communities. A central aim 
is to narrow the gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ (page 2). The 
strategy, however, is much less specific about how this will be 
achieved, beyond assigning a key role to improving learning and skills 
outcomes.
125 
 
The last 25 years can be characterised as a process of slow and partial 
adjustment, or adaptation, of the Northumberland coalfield area to its 
intensified economic peripherality. Such adjustment has occurred either 
through commuting to opportunities elsewhere, taking jobs which would 
once have been regarded as ‘women’s work’, or placing faith in 
education to secure better opportunities. Some communities, families 
and individuals, however, have not been adjusting. These need to be 
targeted by new mechanisms to raise aspirations, and address 
problematic cultural norms. For this a range of issues need addressing: 
The need for local jobs growth cannot be avoided. Increased commuting 
requires the removal of both physical transportation and attitudinal 
barriers. Aspirations need to be raised, and the education system needs 
to provide new generations with the skills and motivation to succeed.  
 
For the local economic development team in Wansbeck, the coalfield’s 
most deprived local authority, hope springs eternal in their LEGI vision 
that ‘By 2017 Wansbeck will be the most enterprising area in the 
region, characterised by high levels of self-employment, business 
creation and growth and private investment…the place to be for 
enterprise’ (GOWansbeck LEGI vision statement). After a period of very 
slow change over 20 years, such a radical turnaround in the next 10 
                                                 
125 Although the proposed learning park at Ashington is certainly a positive step if it 
can be successfully embedded in the community.  
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seems highly unlikely without continuing public resources and sustained 
support.  
 
Mon Valley 
 
In the Mon Valley some optimism has stemmed from the recent 
redevelopment of several of the mill sites, a painfully slow process 
because the Allegheny County government allowed US Steel to walk 
away from their environmental liabilities in exchange for transferring 
site ownership. Most of the sites are now developed or being developed, 
although they offer far fewer jobs than when they were making steel. 
There are 400 on the Regional Industrial Development Corporation 
(RIDC) industrial park occupying the old Duquesne works, and 1,500 at 
the former site of the National Works at McKeesport (Southwestern 
Pennsylvania Commission, 2005; 27-28).
126 While these physical 
developments are largely positive, the communities’ capacities, which 
were decimated by closures, have not in any sense been rebuilt. As we 
have seen, they are now less skilled, more deprived, and their internal 
relationships are more fractious than ever. 
 
Some promising local schemes helped by the non-profit Mon Valley 
Initiative have begun small-scale house building programmes, and some 
rehabilitation of derelict properties, to improve housing stock and 
attract people into the areas. These houses are subsidised and offer 
attractive and affordable accommodation. In Clairton, 44 lease-to-own 
homes and 23 single family homes had been built on a plot which had 
contained 35 condemned houses. In the other towns the scale has been 
much smaller and progress slower. In McKeesport, the city plans to 
spend around $2 million on demolishing more than 300 derelict buildings 
(McKeesport Renaissance Plan, 2005). Such projects offer a chance to 
redress some of the imbalances in the local housing markets and attract 
some new residents, but they represent a fraction of what is required. 
                                                 
126 It is not clear how far the jobs created were filled by local people.   
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The small steps approach is partly necessitated by the priority for 
County funds being directed more to Pittsburgh and the airport than to 
the Mon Valley. Regeneration in the Valley has therefore remained 
severely under-funded, as the director of the local CareerLink 
explained. 
 
I think if you would talk to every politician in 
this county, even the federal, the senators, the 
congressmen would say, ‘yes it’s a priority to 
rebuild the Mon Valley’, but we really haven’t 
seen the concerted effort in the coordinated 
rebuilding of the Valley…it’s really the Mon 
Valley has been left kind of to languish 
(Executive director, Allegheny County East and 
West CareerLink). 
 
While municipal revenues have begun to climb back towards their pre-
closure levels much of this growth has been financed by increasing 
taxes on service provisions, such as waste services, and permits and 
licences, rather than through wage or business taxes. Expenditure 
remains below pre-closure levels as accumulated debts are repaid, with 
little spending on local regeneration or the renewal of infrastructure.  
 
Several more local issues have also limited the prospects for 
regeneration, reflecting the area’s continuing institutional inertia. 
Firstly, as a historical relic, governments in the Valley are fragmented 
into the many, very small municipalities. Some mechanisms have been 
put in place recently to help inter-municipal cooperation, but 
significant barriers remain.
127 Under the present structure it is very 
difficult to develop coherent plans for the regeneration of the whole 
Valley, with problems tending to be tackled in a bit-part manner. 
Fragmentation also means that services are not delivered most 
efficiently; most towns provide their own emergency and other 
                                                 
127 Council’s of Governments (COGs) have been established covering small 
geographical groups (usually of around 5 municipalities) with the aim of fostering 
cooperation. There is however little evidence of their success.   
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services. This problem is described by both those from a strategic 
perspective and local residents themselves. 
 
It doesn’t appear that it’s a coordinated effort. 
I think that’s something that’s really held the 
area back, because we’re structured with all 
these little municipalities, or even big 
municipalities like McKeesport who are often 
vying for the same company or for the same 
limited resources. I think it’s held the 
redevelopment of the area back. If there was a 
more coordinated effort towards the 
redevelopment, rather than competitive, I think 
it would probably have just benefited the entire 
area more (Executive director, Allegheny County 
East and West CareerLink).  
 
Everybody wants their own control, and when 
you look at it it’s really kind of ridiculous…it’s 
very unlikely that you’re going to get North 
Braddock to cooperate with Braddock. Chances 
are somebody’s going to say “why should we 
work with Braddock?”. You know “they have 
their own money, they get money for this, they 
get money for that”, but in reality if you would 
merge the services, if you would merge the 
towns - and it’s been talked about but nobody 
actually wants to do it, nobody wants to give up 
control - It would probably be run much more 
efficiently (Member, North Braddock CARES). 
 
Because of the way local taxation is raised, this even extends into local 
competition for private investment, the destructive nature of which 
was recounted by an economic development manager. 
 
If it’s a choice between a job in your town or my 
town, I compete with you. We have literally, 
and I have been in those negotiations, thrown 
more money at industry than we needed to have 
them locate a factory, simply because we want a 
factory in our town. And once the factory’s 
located I’m not convinced that the employment 
benefit to the region in a macro sense improved 
one iota, not one bit (City Administrator and 
Director of McKeesport Community 
Development).   
  298 
 
These institutional structures, while clearly flawed, have remained 
remarkably robust for two reasons. First, there is the reticence of the 
remnants of the older communities to embrace change. Secondly, there 
is the self-interest of municipalities in not wanting to share the benefits 
of development with communities who are poorer and perceived to be 
more problematic. 
 
Few of the senior municipal administrative and elected officials 
surveyed by the Mon Valley Economic Development Strategy’s SWOT 
Analysis were in favour of consolidating the municipalities, though some 
saw the sense in consolidating some services (Tripp Umbach, 2004; 51-
52). This barrier to regeneration therefore seems unlikely to be 
resolved in the near future. While some argue that such intense 
localism is democratic, the turnout rate of 23% of registered voters for 
the Mon Valley’s 2005 mayoral elections suggests that the majority of 
the population may actually be apathetic to local municipal control.
128 
 
The voluntary nature of municipal governments also represents a big 
problem, with the people in elected positions often lacking expertise to 
cope with the complex situations their towns face. Indeed, almost 90% 
of the senior municipal administrative and elected officials surveyed by 
the MVEDS Analysis said their municipality had no formal economic 
development plan or strategy (Tripp Umbach, 2004; 38). The serious 
problem this poses were outlined in the views of a development 
manager in a local non-profit organisation, and a local community 
activist. 
 
One of the challenges are volunteer 
governments. Very often they don’t work 
because they don’t spend enough time doing 
strategic thinking, or even becoming well 
enough informed about the situations that 
                                                 
128 Figure refers to all those municipalities who had mayoral contests in 2005 
(www.county.allegheny.pa.us/elect). Only 82% of the Valley’s population aged 18 and 
over are registered voters. In the mill towns the voter turnout rate was just 19%.  
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they’re deciding about. I mean it’s just; you put 
the least prepared people into the most 
challenging situation. When all you had to do 
was ask the steel company to come out and fix 
the sewer and pay for new doors on the fire 
house, or something like that, it didn’t take 
much to run a government. But that went away. 
So it’s much harder to manage now. So that’s 
lack of strategic thinking there; volunteer 
governments…mayors and the councils, they 
meet once a month, sometimes twice, maybe 
they’ll have a committee meeting sometime, 
usually not much more than that. They rely on 
the solicitor then whose main job it is to keep 
them out of trouble, so they won’t be doing 
anything very bold most of the time. So there 
just seems to be a mindset of keeping things 
from happening in order to stay out of trouble, 
political trouble and legal trouble, ‘Cos people 
like to stay elected, a position even like that. 
They may not have any regional prestige but 
people don’t like to see themselves booted out 
of a position like that (Vice-president for 
Development, Heritage Health Foundation). 
 
They all get perks. It’s not a thankless job, they 
get stuff, they get little patronage jobs they 
can get somebody, a little petty power, so 
there’s just tons of interest in that. They get 
rewards from their jobs. Now you ask them to 
deal with the real fundamental problems of 
their community, which is no good jobs, then 
they get pitiful because everything they’ve done 
has just led to nowhere. And in 20 years trying 
to pretty things up, change the names of stuff, 
it just hasn’t attracted money to invest (Co-
director, Mon Valley Unemployed Committee, 
former worker Homestead Works). 
 
This lack of leadership in the mill towns has not helped their 
regeneration  prospects. Even when there have been plans for 
redevelopment they have often not been executed as explained by 
frustrated local residents. 
 
The steering committee was very pleased with 
that. However, the County never adopted that 
study; it’s still considered a draft. So five years  
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have gone into a study that is sitting on a shelf, 
and the County agreed to purchase the 
property. So they purchased it, and now their 
next step is, ‘what do we do with this 
property?’  Well you should pick up that study 
and see what we should do with that property! 
If this type of thing continues to happen then 
we will get nowhere, we will not have 
development, we will not have progress 
(Member, North Braddock CARES) 
 
The last comprehensive plan they had was in 
1994, and they never used it. So, what were 
you planning? What were you in office to do? 
It’s just beyond me…All of those years 
(Councilman, City of Clairton, Clairton 
Community Development Corporation (CDC) 
member)  
 
A further complication is the many dissenting views apparent among 
stakeholders about regeneration strategies and the type of development 
which would be most suitable for the Valley. This is most evident in 
arguments over the use of former mill sites, particularly in the 
transformation of the old Homestead works site into a large retail park. 
These debates centred on the quality of the jobs, the fact that the 
Waterfront development is separate from the rest of Homestead, and 
the extent to which business has been taken from Homestead’s main 
street. For those who made the decisions the strategy was driven by 
necessity. As the Mayor of one of the municipalities involved explained, 
there was no other investment on offer:  
 
Maybe the wages aren’t the greatest but there 
are jobs, you know. It’s a positive as far as I’m 
concerned. Naturally the deal that was made in 
98 wasn’t ideal for the towns and all that, but 
it was a deal, and it’s something that’s got to 
work. As I said, you didn’t have nothing back 
then, so how can beggars be choosy? (Mayor, 
Munhall).
129 
                                                 
129 In a community meeting the mayor revealed that the towns had very little say in 
the planning of the Waterfront and were dictated to by the owners/planners of the 
site. (Serrin meeting, 24/3/06). The development was funded through Tax Increment  
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What is quite clear though is that the development links poorly to the 
town, being separated from it by a busy rail freight line, and offers 
little of benefit to its people, with few of the jobs going to local 
residents. In the views of local community activists:  
 
It’s almost as if there is two Homestead’s now, 
there is the Waterfront Homestead, and then 
there’s the rest (Founding member, Homestead 
Economic Redevelopment Corporation (HERC)). 
 
They rebuild the bridge so you can get on and 
off without having to touch the dirty town. I 
mean what the hell, everybody just considers 
Homestead to be full of drug dealers and killers 
and shit. I mean there’s like this really bad 
image of the town around the region (Co-
director, Mon Valley Unemployed Committee, 
former worker Homestead Works). 
 
It’s destination shopping, people wake up on a 
Saturday morning and they’re going to the 
Waterfront. They’re not out for the day, 
they’re not going to Homestead, they’re going 
to the Waterfront. And so in that regard there 
is practically zero impact from having the 
Waterfront in conjunction to 8th 
Avenue (Chairman, Homestead Economic 
Redevelopment Corporation (HERC)). 
 
In the future it was felt that the proposed Mon-Fayette Expressway 
through the Valley which will link Pittsburgh with Interstate 68 in West 
Virginia would aid regeneration, though there are still route issues to be 
resolved before building begins and it seems certain to damage 
liveability further in some communities. The Expressway was first 
planned in the 1950s, however, so some have reservations about 
whether it will ever actually be built. There are also some plans to 
introduce a passenger rail link through the mill sites but these are at a 
very early stage.  
                                                                                                                                  
Financing (TIF) which means the towns receive only partial tax revenues from the site, 
the rest going to the developer.  
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While much of the talk on Mon Valley regeneration is on attracting good 
jobs, there is now a different population in place, for many of whom 
jobs growth alone would not be insufficient. The local employment base 
is also still shrinking. Jobs growth is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for regeneration. The integration of disadvantaged groups 
into the labour market must also be addressed, as well as many other 
social, skills and educational issues. So far, much less official thought 
has been given to these aspects of renewal.  
 
6.10   Summary conclusions  
 
Neither of the study areas recovered from the shocks of the 1980s in 
the following decade. Local demand for labour had not improved 
sufficiently, and in many respects the social and economic problems 
became worse as patterns of socio-spatial marginalisation became more 
entrenched and extreme.  
 
In both areas there were continuing elements of inertia. In the Mon 
Valley many people have physically moved on, but the infrastructures 
and institutions responsible for economic and social development have 
remained rooted in the industrial era. Such structures are now wholly 
inappropriate to deal with contemporary problems. In Northumberland, 
elements of the population have remained in stasis, with old attitudes 
to work and commuting persisting. This is exacerbated by new norms of 
worklessness in parts of the coalfield, based on the long-term direct 
and indirect effects of decreased local demand for labour and 
increasing numbers relying on benefits. The combination of these 
perpetuates a culture of low aspirations.  
 
In both areas, there has been a real sense of the de-bounding of 
communities as the former, relatively coherent, industrial communities  
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were replaced and challenged by new social trends and migration 
patterns, creating new tensions.  
 
The public welfare context continues to exert a strong effect on 
development. While some parts of Northumberland have been and are 
continuing to adjust, public welfare is still propping up many 
communities through the provision of benefits and public goods. The 
fundamental problem of the poor local opportunity structure, however, 
is not being addressed.  In the Mon Valley many communities remain 
under-resourced and rudderless. While the mill sites are redeveloped, 
the town’s infrastructure continues to decline, and they continue to 
lose jobs and population.  
 
There has been a distinct geography to the long-term effects of 
deindustrialisation in both areas. Parts of Northumberland have become 
commuter and tourist areas, and parts of the Mon Valley centres of 
consumption. The localities and communities who were most vulnerable 
however, have over last 25 years seen an increasing cumulative and 
structural concentration of disadvantage. As processes of selective 
migration, housing market sorting, dependency on public welfare and 
social and economic deprivation have become focused on specific areas, 
particularly the older industrial wards of Blyth and Ashington in 
Northumberland, and the mill towns in the Mon Valley.  
 
While serious social problems have developed in both areas they remain 
more acute and intractable in the Mon Valley. Massive out-migration has 
left a collapsed housing market. Combined with changing Federal 
housing policy, this has attracted in-migration, which has generally 
imported the problems of the working poor and welfare dependent from 
elsewhere in the region. There is thus a central difference in the 
experience of the two study regions: the Mon Valley’s long-term 
problems have been largely imported from elsewhere, and are the 
result of the broader failure of American social policy. In  
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Northumberland such problems have developed in-place, thus 
representing a failure to deal more specifically with the consequences 
of industrial decline. 
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Chapter 7) Conclusions: deindustrialisation past and 
present 
 
This chapter draws together the key findings from the research and 
reviews their wider conceptual significance. This relates, firstly, to the 
critical influence revealed by the international comparison of national 
models of political economy on local restructuring processes. Secondly, 
the concept of deindustrialisation is revisited and augmented, 
accounting for contemporary insights arising from the long-term 
perspective adopted in this study.   
 
7.1 Key findings of the research 
 
Following community experiences through, from the huge shocks of the 
1980s to the present, has allowed a comparatively long-term, structural 
interpretation of current conditions in the two regions to be developed. 
This has challenged those, like Murray (1996), who ascribe social 
malaise in deprived areas to the growing incidence of individual 
recklessness, which I believe to be symptom rather than cause. Social 
problems in the study areas must be placed in their historical context if 
we are to gain a fuller understanding of their present situation. 
 
A long-term perspective is important for several reasons. First, 
employment disadvantage in both areas has arisen through a 
combination of historical processes and attitudes and the emergence of 
new norms and social trends over the period since deindustrialisation. 
In the Mon Valley change has been dominated by migration 
relationships, while in Northumberland we have seen the damaging 
impacts of increased in-situ levels of worklessness. The transformation 
of these communities has moved beyond the static cultural situation in 
which they are often portrayed. Secondly, while the crisis began with a 
loss of jobs in both areas, in neither is employment creation now a  
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sufficient remedy. The populations are now very different from those 
initially affected.  Modern problems of low aspirations, poor 
motivations and qualifications, require both intensive demand and 
supply-side interventions, rather than the often polarised prescriptions 
between one or the other of past debate.  
 
Thirdly, the longer-term perspective adopted here has allowed the 
persistence of some remnants of past social structures and cultures to 
be gauged, these add to the complexity of the task required to remedy 
current problems. Examples include local government institutional 
arrangements in the Mon Valley, and elements of cultural lock-in in 
Northumberland. Lastly, regeneration policies must be sensitive to 
these issues. They need directly to address the difficulties of 
community relations and institutional inertia in the Mon Valley, and the 
cultural stasis, founded on the damaging results of worklessness in 
Northumberland. All these issues reflect both the origins and 
subsequent consequences of deindustrialisation.  
 
In both areas, the initial responses of individuals to deindustrialisation 
clearly had long-term implications for their future development 
prospects. Lacking what they considered to be a reasonable alternative, 
many workers withdrew from the local labour market, especially onto 
sickness benefits in Northumberland, and through out-migration from 
the Mon Valley. In Northumberland the sickness benefits system created 
an institutional infrastructure and local knowledge base directed 
towards benefit claiming which proved highly significant in the area’s 
subsequent development. As the area continued to lose skilled trade 
jobs and basic factory employment during the 1990s, claiming sickness 
benefits extended to other sets of manual workers and to younger 
cohorts. This was most characteristic of particular localities, where 
worklessness became normalised among social networks of peers and 
extended families, shaping the aspirations, motivations and 
expectations of work among the next generation.    
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In the Mon Valley, the longer-term impacts of migration left a collapsed 
housing market, which drove a social-demographic shift as the working 
class population was replaced by incomers more dependent on benefits 
or marginal employment. Problems were therefore imported from 
elsewhere to compound those originating locally from job losses. These 
in-migration flows were encouraged by changing federal housing policy, 
including its withdrawal from public housing provision.  
 
In neither area, however, is the story simply one of collapse. There is a 
locally varied geography of change. For example, parts of 
Northumberland have become commuter and tourist areas, and parts of 
the Mon Valley centres of consumption. In many respects, however, 
these apparently positive developments have concentrated 
disadvantage and deprivation, intensifying the longer-term impacts of 
deindustrialisation. They have ostensibly functioned to bypass the 
intractability of local needs by selectively linking more attractive areas 
to outside networks of commuting, consumption or tourism. Such 
developments have never offered effective substitutes for the types of 
jobs required to support the local economies. On the other hand, for 
the most vulnerable localities and communities, the last 25 years have 
seen an increasingly cumulative and structural concentration of 
disadvantage, as processes of selective migration, housing market 
sorting, dependency on public welfare, and social and economic 
deprivation became geographically focused. In Northumberland this is 
most obviously in the older industrial areas of Ashington and Blyth, as 
well as some of the more peripheral villages, while in the Mon Valley it 
is highly concentrated in the mill towns. These have become areas of 
structural decline and stubborn worklessness. 
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7.2 Reflections on the research questions 
 
Some potential drivers of patterns of labour market restructuring, 
derived from past research, were discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. These 
related largely to the role of local work cultures in industrial 
communities, and particularly their inter-generational dissemination. 
This was framed within a structure of both the local demand for labour 
established by private investment decision-making, and the constraints 
of the public welfare system. As the research progressed, it became 
clear that the important differences in restructuring tended to derive 
more strongly from national policies and attitudes than much past 
literature has acknowledged. In summary, two important drivers can be 
identified. First, differences in the respective public welfare systems 
have been critical, especially the greater role of publicly funded 
regeneration in the UK, the availability of welfare benefits (particularly 
Incapacity Benefits) and the universal National Health Service. A second 
driver relates more to national attitudes towards economic change and 
labour mobility. In the US there is a greater degree of commodification 
of place, with a historical emphasis on labour mobility complementing 
the mobility of capital in processes of accumulation. These cultural 
differences are the result of historical experience actively reproduced 
by contemporary state policies.  
 
The initial research questions were somewhat exploratory, and 
reflected the proposed focus on household responses and coping 
mechanisms leading into longer-term development trajectories. In many 
respects the prefix to question 4 (pages 19-20) about national 
differences came to permeate all the other research questions. The 
expanded focus on community and locality change also meant that some 
processes which could have been investigated through a household 
study, for example changes in the domestic division of labour, could no 
longer be examined in detail.  
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While the research evidence partially validates how the original 
questions were formulated, the national political economic models 
impacted across the range of questions even more strongly than was 
anticipated. This was largely a consequence of the long-term 
comparative nature of the study, and the resulting emphasis on 
structural processes rather than short-term particularities. National 
characteristics influenced the form taken by ‘recovery’, and set the 
context for labour market decision-making in profound ways. They also 
created different longer-term patterns of development in both study 
areas.  
 
The re-presentation of the questions as the research developed 
therefore placed more emphasis on comparison of the dominant 
national political-economic models in the UK and the US during the 25 
year period. More specifically it focused on how these models, and 
changes within them, affected: 
 
■  Workers’ initial labour market decisions about taking employment 
or remaining unemployed, migrating or out-commuting.  
 
■  The extent to which deindustrialised local labour markets have 
recovered in the period since closures. 
 
■  Different segments of the labour market.  
 
■  And, critically, how the impacts of short-term labour market 
restructuring, driven by industrial workers’ decision-making, 
influenced longer-term outcomes.  
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7.3 Initial decisions and longer-term patterns of change  
 
Lack of local demand 
 
Initial individual decisions have to be seen in the context of how much, 
and also what type of work was available locally. Declining employment 
levels were clearly important, but there was also an increase in female 
labour supply in both areas. The type of work available was particularly 
significant for areas previously dominated by heavy industry because of 
the cultural norms that had accompanied this type of employment, 
based on the masculinity of heavy work and the male breadwinner 
model. In both study areas local demand for labour has never recovered 
from the shocks of the 1980s. The numbers of jobs in Northumberland 
fell by around 5% between 1981 and 2001, but the numbers of male jobs 
declined by a quarter as female employment rose sharply. In the Mon 
Valley the number of both male and female jobs continues to decline, 
with little indication that the trend will abate in the foreseeable future.  
 
The public welfare context 
 
The public welfare systems in each country were key determinants in 
the labour market adjustment processes. These encompass not just 
benefits and healthcare, but also education, economic development 
and housing. In Northumberland many aspects of the public welfare 
system encouraged, or at least allowed, people to remain and cope ‘in-
place’. The availability of Incapacity Benefit especially presented an 
exit strategy from the labour market for former miners, enabling 
individuals to cope financially without having to look for alternative 
work.  The level of redundancy payments also meant that some bought 
their homes, further limiting their prospects for future mobility. In the 
Mon Valley, in the absence of such provision, and with much lower 
redundancy payments, finding alternative work at the time of closures 
was essential, even if this meant moving away. These differing welfare  
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contexts were reinforced by national healthcare provisions. In the 
absence of universal coverage, the need to pay premiums was an 
important stimulus to finding alternative employment in the Mon Valley.  
 
These welfare differences have also exerted a strong longer-term 
influence, although in somewhat different ways. In Northumberland, 
the availability of benefits, including IB, Jobseeker's Allowance and 
Income Support, continued to enable people to cope without work ‘in-
place’. Much of the benefit dependent population now also live in social 
housing, which adds to their immobility because of the difficulties 
associated with transfers to other areas.  
 
In the Mon Valley, a stronger impetus has remained to take any 
available work, even for low wages in contingent employment. The 
growing importance of the housing voucher system has also tended to 
make those dependent on welfare more geographically mobile. They 
are nevertheless also liable to be attracted to the most deprived 
communities because of the greater availability of housing from 
landlords willing to let to them. This caused an influx of welfare 
dependents into the Mon Valley, and particularly to the mill towns, as 
their housing markets collapsed. 
  
This research has highlighted contrasted deficiencies in the public 
welfare system in both countries. In neither case have the outcomes 
been beneficial. In Northumberland public welfare did not go far 
enough. It attempted a ‘sticking plaster’ approach by affording some 
maintenance of incomes, public sector employment, environmental 
improvements and limited private investment. More expansionary job 
creation programmes were needed at the time, offering sustainable 
outcomes for former industrial workers. Effectively writing off a 
generation of workers, by diverting them from unemployment to 
sickness benefits, has had unintended consequences. In the Mon Valley, 
the lack of any real form of support has created an ongoing cumulative  
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process of declining infrastructure, education and environment in many 
of the towns, leaving, and also attracting from outside, a residual 
population living on the margins. 
 
It is however important to separate the individual from the community 
impacts of the two welfare systems. The US model perhaps better 
served some of those workers who originally lost employment. Many left 
in search of better opportunities, while others moved into alternative 
industries locally. Even though these were often low-waged, this kept 
an attachment to the labour market which, in some cases, could be 
built upon. Generally these workers did not suffer the stasis associated 
with the structures of public welfare and culture in Northumberland. 
Problems imported from elsewhere or developed locally, however, for 
example for black workers unable to access alternative employment, 
reflect a broader deficiency in American welfare and society.  Rather 
than a specific inability to cope with industrial decline, this is the 
failure to provide opportunities for the most disadvantaged citizens. In 
Northumberland, welfare failings more directly reflect the response to 
industrial decline. This raises questions about the multiple criteria 
required to evaluate the effectiveness of welfare policy in different 
areas of chronic decline. 
 
Cultural influences 
 
Much has been made in past commentaries about the importance of 
understanding the culture of mono-industrial communities. This is 
certainly significant, but the extent to which culture outlives location 
change depends in part on the public welfare systems that sustain it. 
Culture develops within the boundaries of economic opportunity, and 
cannot be presented as a stable, totalising structure. It is fluid and 
contingent. 
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In Northumberland cultural attitudes present themselves most obviously 
in approaches towards both education and commuting. In the Mon 
Valley they are manifested most strongly in institutional structures, and 
reluctance to alter decision-making arrangements that are entirely 
inappropriate for the huge challenges they face.  
 
In Northumberland in the period after closures, attitudes towards work 
were built on the previous reliance on well-paid male employment. 
Initially, former miners would often not entertain the idea of going into 
service sector, or ‘women’s work’. In the Mon Valley however, 
economic necessities often overruled such attitudes. In 
Northumberland, there was also a tendency to compare wages in 
alternative work with what had previously been earned. In contrast, the 
comparator in the Mon Valley was most likely to be what could 
otherwise be earned (i.e., nothing). ‘Culture’ therefore operates within 
the confines of specific economic and public welfare situations. In 
Northumberland the combination of higher redundancy payments and 
the availability of universal healthcare and benefits gave workers much 
more of a choice over whether to work and what types of work they 
would do, than was the case in the Mon Valley. 
 
These cultural attitudes from the industrial era did not only affect 
initial responses to restructuring. They have been modified, and in 
some ways intensified, by new developments. For older workers in 
Northumberland, attitudes to commuting may be linked to the area’s 
economic history and past life/work arrangements based on mine work. 
Subsequent attitudes may be traced partially to the same received 
wisdom about work. But they have also been increasingly linked to new 
patterns, involving low aspirations, engagement and motivation, arising 
from the continuing area and inter-generational effects of localised 
worklessness in some areas of the coalfield.  
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In the Mon Valley, the inertia of institutional responses to change may 
be seen in part as reflecting the attitudes of the older generations to 
preserve the structures that historically appeared to served them well. 
But these structures have lost their economic and tax-base support, and 
become subject to new rationales of self-interest, including strong 
prejudices about race and economic standing.   
 
The longer-term perspective 
 
Much of the literature on social and economic deprivation in 
deindustrialised areas is implicitly path-dependent, in that it generally 
assigns causality to the disappearance of old industries. Few though 
give much thought though to the actual mechanisms of transition, from 
past hardworking industrial communities to today’s places of economic 
and social deprivation. Examination of initial responses to closure, and 
subsequent transmission effects and their longer-term impacts, provides 
a much fuller explanation of what is meant by path-dependent 
development. It also links the community studies of deindustrialisation 
undertaken during the 1980s, for example by Bluestone and Harrison 
(1982), Cunningham and Martz (1986), and Weiss (1990), with more 
recent studies of contemporary spatial patterns of disadvantage which 
leave temporal processes implicit. The particular form taken by path-
dependent development, however, is important. This is because the 
difficulties of regenerating, or re-regulating, these economies today 
arise both from an inheritance of institutional lock-in, and new sets of 
structural constraints on social and economic action developed over a 
long period.  
 
The outcomes of the closures for individual workers were highly 
structured according to skill levels, age, and, in the Mon Valley, race. In 
the longer-term, low demand for labour, and the initial responses to job 
losses, provided the context for the establishment of a set of new 
structural determinants. A low aspirations culture developed in many  
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communities, determining how people perceived work opportunities, 
education, and commuting. The emergence of these new social 
structures, and the processes supporting their development, are lacking 
in much of the research literature. The explanations for the current 
deprived state of these areas clearly cannot simply be ascribed to 
increased recklessness or idleness of individuals or households in 
particular communities. In Northumberland, poor opportunities in the 
local labour market, and the inter-generational and area effects of 
living in such areas of disadvantage, have increasingly structured work 
decisions over time. While Bourdieu (1981) describes working class 
aspiration formation, and Hudson (2004; 463) writes of “people like us”, 
what is now required is more detailed exploration of aspiration 
formation among workless households and how this is, and has become, 
historically embedded. 
 
Past conceptions of institutional lock-in are also too simplistic. Some 
aspects of lock-in described in this study have been observed 
elsewhere, for example in the reluctance to commute in 
Northumberland, also described by Hudson (2005) and Waddington 
(2003). There are also new facets to consider, however, in the 
normalisation of worklessness and benefit dependency, or the 
acceptance of the deprived condition in parts of the study areas. These 
are social characteristics that may prove even more difficult to change 
than those observed in the past.   
 
Furthermore, in some instances where cases of lock-in have looked 
superficially robust, they now appear to have a different underlying 
causality. For example, commuting behaviour in Northumberland is no 
longer primarily informed by previous household experiences, but by 
low aspirations and highly localised activity spaces, resulting from a 
lack of household resources. These are reinforced by the inadequacy 
and insensitivity to local needs of public transport services. Similarly, 
the reluctance to change government structures in the Mon Valley is no  
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longer primarily linked to local civic pride and company advantage, but 
rather more to self-interest over resources, itself driven by inter-
locality competition.  
 
7.4   Prospects  
 
Similarities 
 
A substantial degree of employment disadvantage already existed in 
both areas before the closures of the 1980s. Within both areas, the map 
of inequality has been redrawn very little over the last 25 years. In the 
context of a general area decline, however, those beginning from the 
lowest base, the most vulnerable communities, have been left in 
severest distress, as processes of economic sorting through the housing 
market, exacerbated by state policy, have intensified areas of acute 
labour market disadvantage.  
 
In both areas the longer-term impacts of industrial decline have 
prevented sections of their populations from adjusting to the new 
realities, through a lack of the skills required to access employment 
opportunities. The loss of local entry-level manual jobs has served to 
marginalise sections of the population and has concentrated social and 
economic disadvantage. Furthermore the geographical concentrations 
of disadvantage which have been created have become vicious self-
reinforcing cycles.  
 
Some localities have become places of worklessness, with high 
unemployment, inactivity and benefit claiming. Poor educational 
attainment, low car ownership, and limited financial resources combine 
with low aspirations to severely limit access to non-local employment 
opportunities. There is also typically a greater incidence of social 
problems, including crime, drugs and alcohol abuse, and teenage 
pregnancy. Low-skill service sector and production employment leaves  
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many residents failing into the cycle between unemployment and low-
wage jobs. In such circumstances, economic and social mobility is 
extremely difficult, and it hardly surprising that aspirations and 
motivations remain low. In Northumberland this encourages the retreat 
to the benefits system. In the Mon Valley, those affected carry on a 
marginal existence, with some eligible for limited welfare benefits 
while others struggle in various forms of contingent or informal work 
paying poverty wages.  
 
Differences 
 
While similar types of problems have resulted from industrial change in 
both areas, there remain important differences. In Northumberland the 
multiplier effects of industrial decline have tended to be somewhat less 
severe. The loss of local jobs has been less pronounced, though more 
gendered, as government policy at the time of closures was partly 
successful in increasing demand for female labour. The physical 
manifestations of decline are also much less obvious because of the 
funding mechanisms of local government and the use of national 
resources for physical regeneration. In contrast, in the Mon Valley the 
physical run-down, the failure of the school systems, and the lack of 
public money to address these problems, has created an even more 
challenging environment for development. The area’s economy 
continues to decline and there is little sign this is about to be arrested, 
let alone turned around. Here, regeneration remains a depressingly 
distant prospect. 
 
7.5 The failure of state planning  
 
In both countries lack of coherent public planning and effective early 
demand-side action meant industrial decline became a cumulative 
structural process. While in the Mon Valley the largely ‘hands off’ 
stance adopted by the federal, state and county governments left dire  
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conditions for those who could not, or would not, migrate, in 
Northumberland the income maintenance offered by sicknesses benefits 
was no substitute for a concerted and well-funded expansionary policy 
for employment creation. 
 
In the longer-term, where planning has attempted to boost local 
demand in both regions it has generally been aimed at attracting low-
skilled, low-wage employment, for example in unskilled production 
processes, healthcare or call centres. This created a process of 
deskilling, as high level, though industry specific, skills have not been 
replaced with new capabilities to attract new investment. Furthermore, 
increasingly competitive inter-locality relationships in both countries 
have left deprived and peripheral places, such as the Northumberland 
coalfield and the Mon Valley, at a distinct disadvantage in competing 
for both private and public sector investments. 
 
Where developments are occurring they are generally happening much 
too slowly. In Northumberland there has been some adjustment, with 
commuting increasing slowly and the educational attainment of younger 
generations showing some improvement, but progress in the most 
deprived communities is painfully slow. In the Mon Valley, small pockets 
of new house building and rehabilitation, and some redevelopment of 
mill sites, indicate that something is happening, but not at a pace 
anywhere near that which would begin to suggest regeneration.  
 
It is therefore clear that there has been no self-righting of the labour 
market. Instead a new, more troublesome equilibrium has been 
established, with the creation of pockets of hopelessness where people 
feel disengaged from the labour market, and from society itself. Much 
more is therefore required to address these problems and turn around 
the new culture of deprivation. There is a pressing need for both supply 
and demand side action. Too often in recent debates commentators 
have polarised these policy interventions. While lack of jobs was the  
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root cause of the problems, stimulating labour demand would now no 
longer be enough. The characteristics of the local populations have 
changed, either in-situ or through migration, and there are real 
questions over the employability of significant numbers in some 
communities, even if the jobs were available. When Peck and Theodore 
argue that it is not the will to work which has changed dramatically in 
high unemployment areas but simply the availability of jobs, they over-
simplify the situation (2000; 731-733). In both study areas, a sizeable 
number of residents are so detached from the labour market that 
worklessness has become normalised. Supply-side measures are 
therefore of real importance, even though demand boosts are also 
clearly required. Their current incarnation, however, pushing people 
into ‘crap jobs’, simply perpetuates the problems of these localities.  A 
more holistic approach is required that addresses aspirations to work 
and equips people with the skills to access opportunities which offer 
better sustainable prospects.  
 
7.6 Key conceptual insights I: Models of national political-economy 
 
The divergent experiences of the two case study areas, in which similar 
processes of industrial decline have created radically different patterns 
of labour market restructuring, largely reflect differences in their 
respective national political-economic systems. More specifically, their 
modes of regulation both strongly influenced initial processes of labour 
market restructuring and continued to shape subsequent development. 
Within this national frame there are of course elements of local 
specificity and the causal structures are only realised under certain 
circumstances, specifically in this case under radical industrial decline.  
 
The significance of national political economic systems for 
geographically uneven development arises from the tensions that 
always need to be resolved between the differing interests of capital, 
as they are manifested spatially. This resolution is performed by  
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constructing an ‘imagined general interest’ which necessarily 
prioritises some interests and ‘spatio-temporal horizons’, while 
marginalising others (Jessop, 2001b; 13-14 also Cox, 2004; 251). This 
‘imagined general interest’ frames the limits of state involvement. In 
the 1980s it resulted in the conscious abandonment of state help for 
‘old industries’ and, in the US at least, old industrial regions, with a 
shift towards those regions and industries which were perceived to be 
in the vanguard of economic development in the ‘post-fordist’ 
period
130. These regions and industries were typically socially, and 
often geographically, distant from the old industrial regions (see Scott 
1998).  
 
Nationally formulated policies therefore had geographically diverse and 
divisive effects, as some regions were favoured by national 
accumulation strategies (Cox, 2004; 251; MacLeod, 2004; 77). The south 
east of England, for example, occupied a privileged position in the 
1980s (and since) as it became a ‘spatially selected strategically 
significant region within the UK national project’, being the main 
beneficiary of government R and D defence spending, tax cuts, training 
policy and mortgage relief (Jones, 1997 cited in MacLeod, 1997; 545; 
Peck and Tickell, 1995; 28; see also Jessop, 2001b).  
 
Uneven development must however be regulated, or ‘contained’ by the 
national mode of social regulation, and this process has proved to be a 
key distinction between the two countries. In the UK the ‘regulatory 
deficit’ associated with such dominant spatial privileging created a 
complementary need to be seen to be addressing the problems of 
regions which were not ‘strategically significant’, notably through 
publicly funded regeneration. An example of this was the Urban 
                                                 
130 Some 40 years previously, in the immediate post-war period, the study regions 
were themselves being prioritised as areas of production at the centre of the national 
interest as a result of their strategic importance in national defence. Coalmining in 
the UK, and steel production in the Mon Valley (the Homestead works produced 
plating for Naval submarines) were considered strategically important in maintaining 
military capabilities.   
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Development Corporations (UDCs), established by the Thatcher 
government and driven by a perceived ‘legitimation requirement’ that 
something needed to be seen to be done to tackle inner-city problems 
(Goodwin and Painter, 1996; 639).131 This was a product of several 
factors including the historical legacy of place-community reproduction 
(contrasted with the greater degree of commodification of place in the 
US), the politics of the urban riots and, in some area, the direct 
culpability of state policies for localised economic decline. In contrast, 
the US government has consistently maintained a more ambivalent 
approach towards the distribution of population, meaning that such a 
‘legitmation requirement’, and the securing of the reproduction of 
individual communities, remains much weaker.  
 
Variegated capitalism – and the explanation of differential restructuring 
 
The Mode of Social Regulation (MSR) of Fordism was expressed 
differently in different countries because ‘[a]ctual regulatory influences 
develop in specific historical and geographical contexts’ (Goodwin and 
Painter, 1995; 641). Consequently there have also been variants of neo-
liberalism in the search for new forms of regulation after the collapse 
of Fordism (Peck, 2002).  
 
The process of capital accumulation in the US has for a long-time been 
based on inter-locality competition and the acceptance of 
geographically uneven development (Cox, 2004; 252). In addition to 
this, what Cox (2004; 253-254) terms the ‘auto-finance-oil nexus’, has 
been highly significant. US state policy has underwritten cheap petrol, 
subsidised home ownership, provided money for freeway development, 
                                                 
131 In more recent years spending on spatially targeted regeneration policy has become 
further prioritised, as New Labour has added a greater measure of ‘morality’ to 
Conservative policy, attempting the economic regeneration of marginalised 
communities and adopting series of ‘stealthy’ redistributive measures (through 
targeted means-tested benefits, particularly Tax Credits) to redirect some revenues 
(Jessop, undated; 4; also Peck, 2004; 215).  
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and designed planning policies to encourage local planning competition 
– based on opening up greenfield development. This has encouraged 
greater mobility of labour and capital, fostering a more geographically 
expansive form of capitalism. The UK has a much longer history of 
central planning in the national interest, for example the New Towns 
policy to reduce pressure on urban housing markets, or attempts to 
influence the geography of investment to guide it to high 
unemployment areas (ibid, 253). Planning policy has also historically 
been more restrictive, with greater emphasis on regenerating old, 
rather than producing new, communities. These important historical 
differences set the context for future developments.   
 
In the UK, as this research has demonstrated, the public welfare system 
and the historical-cultural context have played much greater roles in 
ensuring the (re)production of place and communities in old industrial 
areas. Even as welfare is reformed towards workfare, the commitment 
to such area reproduction remains. Some recent policies, such as the 
New Deal for Communities, even posit this as the appropriate scale for 
regeneration. In the US, the historical and policy framework has always 
been much less concerned about place-specific community collapse, 
with public welfare providing a bare minimum of support. The two 
systems therefore represent ‘quite contrasting forms’ of the politics of 
local and regional development (Cox, 2004; 247).  
 
National political-economic differences have therefore largely created 
the distinction between the place-based and mobility-dependent 
responses observed in the two study regions. The reproduction of 
coalfield communities in Northumberland was underwritten by publicly 
funded infrastructure development and the maintenance of finance for 
public goods such as schools, which served to protect the liveability, if 
not the employment rates, of the area. In addition, the payment of 
income maintenance benefits, primarily inactive benefits, meant that 
men displaced from the labour market would not have to look for work  
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elsewhere. Other elements of the national political-economic system 
were also significant, including housing policy, through the historical 
funding of social housing rather than private renting and the restriction 
of mortgage capital for those on limited incomes, which both served to 
limit mobility. Lastly, the availability of public healthcare removed the 
impetus to move in order to access medical care present in the US. The 
adjustment process in Northumberland was therefore based to a much 
greater extent on bringing resources to people in-place. In a sense this 
implied a greater sense of command and empowerment in 
Northumberland at the time. Over the longer-term, however, these 
relations have been increasingly imbued with a sense of dependency on 
public funding.   
 
In the Mon Valley much more emphasis was on people moving to ensure 
they could access resources. The time-limited nature of benefit 
payments, the absence of national healthcare, the downward spiral of 
local public finances for services and schools which vastly reduced the 
liveability of areas, the greater availability of mortgage capital and the 
reliance on housing vouchers, together produced a much greater 
dependence on labour mobility. These differences produced the initial 
labour market responses to industrial change, and set the areas on their 
subsequent development trajectories. 
 
These cases illustrate the significant degree of ‘capitalist variegation’ 
which exists, even between systems which may appear superficially 
similar (Peck and Theodore, 2007). Political-economic systems, 
stylistically described variously as Keynesian Atlantic Fordism, and 
subsequently as market liberal or neo-liberal models (Jessop, 2002; 64-
64; Esping-Anderson, 1990), actually generate quite different outcomes 
as a result of their distinct institutional and cultural histories. The key 
difference lies in the remaining support for the reproduction of place-
communities in the UK in ways not apparent in the US.  Over the long-
term, this has produced quite different path-dependent (or at least  
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path-contingent) development outcomes. While some similarities 
between the two systems may be increasing, at the local community 
level they have created very distinct outcomes, which cannot be 
simply, or quickly, overcome by (re)regulation.  
 
7.5 Key conceptual insights II: Deindustrialisation, past and present 
 
In this final section attention turns to the ways in which this research 
has, in several respects, added to our understanding of 
deindustrialisation. Four contentions have been presented. First, small 
town deindustrialisation remains understudied compared to that in 
larger urban areas, even though the outcomes in such places remain 
comparatively more damaging and intractable. Secondly, in relation to 
the coherence of industrial communities it has been argued that many 
such concepts are now outdated. Thirdly, deindustrialisation within 
localities is itself a deeply uneven process, differentially affecting 
individuals and communities. Finally, deindustrialisation is presented as 
a process that affects not just industrial workers who lose their jobs, 
but also future generations, as the impacts of, and adjustments to jobs 
losses, have established the localised conditions of continuing structural 
decline.  
 
The urban bias 
 
While the ‘urban’ has been the focus of a great deal research on 
economic restructuring, much industrial production in the past took 
place in small company towns, such as Ashington and Homestead. The 
story of long-term decline and change in these towns needs telling. 
They cannot simply revitalise themselves as high-tech cities or service 
centres. In many ways, for them their history looms much larger, 
straight-jacketing their future in a way that is less apparent in urban 
centres which may be much better at imagining a post-industrial future 
divorced from industry and history, if not necessarily at achieving it.    
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The notion of community  
 
This research questions the relevance of old notions of coherent 
industrial communities still incorporated in some parts of the literature. 
Profound local changes have clearly created very different communities 
to those of the past, as the bonds that once held them together have 
loosened or broken. Paradoxically, however, new forms of community 
have emerged in response to the conditions they face which, in some 
areas, are now significant barriers to change. Here Hudson’s (2001) 
explanation of community formation in industrial localities has been 
complemented by analysis of the process of de-bounding in 
deindustrialised communities over the past quarter century, developing 
a synthesis of community disintegration and partial reformulation. 
 
Population turnover and local migratory processes in both areas have 
formed increasingly complex and polarised geographies. These 
processes have produced communities which are fractured by wealth, 
opportunity and history. In the Mon Valley, the extent of this 
disintegration is more complete, palpable tensions having been created 
between established communities and incomers. There are also 
disturbing racial overtones to much of the local discourse about this.  
 
The geography of deindustrialisation 
 
Within the negative regional effects of industrial change, those 
localities and communities with older housing stock, lower employment 
levels and generally a less skilled workforce have tended to suffer most 
from closures. During the last 25 years such areas have seen the 
increasing concentration of extreme disadvantage. Selective migration 
driving housing market sorting processes, combined with public policy 
responses, has intensified and entrenched social and economic 
deprivation. In Northumberland these areas can be identified as the  
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older industrial areas of Ashington and Blyth, as well as some of the 
more peripheral coastal villages. In Mon Valley it is clearly the mill 
towns. For these areas the structural decline associated with 
deindustrialisation continues, and the different dimensions of social and 
economic deprivation in such places produce areas of stubborn 
worklessness with little hope of regeneration. This more localised 
geography of deindustrialisation has previously been much less 
acknowledged than the broader regional impacts.  
 
Deindustrialisation as a process 
 
Deindustrialisation has evidently not been the short-term fix that makes 
resource use more efficient (Tomaney et al, 1999; 402). A glance at the 
economic activity figures illustrates the fallacy of this argument. It has 
been a long-term process of adjustment, with severely negative results 
on some groups of people, and on specific locales. This study has 
followed the process, through job loss, initial adjustments, and their 
longer-term consequences. It has traced the causality of change through 
various stages, defining deindustrialisation as an evolving process rather 
than an event. At the local scale, it is not a short-term shock, but a 
series of adjustments, still unfolding 25 years on.  
 
Deindustrialisation has been presented as a process which has become 
more entrenched as its characteristics change over time, it is therefore 
as relevant now as it was during the 1980s, when it attracted so much 
attention in geographical and other writings. 
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Appendix I  
Public spending in the UK, US and EU 
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Public social expenditure: family as percentage of GDP
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
% of GDP UK
US
EU15
(Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database, 2004) 
  352 
Public social expenditure: unemployment as percentage of GDP
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Public social expenditure: sickness benefits as a percentage of GDP
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Public Social Expenditure: old age as percentage of GDP
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Public social expenditure: active labour market policies as percentage of GDP
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Appendix II 
 
Incapacity Benefit reforms and details of the Employment Support 
Allowance 
 
‘From 2008, and for new claimants only, a new Employment and 
Support Allowance (ESA) will replace Incapacity Benefit (IB) and Income 
Support paid on the grounds of incapacity. This will be structured as 
follows:  
•  When an individual applies for the ESA, they will enter an 
assessment phase lasting no more than 12 weeks (this includes 
the reformed PCA – as outlined in the previous chapter). After 8 
weeks, claimants will undertake a work-focused interview (WFI). 
During this assessment phase, they will receive a 'holding benefit' 
set at Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) rates.  
•  If the PCA confirms eligibility for the benefit, the claimant will 
move on to the main phase of the ESA. Most will receive the 
'Employment Support' component which will be conditional on 
drawing up a personal action plan focused on rehabilitation and 
work-related activity. The benefit rate will be higher than the 
holding benefit and set above the current long-term Incapacity 
Benefit rate. If claimants do not attend their WFI or prepare an 
action plan, the benefit will be reduced in a series of slices down 
to the holding benefit level.  
•  Claimants with the most severe illnesses and disabilities, as 
identified in the new PCA, will receive the 'Support' component 
of the ESA which will be paid at a higher level than the current 
equivalent rate. They will not be required to undertake work-
related activity, but will be able to engage in it on a voluntary 
basis.  
 
(Source:www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmworpen/
616/61607.htm) 
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Appendix III 
 
Full Northumberland coalfield commuting tables, 2001 
 
Main commuting flows from the rural coalfield of male full-time workers, 2001 
 
       
Destination ward  Out-Commute 
Expected 
error  As % of total 
Chevington (Castle Morpeth)  416  4  6.5 
Alnwick Castle (Alnwick)  384  4  6 
Amble East (Alnwick)  296  5  4.6 
Ellington (Castle Morpeth)  249  5  3.9 
Morpeth Central (Castle Morpeth)  239  5  3.7 
Ulgham (Castle Morpeth)  235  5  3.7 
Alnmouth and Lesbury (Alnwick)  201  5  3.1 
Amble Central (Alnwick)  198  5  3.1 
Alnwick Hotspur (Alnwick)  195  5  3 
Alnwick Clayport (Alnwick)  186  5  2.9 
Shilbottle (Alnwick)  181  5  2.8 
West City (Newcastle)  142  5  2.2 
Pegswood (Castle Morpeth)  138  6  2.2 
Warkworth (Alnwick)  138  5  2.2 
Amble West (Alnwick)  133  5  2.1 
Hebron (Castle Morpeth)  129  5  1.7 
Longhoughton (Alnwick)  119  5  1.9 
Cramlington West (Blyth)  111  5  1.7 
Morpeth South (Castle Morpeth)  97  5  1.5 
Newbiggin East (Wansbeck)  90  5  1.4 
Central (Wansbeck)  85  5  1.3 
Moorside (Newcastle)  75  5  1.2 
Teams   70  5  1.1 
Dene (Newcastle)  66  5  1 
Haydon (Wansbeck)  65  5  1 
(Source: CIDS) 
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Main commuting flows from the urban coalfield of male full-time workers, 2001 
   
Destination ward  Out-Commute 
Expected 
error  As % of total 
Cramlington West (Blyth)  1311  5  6.1 
Morpeth Central (Castle Morpeth)  836  6  3.9 
Sleekburn (Wansbeck)  800  7  3.7 
Kitty Brewster (Blyth)  797  6  3.7 
Newbiggin East (Wansbeck)  592  7  2.7 
West City (Newcastle)  591  6  2.7 
Cowpen (Blyth)  580  7  2.7 
Haydon (Wansbeck)  538  7  2.5 
Stakeford (Wansbeck)  533  7  2.5 
Central (Wansbeck)  531  7  2.5 
College (Wansbeck)  495  7  2.3 
Wensleydale (Blyth)  493  7  2.3 
Croft (Blyth)  490  7  2.3 
Hebron (Castle Morpeth)  440  7  2 
Bothal (Wansbeck)  406  7  1.9 
Morpeth South (Castle Morpeth)  386  7  1.8 
Dene (Newcastle)  358  7  1.7 
Collingwood (North Tyneside)  343  7  1.6 
Bedlington Central (Wansbeck)  340  8  1.6 
Moorside (Newcastle)  310  7  1.4 
Ellington (Castle Morpeth)  299  8  1.4 
Seaton (Wansbeck)  294  8  1.4 
Camperdown (North Tyneside)  270  8  1.2 
Teams  263  7  1.2 
Sandyford (Newcastle)  250  7  1.2 
Grange (Newcastle)  233  8  1.1 
Holystone (North Tyneside)  231  8  1.1 
Ponteland North (Castle Morpeth)  226  8  1 
Cramlington Village (Blyth)  215  8  1 
(Source: CIDS)  
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Main commuting flows from the rural coalfield of female full-time workers, 2001 
       
Destination ward  Out-Commute 
Expected 
error  As % of total 
Alnwick Castle (Alnwick)  237  4  7 
Morpeth Central (Castle Morpeth)  162  4  4.8 
Amble East (Alnwick)  158  4  4.7 
Alnwick Hotspur (Alnwick)  153  4  4.5 
Chevington (Castle Morpeth)  152  4  4.5 
Hebron (Castle Morpeth)  141  4  4.2 
Alnwick Clayport (Alnwick)  131  4  3.9 
Amble Central (Alnwick)  128  4  3.8 
Central (Wansbeck)  116  4  3.4 
Morpeth South (Castle Morpeth)  113  4  3.4 
Moorside (Newcastle)  99  4  2.9 
Morpeth North (Castle Morpeth)  94  4  2.8 
West City (Newcastle)  90  4  2.7 
Haydon (Wansbeck)  77  5  2.3 
Seaton (Wansbeck)  77  4  2.3 
Ulgham (Castle Morpeth)  68  5  2 
Alnmouth and Lesbury (Alnwick)  68  5  2 
Amble West (Alnwick)  62  5  1.8 
Shilbottle (Alnwick)  61  5  1.8 
Warkworth (Alnwick)  61  5  1.8 
Dene (Newcastle)  57  5  1.7 
Grange (Newcastle)  49  5  1.5 
Pegswood (Castle Morpeth)  46  5  1.4 
Ellington (Castle Morpeth)  41  5  1.2 
Longhoughton (Alnwick)  40  5  1.2 
College (Wansbeck)  33  5  1 
Stannington (Castle Morpeth)  33  5  1 
(Source: CIDS) 
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Main commuting flows from the urban coalfield of female full-time workers, 2001 
 
Destination ward  Out-Commute 
Expected 
error  As % of total 
Central (Wansbeck)  702  5  5.8 
Kitty Brewster (Blyth)  583  5  4.9 
Haydon (Wansbeck)  562  6  4.7 
Dene (Newcastle)  472  5  3.9 
Croft (Blyth)  465  6  3.9 
West City (Newcastle)  428  5  3.6 
Morpeth Central (Castle Morpeth)  427  6  3.6 
Seaton (Wansbeck)  405  6  3.4 
Morpeth South (Castle Morpeth)  390  5  3.2 
Sleekburn (Wansbeck)  383  6  3.2 
Moorside (Newcastle)  379  5  3.2 
Hebron (Castle Morpeth)  353  6  2.9 
Bedlington Central (Wansbeck)  335  6  2.8 
Wensleydale (Blyth)  294  6  2.4 
Cramlington West (Blyth)  286  6  2.4 
Cramlington Village (Blyth)  259  6  2.2 
Morpeth North (Castle Morpeth)  249  6  2.1 
College (Wansbeck)  236  6  2 
Grange (Newcastle)  214  7  1.8 
Cowpen (Blyth)  197  7  1.6 
Bothal (Wansbeck)  165  7  1.4 
Hirst (Wansbeck)  160  7  1.3 
Collingwood (North Tyneside)  153  7  1.3 
Benton (North Tyneside)  137  7  1.1 
Newbiggin East (Wansbeck)  127  7  1.1 
Ponteland North (Castle Morpeth)  121  7  1 
Sandyford (Newcastle)  119  7  1 
Plessey (Blyth)  115  7  1 
(Source: CIDS) 
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Appendix IV 
 
Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2004: Deprivation rankings for the 
coalfield by local authority area 
 
The Indices of Deprivation are formed using 7 domains. These domains 
and their relative weighting are given below: 
•  Income deprivation (22.5%) 
•  Employment deprivation (22.5%) 
•  Health, deprivation and disability (13.5%) 
•  Education, skills and training (13.5%) 
•  Barriers to housing and services (9.3%) 
•  Crime (9.3%) 
•  Living environment deprivation (9.3%) 
(ODPM, 2004) 
 
 
Northumberland coalfield (90 SOAs) 
 
Variable  Coalfield 
High 
(Best) 
Coalfield 
Low 
(Worst) 
Number in 
Worst 5% 
SOAs 
England 
Number in 
Worst 10% 
SOAs 
England 
Number in 
Worst 20% 
SOAs 
England 
IMD Percentile of 
all SOAs in England 
93.4  1.2  5  13  30 
Income Percentile 
of all SOAs in 
England 
97.5  1.5  4  10  28 
Employment 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
77.5  0.3  16  33  48 
Health and 
Deprivation 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
82.5  0.7  13  29  49 
Education, skills 
and training 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
98.2  1.4  8  18  38 
Barriers to housing 
and services 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
99.8  18.0  0  0  2 
Crime and Disorder 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
99.9  2.6  1  6  15 
Living Environment 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
100.0  34.6  0  0  0 
 
 
 
 
  
  362 
Alnwick coalfield area (10 SOAs) 
 
Variable  Alnwick 
coalfield 
High (Best) 
Alnwick 
coalfield 
Low 
(Worst) 
Number in 
Worst 5% 
SOAs 
England 
Number in 
Worst 10% 
SOAs 
England 
Number in 
Worst 20% 
SOAs 
England 
IMD Percentile of 
all SOAs in England 
81.5  23.2  0  0  1 
Income Percentile 
of all SOAs in 
England 
76.8  9.6  0  1  2 
Employment 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
66.4  9.2  0  1  2 
Health and 
Deprivation 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
82.5  16.0  0  0  1 
Education, skills 
and training 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
82.5  17.3  0  0  2 
Barriers to housing 
and services 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
99.8  19.8  0  0  1 
Crime and 
Disorder 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
98.1  48.8  0  0  0 
Living Environment 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
98.0  45.2  0  0  0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  363 
Blyth coalfield area (22 SOAs) 
 
Variable  Blyth 
coalfield 
High 
(Best) 
Blyth 
coalfield 
Low 
(Worst) 
Number in 
Worst 5% 
SOAs 
England 
Number in 
Worst 10% 
SOAs 
England 
Number in 
Worst 20% 
SOAs 
England 
IMD Percentile of 
all SOAs in England 
77.5  2.0  2  6  11 
Income Percentile 
of all SOAs in 
England 
95.4  2.6  2  4  10 
Employment 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
64.1  0.3  8  11  15 
Health and 
Deprivation 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
54.3  1.1  4  9  14 
Education, skills 
and training 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
68.1  1.4  6  8  12 
Barriers to housing 
and services 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
99.2  20.9  0  0  0 
Crime and Disorder 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
99.9  6.3  0  2  8 
Living Environment 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
100.0  34.6  0  0  0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  364 
Castle Morpeth coalfield area (17 SOAs) 
 
Variable  Castle 
Morpeth 
coalfield 
High (Best) 
Castle 
Morpeth 
coalfield 
Low 
(Worst) 
Number in 
Worst 5% 
SOAs 
England 
Number in 
Worst 10% 
SOAs 
England 
Number in 
Worst 20% 
SOAs 
England 
IMD Percentile of 
all SOAs in 
England 
93.4  11.8  0  0  2 
Income Percentile 
of all SOAs in 
England 
97.5  14.3  0  0  5 
Employment 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
75.8  4.0  1  4  7 
Health and 
Deprivation 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
74.0  5.5  0  1  4 
Education, skills 
and training 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
98.3  8.1  0  1  5 
Barriers to 
housing and 
services 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
99.2  22.8  0  0  0 
Crime and 
Disorder 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
98.0  24.6  0  0  0 
Living 
Environment 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
100.0  65.5  0  0  0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  365 
 
Wansbeck coalfield area (41 SOAs) 
 
Variable  Wansbeck 
coalfield 
High (Best) 
Wansbeck 
coalfield 
Low (Worst) 
Number in 
Worst 5% 
SOAs 
England 
Number in 
Worst 10% 
SOAs 
England 
Number in 
Worst 20% 
SOAs 
England 
IMD Percentile of 
all SOAs in 
England 
87.1  1.2  3  7  16 
Income Percentile 
of all SOAs in 
England 
97.1  1.5  2  5  11 
Employment 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
77.5  0.7  7  17  24 
Health and 
Deprivation 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
47.3  0.7  9  19  30 
Education, skills 
and training 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
82.4  3.3  2  9  19 
Barriers to 
housing and 
services 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
97.9  18.0  0  0  1 
Crime and 
Disorder 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
97.8  2.6  1  4  7 
Living 
Environment 
Percentile of all 
SOAs in England 
99.7  48.3  0  0  0 
 
 